Mental health and fitness to plead proposals in England and Wales

Proposals to reform fitness to plead legislation have been published by the Law Commission in England and Wales; they include a new test of decision making capacity and a new psychiatric test that has yet to be fully developed. Although proposals have met with some support, there have also been detractors. The history of fitness to plead is reviewed and current case law (including the 1836 Pritchard criteria) is examined. Although existing arrangements have been criticised, this may be attributable to inconsistent practical application, rather than inherent conceptual flaws. The Pritchard test has largely stood the test of time and has emerged relatively unscathed. Fitness to plead is not a medical construct, but rather a legal entity and any new test would be likely to introduce its own difficulties. A capacity based assessment could enhance debate and disagreement and increase court time in many cases, presenting new resource implications with questionable benefit. As the existing Pritchard criteria, amended by case law, already include a five limb test that closely resembles a capacity assessment (ability to plead to the indictment, to understand the course of the proceedings, to instruct a lawyer, to challenge a juror and to understand the evidence) and given the difficulties in introducing a functional test format in other jurisdictions, the Law Commission's proposals should now be set aside, perhaps for another day: reconsideration may be possible some decades hence, pending enhanced scientific developments within psychiatry and better understanding of the mind.     

Partisan Effects of Legislative Term Limits

Term limits remain a popular policy reform and have generated a great deal of scholarship as a result. Although many predicted that term limits would benefit the Republican party, the literature finds no marked partisan effects, possibly because termed‐out legislators have largely been replaced by copartisans. This article demonstrates that term limits have indeed had partisan effects—just not on electoral outcomes. Term limits have caused a significant reallocation of institutional power from Democrats to Republicans (as measured by contributions from access‐oriented interest groups), in large part because they have removed more senior Democrats than Republicans. The partisan effects of term limits therefore point to the institutional value of seniority.     

Designing policies that intentionally stick: policy feedback in a changing climate

Policy feedback is a widely used concept, but many who use it only focus on the positive and/or unintentional feedback effects of certain types of policy. The literature as a whole is therefore poorly equipped to make sense of the negative policy feedbacks that often appear in more regulatory areas such as climate change, where target groups are put under pressure to shoulder concentrated costs. Advocates of the ‘new’ policy design have an opportunity to address this gap by exploring how policy makers approach the design of policies that intentionally generate positive policy feedbacks and/or are resilient to negative ones. This paper contributes to that effort by identifying the conditions under which specific instrument designs are likely to have opportunity enhancing and/or constraining effects. It relates these expectations to a design situation where positive feedback seemed unlikely, and hence, the challenge of designing locked-in policies was correspondingly greater. It concludes by drawing on the findings of this exploratory case to investigate what the ‘new’ policy design can do better to explicate the temporal aspects of design.     

Political interaction in the senate: estimating a political “spatial” weights matrix and an application to lobbying behavior

Many motivations exist that cause legislators to behave strategically when voting. These include logrolling, towing the party line, or political favor trading. However, it has proven difficult in the existing literature to uncover the magnitude of the interaction among politicians. This paper takes a “spatial” approach to the problem, using a spatial autoregressive model to not only uncover the magnitude of interactions, but also the direction of the interactions. In contrast to most applications of spatial econometrics, I allow the elements of the spatial weights matrix to be estimated as parameters. The political spatial weights matrix is calculated for 96 senators in the 110th U.S. Congress. Furthermore, in a marginal effects simulation, I calculate the overall effect on voting from “flipping” a senator’s vote, allowing flipped votes to have a cascading effect. I apply these measures to study political fundraising, mildly suggesting that political interest groups direct donations to senators with the most influence.     

Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the Election‐Year Economy

According to numerous studies, the election‐year economy influences presidential election results far more than cumulative growth throughout the term. Here we describe a series of surveys and experiments that point to an intriguing explanation for this pattern that runs contrary to standard political science explanations, but one that accords with a large psychological literature. Voters, we find, actually intend to judge presidents on cumulative growth. However, since that characteristic is not readily available to them, voters inadvertently substitute election‐year performance because it is more easily accessible. This “end‐heuristic” explanation for voters’ election‐year emphasis reflects a general tendency for people to simplify retrospective assessments by substituting conditions at the end for the whole. The end‐heuristic explanation also suggests a remedy, a way to align voters’ actions with their intentions. Providing people with the attribute they are seeking—cumulative growth—eliminates the election‐year emphasis.     

Becoming citizens in late modernity: a global-national comparison of young people in Japan and the UK

The experiences of young people in developed societies such as Japan and the UK have undergone considerable change in the last 30 or so years. Our starting point is that such developments are associated with the globalization of institutions and an individualization of experience, which destabilizes life-course transitions and cultural transmission between generations. However, we continue to assert the importance of the national framework, defined by national cultures and territorial jurisdictions, in mediating global processes. Adapting Connolly's (2005. Pluralism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press) differentiation between types of politics in late modernity, we argue for a distinction to be made between being citizens and becoming citizens. Being a citizen involves integration into pre-existing collective identities such as nation-states which increasingly act to restrict membership to the citizen community. With this in mind, we compare the key sites of social recognition in Japan and the UK for young people and identify some fundamental barriers to citizenship. In addition, we discuss the ways in which conventional social and educational policy responses aimed at integrating young people into work and nation perpetuate their precarious relationship to citizenship. These processes are contrasted with becoming a citizen, which is dynamic, intimately connected to cultural learning and the creation of new civic virtues and sources of recognition.