Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control

The paper analyzes the coalition formation process in a global emission game with asymmetric countries where the number of signatories, the abatement target and the policy instrument are chosen simultaneously. Exemplarily, a uniform emission reduction quota and an effluent charge are considered. Stability is analyzed in a supergame framework by applying the concept of coalition-proofness. The analysis also considers the impact of impatient agents, restricted and simple punishment profiles. Two main results may be mentioned: First, paradoxically, IEAs achieve only little (if signed at all) if the externality problem is distinct. Second, our model helps to explain the frequent appearance of emission quotas in international pollution control despite the recommendations by economists to use market-based instruments like effluent charges.     

The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements

We empirically test the role of membership rules and voting schemes for climate change coalitions with the STAbility of COalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures long-run effects of greenhouse gas accumulation. We apply three stability concepts that capture the notion of open membership and exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting. We show that exclusive membership leads to superior outcomes than open membership and that unanimity voting is preferable to majority voting in welfare and environmental terms. Our results suggest restricting membership in future international environmental agreements and they provide a rationale for unanimity voting as applied in many international organizations.     

Informelle transgouvernementale Koordinationsnetzwerke der Ministerialbürokratie der EU-Mitgliedstaaten bei einer Regierungskonferenz

We investigate the informal bilateral transgovernmental relations between equivalent ministries of EU member states during the preparation of the Intergovernmental Conference 1996. Starting point of this analysis is the hypothesis of a growing importance of transnational and transgovernmental relations as a cause and a result of European integration. Whereas these proclaimed tendencies have been extensively researched with regard to economic interdependencies and transnational relations of societal actors, networks of the administrative and bureaucratic elites have been rather neglected. Applying diverse concepts of network analysis, we identify the hitherto latent informal network structures of the governments. The overall configuration can be described as a mixture of a centre-periphery structure and cohesive blocks. The gradual center-periphery structure consists of a “triumvirate” of the powerful member states (Germany — France — Great Britain) and smaller states, and is characterized by a clear north-south dimension. The costs of informal coordination are mainly borne by the large member states as well as by “brokers” (Austria, BeNeLux, Finland, Sweden).     

The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution

Recent research has tried to uncover the political space in which the Council of Ministers of the European Union decides. Rather than the left-right conflict or a cleavage between governments with national and supranational attitudes, this article shows that a redistributive dimension, decisively shapes the interactions in this most important legislative body of the European Union. In contrast to extant studies, we employ ex ante rather than ex post preference data and rely on correspondence analysis as a means to identify the underlying dimensions of contestation. The article concludes with an empirical investigation of how enlargement will affect the emerging political space within the European Union. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the gulf between net-contributors and net-receivers will further deepen.     

Ideological Typologies of Contemporary British Conservatism

Prior to the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, traditional academic assumptions about the British Conservative party focused on its emphasis on party unity, the centrality of loyalty to the party, and its ideological pragmatism in the pursuit of power. The leadership of her successor, John Major, was undermined by disunity, disloyalty and ideological conflict, which contributed to the Tory party's removal from power. The ideological implosion of one the most disciplined and electorally successful parties in Western Europe, has stimulated considerable academic appraisal. This article considers the design and utilisation of the ideological typologies of contemporary British conservatism that have been used by academics to help explain the nature of this ideological conflict. By analysing these developments in typological design, we can enhance our understanding of the ideological realignment of contemporary British conservatism in the immediate post-Thatcherite era.     

A Political Economy Forecast for the 2005 British General Election

Recently, we proposed an original statistical model for forecasting general elections in the United Kingdom, based on the observation of a few key indicators of the political and economic system. That vote function model was tested against the results of the 2001 general election. Here we evaluate the results of that test, and offer an appropriately revised model for the forecasting of the upcoming 2005 general election. According to our forecast, a Labour victory appears the most likely outcome.