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771.
Keith E. Schnakenberg 《Public Choice》2017,173(1-2):43-59
I analyze a model of information transmission in collective choice environments. An Expert possesses private information about the consequences of passing an exogenous proposal and engages in cheap talk to persuade voters to pass or reject the proposal. The Expert may successfully persuade the voters to take her preferred action even when all or most voters would receive a better ex ante payoff with no information transmission. I consider several remedies that an institutional designer may consider in order to avoid this problem while allowing information transmission that benefits the voters. I evaluate the effects of (1) limiting Expert communication to binary endorsements, (2) encouraging competition between Experts, and (3) restricting the agenda in order to consider only one dimension at a time. None of these proposals completely eliminate negative persuasion outcomes, but limiting the Expert to binary endorsements avoids the worst manipulation while preserving beneficial information transmission. 相似文献
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Vincent Ekow Arkorful Benjamin Kweku Lugu Susana Mamley Charway Vincent Ansah Arkorful 《Journal of Public Affairs (14723891)》2023,23(1):e2825
The pandemic outbreak has dealt consequences on global engagements and structures. With the ongoing search for pandemic-mitigating measures and the excesses (notably corruption) erupted in its wake, concerns have been raised about the decline in public trust, transparency and satisfaction – particularly in Ghana. This situation has spurred multilevel governance discussions regarding pandemic management. Ensuingly characterising policy makers' propositions in this regard is the civil society's salience as a control valve to governance deficits like corruption. Therefore, transcending the anecdotal claims on civil society's efficacy, this study takes a state-society perspective to probe its relevance in fostering trust, transparency and satisfaction, relative to corruption-stricken pandemic governance. The current study engages the general systems theory as a conceptual lens. The structural equation modelling technique was used in analysing data (n = 519) gathered through the questionnaire survey approach. Though results of data analysis affirmed the negative effects of corruption on trust, transparency and satisfaction, the civil society received affirmation as an enhancer of trust, transparency and satisfaction. In view of these study findings, implications and future research suggestions are delimited. 相似文献