The Role of Motivation and Leadership in Public Employees’ Job Preferences: Evidence from Two Discrete Choice Experiments

Two discreet choice experiments investigated how three styles of leadership (i.e., transformational, transactional, and ethical) and three job features aimed at activating different motivational forces (i.e., public service motivation, external regulation, and intrinsic motivation) simultaneously and independently affected the job preferences of a sample of public employees. Subjects displayed a strong preference for jobs that benefit more citizens, that are more interesting, and that require working under ethical leaders rather than unethical ones. Whereas the prospect of a 5% salary increase strengthened participants’ preferences for a given position, offering a 1% salary raise did not significantly change subjects’ job choices. Furthermore, participants did not appear to have any preference for working under a transformational leader rather than a transactional leader.     

Les tactiques d'influence1 des directeurs des ressources humaines employées auprès de l'équipe de direction du secteur public québécois

Abstract: This study examines the use of influence tactics by Human Resources managers with the members of the Quebec public-sector management team. The results indicate that they use a large number of influence tactics, that they use more frequently “soft” tactics than “hard” ones or “neither soft nor hard” ones, and they choose their tactics based on a cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, the analyses reveal that respondents whose feelings of self-efficacy are high will not attempt to influence or use “soft” tactics any more frequently than respondents with low feelings of self-efficacy. Finally, the results indicate that our respondents exercise influence effectively.     

Paraquat (gramoxone) poisoning in south-west Hungary, 1977-1984. Toxicological and histopathological aspects of group intoxication cases

Fifty-six cases of paraquat poisoning were examined during the 8 years 1977-1984. The ratio of cases of accidental to intentional ingestion of the poison was 1:1; 23.2% of the total (13/56) survived several months or years. In 1983, 11 subjects accidentally drank 10-30 ml of gramoxone; eight of 11 died in 2 weeks. Toxicological investigations demonstrated rapid elimination of poison from the blood, as well as prolonged fixation of paraquat in the lung, kidney, liver, and spleen tissues. Histological examinations showed multiorgan failure from renal tubular necrosis and pulmonary hemorrhage with alveolar epithelial injury. Pulmonary proliferative changes were present in only two cases who survived 7 and 10 days and in which artificial ventilation was utilized.     

Politiques publiques d'innovation régionale et compétitivité mondiale : une étude comparée Québec-Wallonie

Abstract: The objective of this article is to analyse public initiatives to stimulate regional innovation in Walloon region in Belgium and in the Province of Quebec. The empirical analysis relies on the competitive poles program in Walloon and on the ACCORD project (Action Concertée de Coopération Régionale de Développement) in Quebec. The comparison will allow discussing the implementation and regional embedding of these programs and will reveal the similarities and the differences between the structure, the organization and the deployment of these strategies in the various regions targeted.     

Theoretical foundation for a debtor friendly bankruptcy law in favour of creditors

Although many works support creditor friendly bankruptcy laws, an evolution towards debtor friendly systems is at work. This paper proposes a theoretical ground to meet this paradox. It reconsiders the economic role of bankruptcy law by stressing on the courts’ production of information. It reveals that the transmission of a lenient signal by judges makes it possible to reduce the hazard that bad risks seek to avoid going on trial. Thus, it shows that debtor friendly bankruptcy laws are not systematically opposed to creditors’ interests. They reduce the risk of the economy and contribute to the improvement of the global efficiency.      

The product paradox of voting power

We consider a system made up of two committees, with overlapping membership but with different rules for passing decisions; the passage of a joint resolution requires separate approval by each committee. We show that it is possible for one voter a to be stronger (have greater voting power) than another voter b in both of the two committees, while in the two-committee system (considered as a single composite entity) b is stronger than a. We argue that this apparently paradoxical phenomenon is inherent in the structure of the decision-making system in question, rather than being an artefact of any particular index used to measure voting power.