作为规制与治理工具的行政许可

源于私人生活中财产权人授权他人分享自己财产权实践的行政许可,正成为一种引人注目的政府规制与治理工具。作为治理工具,行政许可承载了一系列不同的社会目标,规制有时只是其中一个主要目标。当行政许可被限定为规制工具时,可以假定其核心是实现对特定行为的控制,具体机制包括信息收集、准入控制、行为监管以及许可的执行。尽管许可制度具有筛选市场主体并对他们进行识别和规制等积极作用,但同时也存在巨大的负面作用,如限制和阻碍竞争、可能导致权力滥用,而且许可制度是有成本的。政府在采取许可制度过程中,应考虑其他能够达成相同制度目标的替代性工具。     

Radicalization of Homegrown Sunni Militants in the United States: Comparing Converts and Non-Converts

Are the mechanisms and processes that lead to radicalization different for Muslim converts and non-converts in the United States? While many scholars attempt to explain why people violently radicalize, the theories are diverse and most treat converts and non-converts the same. This study answers this question by categorizing the many radicalization theories into three levels of analysis so that cases of radicalization can be analyzed across and within disciplines. Out of 83 cases studies, individual-level factors are more prevalent among converts than non-converts. Group-level processes similarly affect both groups. Mass-level mechanisms are not significant factors in radicalization.     

Disagreeing about Disagreement: How Conflict in Social Networks Affects Political Behavior

At the center of debates on deliberative democracy is the issue of how much deliberation citizens experience in their social networks. These “disagreements about disagreement” come in a variety of forms, with scholars advocating different empirical approaches (e.g., Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004 ; Mutz 2006 ) and coming to different substantive conclusions. We address these discrepancies by going back to the basics: investigating the consequences of conceptual and measurement differences for key findings relating interpersonal political disagreement to political attitudes and behaviors. Drawing on the 2008–2009 ANES panel study, we find evidence that different measures of disagreement have distinct effects when it comes to individuals’ preferences, patterns of engagement, and propensities to participate. We discuss the implications for the study of social influence; as interpersonal disagreement can mean different things, scholars should think carefully about how to study it and should exercise caution when making pronouncements about its empirical and democratic consequences.     

Beyond the new look: Policy and operations in the Eisenhower administration

Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New‐Look National Security Policy, 1953–61 (London: Macmillan, 1996). Pp. xvi + 400, biblio, index. NP. ISBN 0–333–65655–5.

Erika Alin, The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis (Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1994). Pp.160, biblio, index. NP. ISBN 0–8191–9332–1.

Audrey R. and George McT. Kahin. Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: Norton, 1995). Pp.318, index. £17.95. ISBN 1–56584–244–8.     

The Public Purpose of Political Economy

ABSTRACT

For too long the discipline of political science has ceded research on the dynamics of the national political economy to the field of economics. In this article, we explore the cost of this cession in the context of the public purpose. Following John Kenneth Galbraith, we define the public purpose in terms of its independence from the market economy and the planning system. Political scientists, and especially political theorists, are uniquely qualified to theorize power relations relative to a host of challenges that have emerged in today’s rapidly transforming national economies. Galbraith’s critique of mainstream economics, coupled with his understanding of power as an inescapable and perpetual dialectical process, provide guidance for theorizations that should attend to rather than deny the contested domain of the public interest and collective good.     

Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in Iraq

The concept of ‘politicization’ of the US intelligence services, and in particular the CIA, has been debated by scholars for many years. However, it has also been easily dismissed by those investigating recent US foreign policy, as in the Robb-Silberman Commission's assurance over the 2003 Iraq War that ‘the Intelligence Community needs to be pushed’. This essay seeks an extension of the critique of politicization by considering the historical context since the formation of the CIA. It seeks an application of that critique by putting forth, when evaluating the policy and operations of the George W. Bush administration, the notion of an ‘alternative network’ within the government. The argument is that politicization must be linked to a conception of ‘Executive power’, both within the American bureaucracy and in the projection and rationalization of US aims overseas.