Are Charitable Giving and Religious Attendance Complements or Substitutes? The Role of Measurement Error

Government policies sometimes cause unintended consequences for other potentially desirable behaviors. One such policy is the charitable tax deduction, which encourages charitable giving by allowing individuals to deduct giving from taxable income. Whether charitable giving and other desirable behaviors are complements or substitutes affect the welfare benefit of the deduction—complements increase the benefit, while substitutes decrease the benefit. This paper focuses on the effect of the deduction on one behavior in particular: religious attendance. Using data from the Independent Sector Survey of Giving and Volunteering, I estimate a tax price elasticity for religious attendance of ?0.4, which implies that charitable giving and religious attendance are complements. I resolve the difference between my estimate and a recent estimate by W. S. Gruber (2004) that implies charitable giving and religious attendance are substitutes. While Gruber imputes itemization status, an important factor in calculating tax incentives, I use survey‐reported itemization status. This imputation creates a large amount of non‐classical measurement error. I show that the measurement error is responsible for the disparate results: If I also impute itemization status, I obtain similar results as Gruber.     

Patterns of Middle School Adjustment and Ninth Grade Adaptation of Rural African American Youth: Grades and Substance Use

The transition to high school has been identified as a potentially difficult time in adolescents’ lives. Reductions in both academic and social functioning often accompany this transition. While these effects have been documented in urban youth, the move to high school has not been extensively studied in rural minority youth. Toward that end, the academic grades and substance use in ninth grade of 447 (184 male and 263 female) African-American adolescents from two rural counties in a state in the deep South were examined in relation to configurations of adaptation from sixth through eighth grade. Results indicate that individual with consistently positive patterns across middle school had higher grades and lower rates of substance use compared to individuals with persistent difficulties or those that transitioned to problem behavior. Many individuals who improved in their patterns of adaptation had relatively high grades, but also rather high rates of substance use in the ninth grade. David B. Estell is an assistant professor of educational psychology at Indiana University Bloomington. He received his PhD in Developmental Psychology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His major research interests include peer relations and the development of aggression. Thomas W. Farmer is an associate professor of education at Pennsylvania State University and director of the National Research Center on Rural Education Support. He received his PhD in Special Education from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His major research interests include peer relations and the development of aggression in students with and without special needs. Matthew J. Irvin is a research scientist at the Center for Developmental Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He received his PhD in Educational Psychology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His major research interests include resilience and student engagement. Jana H. Thompson is a research associate at the Center for Developmental Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her research interests include peer social relations and developmental transitions into early adolescence. Bryan C. Hutchins is a research assistant at the Center for Developmental Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is also a graduate student in the Educational Psychology, Measurement, and Evaluation Program at UNC. His research interests include child and adolescent social development and school based emotional and behavioral interventions and prevention programs. Erin M. McDonough is currently a doctoral candidate in School Psychology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She received her Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology from Emory University. As a research assistant at the Center for Developmental Science, she has been able to explore her interests in student achievement as well as rural education. Another major research interest of hers is school-based mental health.     

Electoral Competition, Participation, and Government Responsiveness in Mexico

In this article I test two competing visions about how democracy produces responsive government. Electoral theories of democracy posit that elected governments are responsive to public demands because citizens are able to sanction bad politicians and select good ones. Participatory theories attribute responsiveness to a citizenry's ability to articulate demands and pressure government through a wider range of political action. I test hypotheses derived from these two approaches, using an original dataset that combines electoral, socioeconomic, and public-financial indicators for Mexico's 2,400 municipalities, from 1989 to 2000. The data show that electoral competition has no effect on municipal government performance. But the results are consistent with the hypothesis that nonelectoral participation causes improved performance. Thus, I suggest that the quality of municipal government in Mexico depends on an engaged citizenry and cooperation between political leaders and their constituents, rather than the threat of electoral punishment. I recommend that scholars broaden the study of government responsiveness to account for participatory strategies of political influence and critically assess the claims of those who would promote elections as a cure-all for poor democratic performance.     

Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789–2000

Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits.     

General interest and redistribution with self-interested voters: Social contract revisited

I provide a rational solution to the lasting paradox that citizens be more concerned with “general interest” than most economic agents. I show who that, in the face of fundamental political uncertainty, the social contract, as conceptualized by Jean-Jacques Rousseau two centuries ago, provides to self-interested voters an effective mechanism of self-insurance that limits amount of involuntary transfers. My positive theory of voter behavior and general interest has but a formal resemblance with the normative theory of welfare judgments and social justice. Even when the efficiency aspects of redistribution are not considered, there is no way in which the final distribution of incomes could be equal if the initial distribution of incomes were unequal! The role of political parties in this model is to manipulate the distribution of political chances in order to maximize their probability of winning elections. I show for instance that “social instability” and progressive redistribution characterize the equilibrium outcome of a two-class democracy in which the lower class forms a majority.