Competitiveness and Democracy

After reviewing progress in Latin America's economic stabilization and international competitiveness in the last two decades, this essay discusses the current post‐Washington Consensus “social democratic convergence” agenda, which aims to sharpen market efficiency, improve the quality of democratic governance, and advance equity goals by attacking the social deficit. Two illustrative examples, at opposite ends of the development spectrum, are Nicaragua's pro‐CAFTA agenda and Chile's Chile Compete program. More generally, pluralistic democracy can hamper progress by giving veto powers to recalcitrant vested interests; but enlightened political leadership can make gains by combining carefully crafted coalitions, international support, popular pressures, and an attractive ideological message.     

Congress, the Deficit, and Budget Reconciliation

President Clinton's veto of the 1995 reconciliation bill, the largest and most ambitious such legislation ever passed by Congress, was the first time a reconciliation bill was ever rejected by a president. It was also the first reconciliation bill in two decades to include a tax reduction rather than a tax increase. The fate of this bill, and its scope and contents, suggest the need to assess the evolution of reconciliation within the congressional budget process. In the early 1980s, Congress altered budget reconciliation procedures, putting in place a powerful new capability for deficit reduction. Reconciliation became the primary means within the budget process of restraining entitlement spending and increasing taxes as part of congressional efforts to reduce the deficit. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings magnified certain problems Congress encountered in using reconciliation to control entitlements, producing increased pressure to cut discretionary spending. While the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 included new authority to use reconciliation to restrain entitlements, congressional spending priorities combined with the Peace Dividend to maintain the relative sanctuary entitlement programs have enjoyed. The limits of reconciliation as a deficit reduction tool, both in terms of increasing revenues and curtailing entitlements, are detailed. The inherent procedural advantages accorded to entitlements are contrasted with the treatment of discretionary programs, explaining in part the widening gulf between these two categories of spending. Congress has attempted, without success, to find alternatives to reconciliation. The failure of the seven-year, deficit-eliminating reconciliation bill of 1995 may indicate that certain Limits on the use of reconciliation may have been reached.     

(Non)equivalence in a federalism: Dual tax shares, flypaper effects and Leviathan

Among the best-known theorems of fiscal federalism is the presumed allocative and distributive equivalence between a lump-sum grant to a collectivity and a set of lump sum grants to the members of a collectivity. Interestingly, the simple elegance of the theorem is at odds with observed behavior. Grants to governments produce greater public spending than does tax reduction. Explanations of this "flypaper effect" range from misspecified econometric modeling to presumed behavior based on fiscal illusion. In this paper we show that theoretical equivalence exists in a model that recognizes only one tax share, the citizen voter's local tax share. When the model is expanded to include voters' federal tax shares as well as local taxes, non-equivalence and the flypaper effect become the rule, not the exception.     

The Budget Enforcement Act in 1991: Isometric Budgeting

The immediate effect of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 was to cancel a pending $110 billion sequester and to change the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets. These and other changes allowed Congress and the administration to escape responsibility for increases in the deficit if discretionary spending was kept within the caps and no new entitlement programs or revenue enhancements were added. This assumption and others relating to the empowerment of the Appropriations Committees and the new authority of the OMB are explored in this article.     

Credit enhancement of municipal debt

Abstract: The municipal bond bank (mbb) innovation began in Canada in 1956 and in the United States in 1970. This paper concentrates on why mbbs exist, their characteristics, where they work best, and how they compare with other municipal debt credit enhancement techniques. It concludes with a discussion of the future role these organizations will have in providing long-term capital funding to municipalities in Canada and the United States. Sommaire: Le principe de la Banque d'obligations municipales (BOM) fut introduit en 1956, au Canada et, en 1970, aux États-Unis. Cet article explore la raison d'être des BOMS, leurs caractéristiques, leurs conditions de succés maximum et les compare à d'autres techniques pour rehausser le crédit de la dette municipale. L'article se termine par une discussion sur le rôle que ces organisations auront à l'avenir dam le financement capital à long terme des municipalités au Canada et aux États-Unis.