An overview of the EU–SA Strategic Partnership 10 years on: Diverging world views,persisting interests

ABSTRACT

The European Union–South Africa (EU–SA) Strategic Partnership has entered its 10th year. It is a product of its time and particular regional and international circumstances. These having changed somewhat over the course of the last decade, it is not surprising that the dynamics of the relationship, expressed through the strategic partnership's parameters, have undergone commensurate changes. Based on the recognition that the partnership is between a multilateral institution and a state, the difference in their respective strategic positions is inevitable. The challenge, therefore, is for the EU–SA Strategic Partnership to maintain a flexibility that allows for continued contestation, development and relevance. This paper reviews the historical context of the partnership and the challenging dynamics that have evolved over the lifespan of the partnership, providing the basis for the thematic discussion which follows in this issue. The analysis in this article demonstrates that, in spite of acknowledged challenges, the functionality of the strategic partnership based on persisting interests remains intact.     

Strategic coalition voting: Evidence from New Zealand

Whereas the classic literature on strategic voting has focused on the dilemma faced by voters who prefer a candidate for whom they expect has little chance of winning a seat, we consider the dilemma faced by voters in PR systems who do not expect their preferred party to be in government. We develop hypotheses relating to strategic voting over multi-party governments that we test using the New Zealand Election Study (NZES) campaign study of 2002. We find evidence that expectations play a role in structuring vote choice. While there is clear evidence of wishful thinking there is also evidence that voters respond to expectations about government formation. These expectations may mobilize voters and lead them to defect from their first preference.     

Tactical coalition voting and information in the laboratory

Tactical coalition voting (TCV) is a balancing strategy where voters choose to vote for their second preferred party in order to influence the policy direction of the government coalition formed. In this paper, we experimentally evaluate the extent voters in a PR system engage in TCV. We find significant evidence that voters in the laboratory, even those not experienced with PR systems, choose strategically to affect post election coalitions using a balancing strategy, although the percentage of voters who do so is much less than that predicted by the theory. We also find that although voters who are less informed are less likely to use a balancing strategy, strategic motivations are still a factor in their behavior.     

Voters and coalition governments

Coalition governments are the norm in parliamentary democracies. Yet, despite the predominance of this type of government, political scientists have only recently started to investigate how voters approach elections when a coalition government is the likely outcome. Such elections present additional uncertainty and complexity for voters compared with elections in plurality systems, where party choice translates more directly into a choice of government. These factors have lead to the assumption that strategic voting is unlikely to occur in systems that produce coalition governments. In this introductory article to the special issue on Voters and Coalition Governments, we consider whether voters have the capacity to anticipate specific coalition outcomes and propose a framework for understanding the conditions that lead to strategic voting in both plurality and proportional systems.     

破解“城管困境”的战略性人力资源管理视角——基于对北京城市管理综合执法队伍的调查研究

近些年围绕城管执法队伍产生了很多争论,一方面,地方政府对这支队伍有很强的依赖,另一方面,这支队伍受到了很多批评甚至攻击。本文在对北京市城管执法队伍进行深入调查的基础上发现,问题的根源在于国家对这支队伍缺乏明确的战略定位,这导致赋予他们的职责与这支队伍的数量和质量之间出现较为严重的不匹配,再加上没有及时采取措施对这支队伍的结构和管理机制进行优化,结果使城管执法工作的职责不断扩大,与这支队伍的人力资源状况之间的矛盾日益尖锐。相应地,必须从战略和人力资源管理两个层面来寻找解决问题的方案,即借助战略性人力资源管理思想来化解城管困境。     

关于加强中国国家软实力建设的几点思考

10月18日中共十七届六中全会在北京落幕,会议审议通过了《中共中央关于深化文化体制改革、推动社会主义文化大发展大繁荣若干重大问题的决定》,国家文化建设作为软实力塑造的重要组成部分,将人们的视线再次拉回到传统文化建设上来。自从20世纪90年代初美国著名学者约瑟夫·奈提出“软实力”概念以来,它就开始成为世界各国关注的焦点。纵观近现代世界一流强国崛起的历史,可以看出“软实力”建设在其崛起的过程中发挥了重要作用。中国在和平发展过程中如何提高自身的国际影响力,如何通过软实力来塑造中国良好的国际形象,掌控能力、战略信誉以及表现能力非常重要。     

中国气候外交的战略布局

近年来,气候变化问题在国际关系中的地位不断上升,成为影响国际格局走势的一个重要因素,并将引起世界各国外交领域的“气候变革”。当前,应对气候变化已成为中国“领域外交”的一项重要任务。气候外交作为中国整体外交布局的重要组成部分,是中国积极应对气候变化、优化对外战略布局的一项重要举措。认清形势并进行战略布局,积极开展气候外交,促进国民经济健康可持续发展,进一步提升国家形象,更好地履行国际责任,也是中国和平发展战略的一项重要内容。     

Strategy and Selection in International Relations

It is widely recognized that many of the samples we use for statistical analysis in international politics are the result of some selection process. Not surprisingly, selection models are becoming increasingly popular. At the same time, the role of strategic interaction has begun to play a more important role in statistical analyses. However, it has not been clear how statistical strategic models and selection models relate to each other, or what the effects are of employing one when the other is the more appropriate model. In this article, I 1) clarify why international relations scholars cannot shield themselves from selection bias simply by assuming their results are limited to a given sample; 2) show how recent statistical strategic models relate to traditional selection models and generalize the two sets of models by deriving a correlated strategic model; and 3) examine the effects of misspecifying either correlated errors or strategic interaction. My results indicate that failure to model the strategic interaction produces worse specification error than failure to account for correlated disturbances. In fact, traditional bivariate probit models appear to be superior only when states are almost completely uncertain about each others' preferences.     

Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy

Sanctions rarely work but they continue to be used frequently by policymakers. I argue that previous studies of sanctions ignore the problem of strategic censoring by focusing only on cases of observed sanctions. In this paper, I develop a unified model of sanction imposition and success and test it using a simultaneous equation censored probit model. This selection-corrected sanction model finds that the process by which sanctions are imposed is linked to the process by which some succeed while others fail, and that the unmeasured factors that lead to sanction imposition are negatively related to their success.     

Where in the world is South Africa? Lecture by Ambassador Tony Leon 14 February 2013

Most of the current constructs which theoretically underpin foreign policy for this country are either overblown or incoherent; they do not appropriately define or advance or prioritise South Africa's national interests abroad, nor do they acknowledge the tensions embedded in the clash between normative policies and realpolitik. Drawing from ‘real time’ experiences in international diplomacy, this lecture explores some of the dilemmas that South Africa, as a middle-range power in the world, confronts in its international engagements. The cost-effectiveness of South Africa's global projection is also examined, and some practical reforms to achieve better results in the current age of austerity suggested.