The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review

This paper reviews research on central banking and monetary policy, with special emphasis on the position of the future European Central Bank. Nowadays, it is often thought that an independent central bank with an explicit mandate to aim for price stability constitutes an important institutional device to assure price stability. Indeed, the ECB will be one of the most independent central banks as follows from the codings of various indicators measuring legal independence. Still, it does not follow straightforwardly from the literature that the Statute of the ECB is optimal. It is also argued that the accountability of the ECB is poorly arranged for in comparison with that of several national central banks. Finally, the discussion about the monetary strategy of the ECB is reviewed.     

Public Spheres on the Internet: Anarchic or Government-Sponsored – A Comparison

This article discusses whether the internet can contribute to strengthening democracy by creating new public spheres online. The focus is whether government-sponsored initiatives are more successful than private 'anarchic' ones in shaping conditions for democratic dialogue. Two cases are examined and it is concluded that the government-sponsored case in general is most successful in achieving democratic ideals of openness, respect, argumentation, enlightenment and deliberation. Three factors are crucial for the success of the former case: rules and moderation, a geographical affiliation and the presence of politicians. On the other hand, it is clear that political debate online is still an exclusive activity reserved mainly for the well educated and politically active. The internet's often-claimed potential for mobilising new groups cannot be confirmed. Rather, the chosen few have got yet another opportunity to discuss and influence the political process.     

Identifying the Persuasive Effects of Presidential Advertising

Do presidential campaign advertisements mobilize, inform, or persuade citizens? To answer this question we exploit a natural experiment, the accidental treatment of some individuals living in nonbattleground states during the 2000 presidential election to either high levels or one‐sided barrages of campaign advertisements simply because they resided in a media market adjoining a competitive state. We isolate the effects of advertising by matching records of locally broadcast presidential advertising with the opinions of National Annenberg Election Survey respondents living in these uncontested states. This approach remedies the observed correlation between advertising and both other campaign activities and previous election outcomes. In contrast to previous research, we find little evidence that citizens are mobilized by or learn from presidential advertisements, but strong evidence that they are persuaded by them. We also consider the causal mechanisms that facilitate persuasion and investigate whether some individuals are more susceptible to persuasion than others.     

Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered

The debate on the relationship between institutions and economic development is discussed, focusing on two illustrations, i.e., the impact of democracy and political instability on economic growth. Various pitfalls of existing research are identified, like sensitivity of the outcomes to model specification, sample heterogeneity, measurement of political variables, and the treatment of the time dimension.     

Further evidence on the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth

Much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues, from an empirical perspective, that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy. In this paper, a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the Congress, the President, and one agency (we use the U.S. Federal Reserve as an extended example) can dictate policy outcomes. The results of the paper include the “Congressional Dominance” theorem: If more than 2/3 of House members, and more than 2/3 of Senate members, agree on something, they get it. The theorem is obvious (the “proof” is in the U.S. Constitution), but often forgotten in the substantive literature. More realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of Congress are more diverse. Powers of the President to influence policy with, and without, appointments are also analyzed.     

On the Meaning of Survey Reports of Roll‐Call “Votes”

Contemporary efforts to evaluate representation often compare survey measures of how citizens say they would vote on legislation to what elected officials do in office. These comparisons generally suggest poor representation. We argue here that this common design is unlikely to effectively evaluate representation because responses to survey questions differ in important aspects from voting in legislatures. Measurement error and construct validity undermine the comparison. Three survey experiments show that providing partisan and nonpartisan information readily available to legislators materially changes respondents' expressed preferences on roll‐call votes. With information, expressed policy positions are both less centrist and more closely matched to legislator behavior in their preferred party. Respondents also appear aware of their own lack of knowledge in evaluating roll‐call policy votes. The treatment effect of information decreases in confidence judging policy in that area. We show similar patterns for respondent opinions on Supreme Court decisions.     

A Multiple Streams Analysis of Institutional Innovation in Forest Watershed Governance

Increasingly severe wildfires have focused attention on forested watershed vulnerabilities, causing significant changes to policies and governance. We utilized the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) to understand institutional innovations of federal agency–large water provider partnerships in Colorado to protect watersheds through joint planning and funding. Ambiguous problem definition and focusing events were significant aspects of these partnerships. We interviewed individuals in the partnerships, with MSA ideas of how solutions to policy problems develop, and the role of policy entrepreneurs. We found that wildfires served as focusing events, creating space and time for learning, collaboration and new problem framing, increased political attention, and institutional innovation. In this study, windows of opportunity stayed open longer, policy entrepreneurs and agencies played larger roles in communication and coupling streams and the context of fast‐moving, unpredictable ecological crises changed responses to issues. Our findings also have implications for broader policy studies and environmental governance scholarship.     

Arbeiterbewegung von rechts? Motive und Grenzen einer imaginären Revolte

The article examines populist and völkisch orientations of unionized workers, some of them active members of workers’ councils. It empirically shows how, in respondents’ everyday consciousness, protest motifs are intermingled with an ethnicized view of the social question. Völkisch populism can be interpreted as a Polanyi-type movement that is motivated by problems generated by post-growth capitalism, presenting itself as a venture to give back power to the people. Its revolt remains an imaginary one, though, for, ultimately in accordance with existing power relations, it aims at reconstructing an irretrievable past. Our empirical results keep a distance from monocausal explanations, though call to mind issues of class that have long been neglected. As workers perceive the current distribution of wealth as unjust, yet don’t believe in any possibility for change, they are spontaneously inclined to redefine existing top-down conflicts into inclusion-exclusion types. Professional right-wing populists take up and aggravate this tendency of exclusive solidarity and thereby pose a serious challenge for the unions as well as for democratic civil societies.     

Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in a Median Voter Model

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income. It turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of i) economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii) political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions. A negative welfare effect is more likely, the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter's labor income to average labor income. We also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination; it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters.