Teaching through the use of games and simulations

This paper describes the use of games and simulations in teaching criminal justice students and those in the related social sciences. The authors have utilized a two-week interim session (following the spring semester) to use this approach in illustrating a wide variety of concepts such as political power, conflict, cooperation and negotiation as applied to criminal justice and other governmental agencies. Two types of teaching tools--small group board games and large group simulations--have been utilized. While the interim class sessions run two and one-half hours each, many of the games and simulations are adaptable to shorter time periods or multiple class periods and, thus, are useful teaching devices for regular school terms¹.     

Are Procedural Rights Derivative Substantive Rights?

Law and Philosophy -     

Bias in OMB's economic forecasts and budget proposals

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) annually submits the President's budget for the U.S. government to the Congress. The economic forecasts and revenue and outlay proposals contained in the budget have been criticized as biased, especially during the 1980s. Tests for bias in one year ahead proposals for the 1963–89 period show no bias in economic forecasts and revenue estimates, but substantial bias in outlay proposals. Most outlay proposals are consistently less than actual outcomes, accounting for underprediction of the Federal deficit. OMB outlay proposals appear to be influenced by politics. Republican administrations show more significant proposal biases, with defense proposals higher and domestic outlay proposals lower than outcomes. The Office of Management and Budget consistently understates the deficits by resorting to the most optimistic economic assumptions it can credibly — and now sometimes even incredibly — employ. — Senator James SasserWall Street Journal, 25 January 1990     

Tansnationals and foreign trade: Evidence from Brazil

A recursive model of exports and imports of manufactures, in which imports depend in part on exports, is estimated using data for a cross‐section of 17,053 industrial firms. In this sample, 652 firms are foreign‐owned. Explanatory variables include firm size, skill intensity, advertising and other variables in addition to foreign ownership. Foreign ownership has a large, independent effect on both export performance and import propensities, but foreign ownership in itself explains little of the relatively low export/import ratios registered by affiliates of transnationals.