VERTICAL STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE PERFORMANCE

We report the results of a study examining the effects of vertical strategic alignment (that is, the degree to which strategic stances are consistent across different organizational levels) on public service performance. Longitudinal multivariate analysis is undertaken on a panel of public organizations over four years. We find that alignment on a prospecting strategy leads to better performance, but that no such effect is observed for a defending strategy. We also find that high levels of prospecting alignment produce stronger positive performance effects in centralized organizations and when environmental uncertainty is high. The implications of these findings for research and practice are considered in the conclusion.     

DOES POLITICAL CHANGE AFFECT SENIOR MANAGEMENT TURNOVER? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TOP‐TIER LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ENGLAND

In many political systems the political neutrality of senior managers' tenure is often cherished as a key part of the politics-administration dichotomy and is subject to formal safeguards. We test hypotheses about the impact of political change on senior management turnover drawn from political science, public administration and private sector management theory. Using panel data to control for unobserved heterogeneity between authorities, we find that changes in political party control and low organizational performance have both separate and joint positive effects on the turnover rate of senior managers. By contrast, the most senior manager, the chief executive, is more sheltered: the likelihood of a chief executive succession is higher only when party change and low performance occur together. Thus the arrival of a new ruling party reduces the tenure of senior managers, but chief executives are vulnerable to political change only when performance is perceived as weak.     

CENTRAL GRANTS AND LOCAL POLICY VARIATION

This paper estimates the impact of central grants on local spending decisions in England in the 19%. The analysis is based on a more explicit conceptual framework and a more appropriate methodology than conventionally used to measure grant effects in 'output' studies' of local policy variation. A set of six hypotheses is derived from political and economic theories of grant impact. The relationship between grants and expenditure change is estimated through a TSLS (Two Stage Least Squares) regression model. The main empirical results are that grants are an important constraint on spending decisions and that different types of grants have different effects: lump sum grants are substitutive and matching grants are stimulative. The evidence also indicates that spending is influenced by party politics, service needs and the local tax base.     

The Obligation to Contribute to Discretionary Public Goods

The principle of fairness, first introduced by H. L. A. Hart in 1955, is able to support a workable theory of political obligation upon liberal premises. In a previous paper, 'Presumptive benefit, fairness, and political obligation', I argued that the principle can establish general obligations to cooperate in the provision of 'presumptive public goods' (that is, public goods that are indispensable to the typical member of society). Because a wider range of governmental services is necessary for the provision of presumptive goods, the principle also supports obligations to support 'discretionary public goods' (goods that are desirable but not indispensable). The 'indirect argument' developed in this paper counters the criticisms of my previous paper presented by A. John Simmons in 'The anarchist position: a reply to Klosko and Senor'.