Community size, heterogeneity and voter turnouts

Numerous studies have found a negative relationship between the closeness of an election, the size of the electorate and voter turnout. It is often claimed that this relationship supports the rational voter hypothesis, with closeness and size proxying for the decisiveness of a vote. We offer a different interpretation. Larger communities are more heterogeneous than smaller ones, and turnouts are inversely related to the heterogeneity of a community. We present empirical support for this hypothesis using data for voter turnouts in Norwegian school language referendums. Community size is found to have a negative effect on voter turnouts, even after accounting for the probability of a single vote being decisive and the linguistic dimension of this heterogeneity. Our findings question the adequacy of the turnout regression in testing the rational voter hypothesis, as neither a positive correlation between closeness and turnout, nor a negative correlation between size and turnout can be exclusively attributed to instrumental voting.     

Insane Arsonists: An Early 21st Century Sample

We studied all individuals (n = 41) who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity for arson and who were committed to a California state psychiatric hospital on October 1, 2016 in a cross‐sectional analysis. This group of insane arsonists contained 33 (80.5%) males and eight (19.5%) females with a mean age at the time of the index arson of 35.9 years. At least 87.8% (n = 36) were considered to not have been participating in psychiatric treatment at the time of the index arson. Five (12.2%) of the insane arsonists had previously been found not guilty by reason of insanity for arson or had been convicted of having committed arson. Our findings suggest that lack of participation in psychiatric treatment was the most important factor in contributing to the index arson and the most important problem to be addressed in subsequent psychiatric treatment plans.     

A theory of executive dominance of congressional politics: the committee system in the Brazilian chamber of deputies

This article analyses the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies committee system using rational choice theories developed originally for the US Congress. We suggest that pure versions of these theories are unable to explain Brazilian committee politics, and point out the necessity of building a specific theory that takes into account key institutional characteristics which give the Brazilian Executive considerable power to control the legislative process to assure outcomes consistent with presidential preferences. We demonstrate that committees in Brazil operate to some degree as agents of the executive. For this reason, we call it the Theory of Executive Dominance.