Broadcasting system in Italy: Evolution and perspectives

Italian public broadcasting service (RAI) has had a monopoly until the middle of the 1970s. The peculiarity of public monopoly in broadcasting is its tendency to secure political rather than economic rents. The dangers that public monopoly causes to consumers (viewers-listeners), has not emerged at least until the mid-seventies for the simple reason that broadcasting has been conceived under the ideological umbrella of public good rather than in terms of opportunity costs. A law limiting monopoly has taken fourteen years to be passed so that the proliferation of private radio and television stations has orgininated the subrogatory intervention by the Constitutional Court. From 1975 to 1989 regulation has tended to perpetuate RAI's monopoly, in a context which was very different from the one in which the RAI was established. It is no wonder, therefore, that reforms have been motivated by RAI's financial crisis in the seventies and eighties, and not by political choices. The 1990 law puts a stop to public monopoly in broadcasting giving rise to what now appears to be a duopoly, but which in 1990 to many seemed to introduce a contestable market able to respond to both consumers' demand and technological innovations more efficiently, so ensuring more freedom of information.     

Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking

This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors’ exit option, distinguishing between “redistributive rent-seeking” and “productive rent-seeking” situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the “lost treasure” effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors’ exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases.     

Immediate anaphylactic death following antibiotics injection: splenic eosinophilia easily revealed by pagoda red stain

The comparison of 4 cases of immediate anaphylactic death following the intramuscular injection of antibiotics (different types of penicillin or cephalosporins) with 4 cases of immediate non-anaphylactic death (induced by different causes) recognized splenic eosinophilia, as the main feature for the differential diagnosis, in agreement with isolated previous studies. The use of a stain (pagoda red) little known and seldom employed in Pathology and in Forensic Medicine, showed the concomitant massive presence (immunohistochemically confirmed) of mast cells and degranulated mast cells, the latter mainly located in splenic sinuses. The whole of our findings led us to consider the spleen as the possible shock organ in man. Waiting for further judgment on our hypothesis, we seized the opportunity to remark the employment of the pagoda red stain when the contemporary demonstration of eosinophils, mast cells and degranulated mast cells is required.     

The cost of delegated control: vicarious liability, secondary liability and mandatory insurance

Vicarious liability, secondary liability and mandatory insurance are three systems for attaining judgment-proof or disappearing injurers’ precaution through the direct control of a second party (the vicariously liable principal, the secondary liable party, or the insurer). In this way, the legal system delegates control over some injurers to private entities. Such mechanisms generate monitoring costs. In this paper, we consider who bears the cost of such monitoring, and the effect thereof on the equilibrium level of precautions under different liability rules. We use these findings to explain some of the patterns in the coupling of substantive standards of liability and legal regimes of delegated control.     

Britain,Ireland and the Italian Risorgimento

Britain, Ireland and the Italian Risorgimento. Edited by Nick Carter (London: Palgrave, 2015), £60.00 (cloth).     

“To have and have not”: founders’ human capital and university start-up survival

In order to preserve innovation, knowledge development and diffusion, as well as the transfer of new technologies, the emergence of University Start-Ups (USU) and their survival as a particular dimension of performance represents a relevant research topic. As USU generally have scarce initial resources, the human capital of their founders is one of their main business assets. Although the survival of such firms is supposed to be heavily dependent on the human capital characteristics of their founders, this has not received enough attention in existing research. In this paper we investigate the contribution of founders’ specific human capital characteristics to the survival of USU, building on Gimeno et al. (Adm Sci Q 42:750–783, 1997) threshold model of entrepreneurial exit. We divide USU founders’ specific human capital into three components (entrepreneurship, industry and university) in order to better understand its impact on firm survival. Our theoretical model is empirically tested on a unique sample of Catalan USU through a logistic regression analysis. Coherently with our theoretical reasoning, the results show that industry human capital negatively affect USU survival, while university human capital and entrepreneurship human capital enhance the likelihood of USU survival.     

Returns to effort in rent-seeking games

In the traditional formulation of rent-seeking games, increasing returns to effort are characterized by an exponent r>1. However, when the value of the rent is normalized to 1, the players’ effort levels A and B will typically be less than 1. Thus, when A<1 and r>1, the value of A ^r decreases as r increases, contradicting the interpretation of r>1 as representing increasing returns to effort. This apparent defect in the mathematization of the problem seems to suggest that a different interpretation of r is required whenever A<1, upsetting the uniformity and elegance of the model. In this short note, we demonstrate that the perceived problem is illusory, and that the usual interpretation of r is satisfactory for all values of A.     

Government Alternation and Patterns of Competition in Europe: Comparative Data in Search of Explanations

Government alternation is a fundamental component of any efficient democracy and it could be seen both as an empirical proof (in democracy there is government alternation) or as an ideal pattern of competition (in democracy there should be government alternation). However, to what extent do democracies work according to such an ideal pattern? A Government Turnover Index (GTI) is provided to answer this question with respect to 524 governments in 22 European contemporary democracies since World War II. As suggested by the data and by the GTI, there is not necessarily a link between democratic competition and government alternation, although some democracies are more likely to experience it. It is therefore necessary to direct the analysis towards some systemic factors which may favour or hinder government alternation (such as the party system structure and the institutional framework).