Beyond ‘Constitutionalism Beyond the State’

For contemporary constitutional theory, the key challenge posed by globalization undermines the traditional link between constitutionalism and the state: in response to multi‐level governance, theories of constitutionalism beyond the state have been advanced. This focus on levels obscures more fundamental epistemological questions raised by globalization about the nature of constitutionalism itself. Critical analysis of three leading schools of constitutionalism beyond the state – supranational, societal, and new constitutionalism – highlights their shared assumptions with state‐based thought regarding the separation between economics and politics, and the necessarily hegemonic character of constitutionalism. However, globalization intensifies critique of these assumptions, and questions their translation to the transnational context. An alternative scholarly fault line to the state/non‐state cleavage emerges between working within and transcending the politics of constitutional knowledge produced during the nation‐state era. A broader globalization perspective reveals the extent to which such processes of constitutional rethinking are under way through developments in the global South.     

Understanding “corruption” in regulatory agencies: The case of food inspection in Saudi Arabia

Corruption is a relatively neglected topic in studies of regulatory agencies. The label is applied to a wide range of deviations from behavioral standards ultimately derived from Weber's account of the ideals of Prussian bureaucracy. This paper draws on a study of the work of Saudi Food Inspectors to argue that it is unhelpful to reduce a complex phenomenon to simple allegations of malpractice that can be managed by disciplinary sanctions. Our data show that irregular behavior by street‐level agents may be deeply embedded in the expectations that members of a society have of one another. It is less a matter of personal gain than of maintaining one's recognition as a fellow citizen. Such behavior is not easily changed through sanctions directed at individual inspectors. Our study does not exclude the possibility that irregular behavior can be motivated by personal gain, and properly managed by criminal or similar penalties. However, it does propose that research should be more sensitive to the contexts within which irregular behavior occurs rather than treating “corruption” as a uniform and homogenous phenomenon.