The Changing Structure of Opportunity: Recruitment and Careers in Large Law Firms

Growth and bureaucratization have begun to transform patterns of recruitment and career development in large law firms. Based on a case study of four large Chicago firms, this article examines these changes and their implications. The findings indicate that the social composition of large firms has become substantially more heterogeneous with respect to the status of law school attended, gender, and ethnoreligious background. However, data on lawyers' careers suggest that associates entering firms today face an increasingly bureaucratic organizational context marked by higher levels of turnover, earlier and more intensive specialization, decreased levels of client responsibility, and more frequent assignment to large-scale litigation. The article also addresses the dynamics of individual choice over type of work performed in firms. Lawyers initially working in litigation fields are far more likely to change fields of practice than are lawyers who begin in office practice fields, reflecting the increased tendency for firms to assign new associates to litigation as well as the alienating propensity of large-firm litigation for many associates. Paradoxically, a greater proportion of lawyers in traditionally organized, general service firms than in bureaucratically organized, specialty firms report that their choice of work was dictated by the firm. Also, somewhat surprisingly, the frequency with which firms explicitly direct lawyers into particular fields has not increased from earlier periods. The article concludes that these anomalies result from the fact that firms control the career choices of lawyers, and always have, but that the way such control is exercised varies across firms and historical periods.     

Private Representation in Washington: Surveying the Structure of Influence

Despite the significance of interest representation to theories of law and politics, the social organization of interest representation has not received systematic empirical analysis. Based on interviews with 776 individuals engaged in the representation of private interests concerning national policies on agriculture, energy, health, and labor, this article reports some findings concerning the social and political characteristics of representatives, the nature of their work and their relationships with client organizations. Three models of the social organization of interest representation are developed and examined: a model based on substantive expertise, an institutional targets model, and a client-based model. The findings indicate that representation is predominately organized around client interests Although lawyers constitute a significant and distinctive group among representatives, they are neither as numerous nor as active in policy making as is commonly assumed. The analysis suggests that representatives are not likely to exercise influence in the policy-making process that is autonomous from client organizations.     

A functional approach to sudden unexplained infant deaths

There is a great deal of variation in the methods and wording used by medical examiners in the medicolegal investigation and certification of infant deaths. This paper was created by the NAME Ad Hoc Committee on Sudden Unexplained Infant Death to address several specific issues, namely: * To establish a functional approach to the investigation of sudden unexplained infant deaths; * To outline a "bare minimum" set of recommendations to define the scope of investigation required; * To recommend methods and wording to be used when certifying infant deaths; * To develop a list of potential stressors or possible external causes of death that should be identified and reported on the death certificate and/or within a medical examiner/coroner office database. This paper was electronically posted for NAME member review and comment for a period of 30 days. The paper was further revised based on member comments and then submitted to the NAME board of directors in the fall of 2005 prior to the annual meeting. This text of this paper was officially approved and endorsed by the NAME board of directors on October 14, 2005, at the annual meeting in Los Angeles, CA.     

Review Article Note bibliographique

A Review of the Working Papers on Citizen Involvement Prepared for the Committee on Government Productivity of the Ontario Government (COGP) Citizen Involvement By the STAFF OF THE COGP, 1972. Pp. 50 A Public Communications System. By LLOYD AXWORTHY, 1971. Pp. 60 Gone Today and Here Tomorrow. By CATHERINE STARRS and GAIL STEWART, 1971. Pp. 89 Public Bureaucracy and the Possibility of Citizen Involvement in the Government of Ontario. By GEORGE S. SZABLOWSKI, 1971. Pp. 37 Participation and Liberal Democratic Government. By FREDERICK C. THAYER, 1971. Pp. 41 All are available from the Queens Printer, Government of Ontario; 1.00 each     

Ethics by Design: The Impact of Form of Government on Municipal Corruption

While trust in government at all levels is at an all‐time low, actual corruption at the municipal level has been declining. One factor often credited with this decline is the introduction of the council‐manager form of government. One of the key reasons the council‐manager form was created in the early 1900s was to act as an antidote to the corruption prevalent in the big‐city machine politics of the era. Despite this, no one has tested whether the council‐manager form has in fact influenced the decline in corruption rates. This article uses a rare events logit model to analyze corruption convictions in municipalities between 1990 and 2010 to determine which factors, including form of government, affect the probability that a corrupt act will occur. The findings indicate that municipalities with the council‐manager form are 57 percent less likely to have corruption convictions than municipalities with the mayor‐council form.     

Rejecting the gift horse: international politics of disaster aid refusal

This is a study of the increasingly common phenomenon of developing states refusing some or all international aid following serious natural disaster. Aid refusal by the Myanmar junta following a 2008 cyclone is only the most recent prominent example of this practice, and I present here an original dataset of all cases of disaster aid refusal occurring between 1982 and 2006. Through quantitative analysis, I show that although poorer states are indeed less likely to refuse aid than wealthier states, recipient need does not alone drive the decision-making process. Nor are autocratic regimes any more or less likely to refuse aid than democratic regimes. Rather, just as recently transitioned states have been shown by other scholars to be particularly likely to engage in military conflict, I find that they are also particularly likely to publicly and explicitly refuse aid and insist on their own ability to handle disaster relief and recovery. Aid refusal, much like aid provision, is at its core a political act.