The Role of Overall Organizational Justice Perceptions Within the Four-Dimensional Framework

Given the recent interest in a global model of organizational justice, the purpose of the present paper is to examine the role of overall justice within Colquitt’s (J Appl Psychol 86:386–400, 2001) four-dimensional framework. In two studies (using a student and professional sample), confirmatory factor analysis results supported a five-factor model of justice. Analyses demonstrated that overall justice is likely an independent construct, can be predicted from the facet measures of justice, and is not a second-order hierarchical construct. In both studies, structural equation modeling indicated that overall justice partially mediated the relationship between the four dimensions of justice and both global and specific outcomes examined by Colquitt (2001) and Ambrose and Schminke (J Appl Psychol 94:491–500, 2009), respectively. Taken together, this research demonstrates that there is a need for both overall justice and the four justice dimensions in comprehensive models of organizational justice. Implications for research and practice are discussed.     

Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments

Does partisan conflict damage citizens’ perceptions of Congress? If so, why has polarization increased in Congress since the 1970s? To address these questions, we unpack the “electoral connection” by exploring the mass public's attitudes toward partisan conflict via two survey experiments in which we manipulated characteristics of members and Congress. We find that party conflict reduces confidence in Congress among citizens across the partisan spectrum. However, there exists heterogeneity by strength of party identification with respect to evaluations of members. Independents and weak partisans are more supportive of members who espouse a bipartisan image, whereas strong partisans are less supportive. People with strong attachments to a political party disavow conflict in the aggregate but approve of individual members behaving in a partisan manner. This pattern helps us understand why members in safely partisan districts engage in partisan conflict even though partisanship damages the collective reputation of the institution.     

Incrementalism in Appropriations: Small Aggregation,Big Changes

U.S. federal budget dynamics, as a major attribute of the legislative and bureaucratic decision‐making processes, increasingly calls into question the scholarly focus on incrementalism. What constitutes a “small” change is largely unspecified in previous research that has also been unable to assess incrementalism across multiple levels of aggregation. Using a unique budgetary database, this article analyzes whether budgetary changes are in fact “small” at different levels of aggregation. Surprisingly, a low proportion of changes are small by any logical standard. During most years, more than one‐fifth of budgetary changes are greater than 50 percent, and nearly half are more than 10 percent. The level of aggregation is also important for assessing whether political variables influence incrementalism. A salient finding: change in party control reflects greater influence within micro‐level budget decisions, while divided government manifests more impact on aggregate‐level budget decisions.