PAY DETERMINATION IN THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE SINCE 1979

This article traces the development of pay determination in the British civil service over the last decade. It argues that after a period of instability, the pay system established at the end of the 1980s embraced rather than reconciled two competing traditions of pay determination; one based upon the importance of traditional compatibility criteria and the other stressing flexibility to meet managerial needs. As a consequence of the difficulties which emerged under these new arrangements, neither the unions nor the government have fully achieved their pay objectives. While the creation of executive agencies may herald a more fundamental change in pay determination based upon devolved structures and systems, the nature and extent of this change still depends upon resolution of the tension between competing central government concerns to retain financial control and allow agencies to adapt to meet local needs and circumstances.     

Policing: Continuity,Consensus and Controversy The Political Quarterly Lecture 2010

While British policing has an unparalleled worldwide reputation for excellence, its system of governance has not been formally examined for almost fifty years. Known as the tripartite system, giving overlapping but compatible powers and duties to the Home Secretary, to local Police Authorities and to Chief Officers of Police, it is now long overdue for reconsideration and adjustment. More than one political party is suggesting significant reform but only of individual parts of the system. Given other issues concerning the police, particularly the number of United Kingdom forces and the fixation with the number of police officers as an indication of political success, there is now an urgent need for agreement that policing in Britain should have a holistic and cross‐party re‐examination, possibly but not necessarily in the form of a Royal Commission.     

Representation as a median mandate: Taking cross‐national differences seriously

The extent and ways in which popular preferences influence government policy are absolutely central to our understanding of modern democracy. Paul Warwick's discussion of these in the European Journal of Political Research in 2010 puts itself at the heart of the debate with its critique of the median mandate theory of McDonald and Budge, proposing an alternative ‘bilateralist’ concept of representation. This article questions whether this concept has much to add to our theoretical understanding of representational processes. However, Warwick's further conceptual points deserve serious consideration. These concern the time horizons within which representative processes work, and the status of the median position given multi‐motivated voting. At the evidential level, Warwick argues that survey‐based measures of voter and party left–right positions fail to produce the correspondence between median and government policy positions that median mandate theory would have us expect. However, survey‐based measures of median voter and party placements obscure important cross‐national variation. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems ( CSES 2007 ), as Warwick does, this article shows that survey respondents norm their own and their country's party positions to their national context. The consequence is to make the political centre in all nations appear similar. Allowing for the relevant cross‐national differences brings the relationship between the median voter and government position back in line with expectations.     

Europeans outside the EU: Telecommunications and Electricity Reform in Norway and Switzerland

Norway and Switzerland are two western Europe states that are not members of the European Union (EU), and they are among a number of small and economically open states in which reform of economic sectors is seen to be incremental and reactive. This article poses two questions about the reform of telecommunications and electricity in the two countries. First, what impact has nonmembership of the EU had on the reforms? Second, have their small and open economies and policymaking systems—conceptualized as “social corporatism” in Norway and “liberal corporatism” in Switzerland—had a decisive impact? Some influence from the EU is evident, particularly in telecommunications, but parallels with EU states indicate that nonmembership of the EU, though influential, is not decisive. Although national characteristics matter, social and liberal forms of corporatism are shown to have limited utility. The “actor‐centered institutionalism” approach, which allows a more nuanced analysis of actors and national institutions, is better at explaining the reforms.