"The World Changed Today": Agenda-Setting and Policy Change in the Wake of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks

The September 11 terrorist attacks constitute a focusing event that have been said to have “changed everything” in America. However, the literature on focusing events, policy change, and the policy process suggests that the “windows of opportunity” opened by focusing events like the September 11 attacks do not automatically equate to policy change. This paper considers whether and to what extent the agenda and policies have changed as a result of the attacks. While the events of September 11 provided the impetus for change, the threat of terrorism was already well established in the policy stream, and September 11 only threw open the window of opportunity for policy change based, in large part, on preexisting ideas; many of these ideas were enacted. And in the case of aviation security, some innovation is evident in the area of cockpit security.     

A Pragmatic Response to an Unexpected Constraint: Problem Representation in a Complex Humanitarian Emergency

This paper elaborates a model of problem representation first presented by Billings and Hermann (1998) . The foreign policy process begins when decision-makers specify policy goals and identify relevant constraints in response to a perceived problem. Although this initial problem representation often sets the course for subsequent policy, unanticipated constraints can arise that catch decision makers off-guard. Finding themselves in a context they did not anticipate to be in, decision makers may choose to alter their representation of the problem and/or change the course of policy. Billings and Hermann offer one piece of this puzzle by examining how decision makers re-represent problems; this paper provides the second piece by assessing how policies, not representations, change in response to new constraints. A case study of the U.S. response to the Ethiopian famine in the mid 1980s demonstrates that policy does not always follow problem representation.     

Attachment and social bonding in maximum and minimum security prison inmates

Attitudes towards social attachment and bonding were evaluated in groups of maximum (N=48) and bonding were evaluated in groups of maximum (N=46) security prison inmates and compared with the attitudes of a group of 49 noncriminal college students. Three primary styles of attachment were considered: avoidant, ambivalent/anxious, and secure. It was predicted that the maximum security condition, a group hypothesized to contain a large number of lifestyle criminals, would evidence more of an avoidant style of attachment compared to minimum security inmates or a group of college student controls. Consistent with this hypothesis, the maximum security inmates exhibited greater avoidance in their attitudes towards relationships than subjects in the other two conditions. The implications of these results are discussed.     

Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit Technology on Children's Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors' Decisions

The present study was designed to examine effects of closed-circuit technology on children's testimony and jurors' perceptions of child witnesses. For the study, a series of elaborately staged mock trials was held. First, 5- to 6-year-old and 8- to 9-year-old children individually participated in a play session with an unfamiliar male confederate. Approximately 2 weeks later, children individually testified about the event at a downtown city courtroom. Mock juries composed of community recruits viewed the trials, with the child's testimony presented either live in open court or over closed-circuit television. Mock jurors made ratings concerning the child witness and the defendant, and deliberated to reach a verdict. Results indicated that overall, older children were more accurate witnesses than younger children. However, older, not younger children produced more inaccurate information in free recall. Compared to live testimony in open court, use of closed-circuit technology led to decreased suggestibility for younger children. Testifying in open court was also associated with children experiencing greater pretrial anxiety. Closed-circuit technology did not diminish factfinders' abilities to discriminate accurate from inaccurate child testimony, nor did it directly bias jurors against the defendant. However, closed-circuit testimony biased jurors against child witnesses. Moreover, jurors tended to base their impressions of witness credibility on perceived confidence and consistency. Implications for the use of closed- circuit technology when children testify are discussed.