Citizenship gone wrong

This paper examines how and why a deliberate enactment of the state got out of control. It does so by outlining three phases of border management in Tusheti, a highland province of post-Soviet Georgia. In the first phase, control was directly exercised by the local population. At the same time, border transgression for economic and political purposes was encouraged. A second phase of border management was triggered by the Chechen war in the mid-1990s. In order to discredit claims that Chechen ‘terrorists’ were hiding in Georgian territory, the Georgian government, monitored by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, effectively brought border transgression to a standstill. Finally, a third phase was initiated by a mission of the Georgian Orthodox Church sent to Tusheti with the aim of ‘spiritual fortification’. In the end, despite their courageous civic engagement, the locals had fewer entitlements than before. In order to explain what went wrong, I reflect on the downside of performing and incorporating the state and elaborate three different models of citizenship enacted by the key players in each distinct period. Finally, I argue for a temporalisation and hence deconstruction of the notion of ‘post-socialism’.     

Explaining institutional change in international patent politics

This article seeks to explain institutional change in international patent politics since the conclusion of the 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (trips). I argue that the distribution of interests in this issue area adheres to a sharp North–South distinction, and that the pursuit of largely incompatible and conflicting patent agendas by industrialised and developing countries, respectively, has led to the gradual emergence of an international patent regime complex. Focusing on trips-plus measures under various Free Trade Agreements, patent enforcement clubs and a range of UN organisations which have recently gained relevance for international patent politics, I show how the distribution of interests in this area has led to the development of two parallel and partially inconsistent international governance structures. I conclude that the distribution of interests explains the propensity of regime complexes towards stability and change, with institutional change being particularly pronounced when overlapping interests among revisionist actors enhance the prospects of collective action.     

FIGHTING CORRUPTION WITH SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS' POTENTIAL TO REDUCE CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Given the poor track record of traditional anti‐corruption initiatives, donors and governments are increasingly looking at how civil society can fight corruption in public administration. Social accountability mechanisms intend to perform this role by holding officials directly accountable through citizen engagement. However, this article argues that social accountability mechanisms are only capable of reducing corruption systemically if they activate horizontal accountability and sustain it through the sanctioning mechanisms of electoral accountability. A comparative case study analysis using the cases of the Ugandan Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and the Bangalore Citizen Report Card is applied to test this hypothesis. The Tanzanian Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and an example of citizen engagement in Mumbai are employed as shadow cases to provide additional evidence for the hypothesis. The results indicate that social accountability mechanisms must be inclusive, broad, with public effect and embedded in other accountability relationships to fight corruption effectively. Electoral accountability is key, and support to social accountability mechanisms should therefore always be well placed within a broader agenda aimed at strengthening democratic governance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nail-biters and no-contests: The effect of electoral margins on satisfaction with democracy in winners and losers

Previous scholarship has found robust connections between winning an election and democratic system support. Building on this connection, our analysis theorizes an additional dimension of competitiveness existing in executive elections. We hypothesize a polarizing effect in close elections: that individuals feel the most satisfied after winning by a narrow margin, while losers will be most dissatisfied. Using survey data from eighteen national elections across eight countries, our findings support half of this expectation. Winner satisfaction with democratic systems is highest in close elections and erodes as margin increases. Losers' reported satisfaction is not affected by margin – those who lose by half a percent are indistinguishable in levels of system support from those who lose in landslides.     

THE CASE OF EXPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND PROTECTIONISM

Most competition laws do not prohibit anticompetitive conductthat affects foreign target markets as long as there is no spillover effect on the home market. The U.S. in particular justifiesthis leniency towards export cartels by the aim of increasingefficiency in target markets that are suffering from high entrancebarriers for importers. Attempts to use the legal regime ofthe WTO to overcome private restrictions of competition arelikely to fail, because of the fundamental differences betweentrade policy and competition policy. Although a multilateralcompetition policy would be best suited to challenge exportcartels, the current state of the political debate makes itmore likely that second-best solutions such as capacity buildingin lesser developed target states will have to be established.     

Inside versus outside lobbying: How the institutional framework shapes the lobbying behaviour of interest groups

Different types of interest groups use different lobbying strategies. This article presents an investigation of this already well‐established hypothesis once more, but additionally proposes that the institutional framework of the country in which interest groups operate also influences their lobbying behaviour. More specifically, it is shown that groups working in the interest of the public are better integrated into the policy‐making process when direct democratic instruments, such as referendums, occur regularly (as in Switzerland) than when referendums are the exception (Germany). The article demonstrates that Swiss cause groups – often also referred to as ‘public interest groups’ in the literature – use a more balanced mixture of insider and outsider strategies than their German peers, but also that this moderating effect cannot be found for specific interest groups, such as industry groups or unions.     

Beyond citizenship and residence? Exploring the extension of voting rights in the age of globalization

The introductory article to the special issue discusses how the extension of voting rights beyond citizenship (that is, to non-national immigrants) and residence (that is, to expatriates) can be interpreted in the light of democratization processes in both Western countries and in developing regions. It does so by inserting the globalization-specific extension of voting rights to immigrants and expatriates within the long-term series of historical waves of democratization. Does the current extension enhance democracy by granting de facto disenfranchised immigrants and emigrants political rights or does it jeopardize the very functioning of democracy by undermining its legitimacy through the removal of territorial and national boundaries? The article offers a synthesis of the findings of the volume's contributions in a broad comparative perspective covering both alien and external voting rights in Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. It shows that reforms toward more expansive electorates vary considerably and that their effects on the inclusion of migrants largely depend on the specific regulations and the socio-political context in which they operate.