RATIONAL POLITICIANS AND RATIONAL BUREAUCRATS IN WASHINGTON AND WHITEHALL

William Niskanen's theory of Bureaucracy and Representative Government predicts that the interaction of rational vote-maximizing politicians and rational budget-maximizing bureaucrats will lead to an oversupply of bureaucratic goods and services. The demand, supply and motivational components of this model are all shown to be flawed; and the oversupply conclusion therefore fails to follow. A revised model constructed from the elements that can be salvaged from this critique suggests that rational mission-committed politicians and bureaucrats join in a policy-making oligopoly, run internally on the basis of trust and externally on the manipulation of information. This leads to a skewing (rather than a simple oversupply) of bureaucratic goods and services. Some evidence suggests that this model fits British as well as American policy-making.     

State legislation on smoking and health: A comparison of two policies

The two principal smoking-related state legislative activities stand in sharp contrast to one another. Cigarette excise taxation diffused among the states well before the connection between smoking and illness became a public issue, yet more recent tax increases appear to reflect a response to the national anti-smoking campaign. The growing disparity in cigarette prices between tobacco and other states has created a lucrative market in bootlegged cigarettes and has thereby brought new taxation to a virtual standstill for six years. Laws restricting smoking in public places represent a phenomenon of the 1970's clearly bearing the imprint of the anti-smoking campaign. From 1972 through 1978, the number of states with such laws in effect grew from 5 to 36, and the restrictiveness of the laws also increased. The dramatic correlation between diffusion of the laws and decreases in cigarette consumption rates seems best interpreted as each of these reflecting changes in social attitudes toward smoking.     

Deterrence and the tipping effect

Previous research has focused on certaintyznty of punishment as one. factor. upon which any dzterrent effect of punishment might be contingent and Auggested that it must reach a critical tipping level before the deterrent effect becomes evident. Using data on index crimes and clearance. rates for. Virginia cities and counties, bupport was found for both the. deterrent effect and the exlstenee of a tipping level. Attention was directed towand a more precise specification of the form of the tipping effect, suggesting that there is a single critical tipping level and that it occurs at a relatively low level of certainty of punihment.     

Procedural fairness and work group responses to performance evaluation systems

In a variety of settings, procedures that permit predecision input by those affected by the decision in question have been found to have positive effects on fairness judgments, independent of the favorability of the decision. Two major models of the psychology of procedural justice make contrary predictions about whether repeated negative outcomes attenuate such input effects. If such attenuation occurs, it would lessen the applicability of procedural justice findings to some real-world settings, such as organizations, where procedures often provide repeated negative outcomes. The present laboratory investigation examined the procedural and distributive fairness justments produced by high- and low-input performance evaluation procedures under conditions of repeated negative outcomes. Thirty-five three-person groups of male undergraduates participated in a three-round competition. Groups either were or were not allowed to specify the relative weights to be given to two criteria used in evaluating their performance. All groups received negative outcomes on each of the three rounds. A second experimental factor varied whether or not the group learned after losing the second round that it could not possibly win the third and final round of the competition. Measures of procedural and distributive fairness showed that the high-input procedure led to judgments of greater procedural and distributive fairness across all three rounds. The input-based enhancement of fairness occurred regardless of whether reward was possible. The implications of these findings for theories of procedural justice and for applications of procedural justice to organizational settings are discussed.