The Idiom of Legalism in Bar Politics: Lawyers, McCarthyism, and the Civil Rights Era

This paper considers the political role of the organized bar from three perspectives: the historical question of the stance taken by bar associations during the major civil rights debates of the post-World War II period; the sociological question of the extent to which legal associations can act collectively on highly contentious political issues; and the legal question concerning the implications of legal formalism for the politics of the bar. Contrary to the belief that legalism is an inherently conservative means of justifying professional inaction on fundamental issues, the paper argues that in fact legalism may well be the most important basis of intra-professional consensus on those issues as well as the most powerful means by which the profession can influence state and national governments. Legalism can be understood as a common professional idiom which allows mobilization on divisive issues. It can be used in support of both liberal and conservative causes. In this sense, within certain limits, legalism is neutral–an expedient which enables the profession to act politically in circumstances which otherwise would effectively immobilize its collegial associations.     

Precedent Externality, Network Effect, and the Possible Inefficiency of the Evolution of Laws

Using the traditional scenario of tort conflict as an example, I argue that the marginal precautionary costs of injurers and victims are not constant, as was assumed by most previous researchers. The precedent of a liability rule has some natural externality on the precaution technology, and hence marginal cost, faced by future agents involved in torts. The adoption of legal rules therefore has a network effect, meaning that the present prevalent adoption of one rule increases the probability of its future adoption. Treating the dynamic evolution of legal rules as a random process, we are able to apply an established result in the literature of network economies to conclude the path-dependence, non-predictability, and potential inefficiency concerning the final legal rule to which the dynamics converge.