美国在伊拉克战争中的法律战教训

在伊拉克战争“结束”两年之后,从武装冲突法的角度检讨美国发动和进行的这场战争,我们发现,它全面违反了武装冲突法关于使用武力、作战行动、人道保护的规则,犯下了严重的战争罪行。尽管美国取得了军事上的“胜利”,但在政治上特别是在国际法上漏洞百出,破绽很多,引起了国际社会的强烈不满和谴责,为其推行单边主义和霸权主义设置了新的障碍,值得引起注意。     

Interpersonal violence by authoritarian rulers: Saddam Hussein and Joseph Stalin compared

Why do some authoritarian rulers, such as Saddam Hussein, kill or torture other people personally, whereas others, like Joseph Stalin, delegate such violence to subordinates? Such politically motivated interpersonal violence committed by authoritarian leaders has never before been theorized. Through a comparison of Hussein and Stalin, we explain why some dictators engage in this behavior and others do not. We propose a model based on three components: the individual's prior habituation or non-habituation to violence; regime characteristics that ‘select for’ a personally violent or non-violent ruler; and, once a ruler takes power, the interaction of the first two variables. We also suggest that most communist regimes featured organizational characteristics that discouraged such violence by the leader.     

Understanding the Islamic State’s competitive advantages: Remaking state and nationhood in the Middle East and North Africa

While many researchers have examined the evolution and unique characteristics of the Islamic State (IS), taking an IS-centric approach has yet to illuminate the factors allowing for its establishment in the first place. To provide a clearer explanation for IS’s successes and improve analysts’ ability to predict future occurrences of similar phenomena, we analyze IS’s competitive advantages through the lens of two defining structural conditions in the Middle East North Africa (MENA): failure of state institutions and nationhood. It is commonly understood that the MENA faces challenges associated with state fragility, but our examination of state and national resiliency shows that Syria and Iraq yield the most deleterious results in the breakdown of the nation, suggesting that the combined failure of state and nation, as well as IS’s ability to fill these related vacuities, is a significant reason IS thrives there today. Against this backdrop, we provide a model of IS’s state- and nation-making project, and illustrate IS’s clear competitive advantages over all other state and non-state actors in both countries, except for Kurdish groupings. We conclude with recommendations on how policy-makers may begin halting and reversing the failure of both state and nation in Iraq and Syria.     

Democracy promotion and ODA: a comparative analysis

Scholars of democracy promotion foreign aid often claim it has substantially increased, yet they shy away from explaining by how much, nor investigate comparative trends in giving. This paper attempts to fill this void by addressing the following: (1) Has democracy promotion aid increased since the end of the Cold War? (2) Has the ‘assumed’ trend of increasing aid persevered through the difficulties encountered in democratizing Iraq? (3) Did aid increase from states that supported the invasion of Iraq compared to states that did not? The author's analysis purports that the answer is yes to the first two, yet it is harder to draw conclusions regarding Iraq. Another finding, contrary to claims in the scholarly literature, in terms of percentage and overall spending, the USA gives more democracy promotion aid than the EU. The author hopes this work stimulates research into the role of democracy promotion in the Arab Spring to consider historical trends in giving.     

国际法视角下的伊拉克战争--浅析布什主义的先发制人策略

先发制人是布什主义的基本要素,即坚持美国具有潜在的敌人能够伤害美国之前,对其首先发动攻击的权力.国家进行预防性战争的理由主要是,他国未来将发动袭击,因此要努力阻止这样的袭击发生.先发制人与预防性战争的区别主要在于敌人正准备进攻的确定无疑或似是而非.伊拉克战争是美国人一场预防性的战争,历史和国际法对预防性战争都是否定的.     

Reply to Christine Sylvester, “Terrorwars: Boston,Iraq”: an examination of differences between counter-terrorism and war as seen through the Iraqi experience of occupation

This response examines what is overlooked in Sylvester’s analysis of similarities between the US police security response to the Boston marathon bombings (2013) and Kevin Powers’ fictionalised account of the US war operations in Al Tafar, Iraq (2004) and evaluates the consequences for our understanding of contemporary war. This is done by highlighting differences between the experience of residents in Boston and the (real) town of Tal Afar, key among them the insecurity, fear and calamity that result from the distinct political realities in these locations. The experience of war from the perspective of the victims adds an important dimension to the debate over the changing nature of war. At a time that is marked by an unprecedented level of technologisation and visual mediation, it brings into focus the fragmentary and often one-sided evidence on which our knowledge of contemporary war is based. It reminds us to ask not only what we know about war, but how we know it.     

Let’s not jump (over) the guns: response to Christina Hellmich

This reply explains several decisions I made as author of “Terrorwars: Boston, Iraq.” Among points raised is the central comparison of the Boston counterterrorist operation in 2013, which I call a one-day war, with techniques of the early Iraq war. Relatedly, I use war knowledge presented in a “novel” by an American veteran of the Iraq war to make that comparison, plus my own experiences with the Boston lockdown, all of which raise questions about who or what is a legitimate source of information on war. I close with events of August 2013 in Ferguson Missouri that confirm the idea that the USA is bringing tools and techniques from contemporary wars into urban policing, and doing so in ways that many ordinary people on the ground are identifying as war.     

Independence referendums and nationalist rhetoric: the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Using the case study of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and the 2017 independence referendum, this article examines the nexus between independence referendums, nationalism and political power. It argues that the referendum in the KRI was held due to internal political competition and growing rebellion from the population against the poor economic performance and political situation rather than because the time was right for independence referendum. Focusing on the poor political and financial dynamics, as well as the lack of regional and international support for Kurdish independence, the article argues that independence was not a realistic goal and was rather used as a distraction amid internal turmoil. The example of the referendum in the KRI poses questions about the democratic credibility of such referenda, as the population were voting for an unachievable result and the referendum itself became a tool of internal political competition.     

Support and Opposition for Invading Iraq: Did the President's Speech Make a Difference?

Utilizing data from the annual San Antonio Survey, this research addresses the issue of support and opposition to invading Iraq among respondents randomly selected from Bexar County, Texas. Data were collected prior to and after President Bush addressed the nation on October 7, 2002, seeking broad citizen support for his plan, allowing us to ascertain whether or not his speech impacted the attitudes of potential voters. Our results indicate that the President's speech, along with the extensive media coverage about it, was effective in gaining support for his proposal to invade Iraq. A multivariate logistic regression analysis also displayed that the speech still had a significant impact even after controlling for confidence in the president, political orientation, race, ethnicity, nativity, and socio-demographic context. The findings suggest support for earlier research indicating that the impact of presidential speeches could boost the approval of a policy, in particular, if the speech occurred during his first term of office, was considered a “major” speech, was devoted to one important topic, and its primary focus was on foreign policy. Under these conditions, such a speech portrays the president as a strong leader.     

Tracking the War of Ideas: A Poll of Ottawa Muslims

A 2008 poll of 430 Ottawa Muslims found predominantly negative views of the U.S. war on terrorism, including the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. This poll also assessed approval of Western powers (U.S., Canada, Israel, United Nations) and challengers of Western power (Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hizballah, government of Iran). Surprisingly, attitudes of Ottawa Muslims toward militant Muslim groups were unrelated to their attitudes toward Western governments. Discussion suggests that this pattern, if confirmed in other Muslim polls, would mean that the war of ideas against radical Islam must address not one target but two: favorable opinions of militants and unfavorable opinions of the U.S. Muslims who come to like the West more may not like Muslim militants any less.