Endangering alliance or risking proliferation?: US–Japan and US–Korea nuclear energy cooperation agreements

This paper seeks to understand why the United States treated Japan and Korea differently in the revisions of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. On the sensitive issue of grating its allies the rights of developing enrichment and reprocessing (ENR), the United States did so for Japan in the 1977 and 1987 revisions, but did not for Korea during the 2015 revision. For the great power as a supplier state, there are two factors affecting the decision: policy-makers’ concern about alliance management prior to the calculation of security outcome, and firms’ commercial interests. In order to avoid damage to the US–Japan alliance and to maintain Japan's complementation for the US nuclear industry, Washington granted the rights of ENR to Tokyo. In contrast, because of its confidence of managing the US–Korea alliance and partly because of incompatibility of commercial interests between the two, Washington did not grant the rights to Seoul at the 2015 revision. Based on the comparison of the two cases, this paper underscores a need to alter the power projection theory regarding nuclear proliferation by explicating the alliance management as the ex ante element of power projection and by accounting for commercial interests such as fuel sale and technological partnership.     

亚太地区安全结构转型与东盟的角色

冷战结束后,亚太地区的安全结构经历了巨大的变化,特别是当前中关两国在亚太地区发生"权力分享"乃至"权力转移"之际,亚太地区安全结构的调整尤为显著。一方面,以美国为枢轴的"同盟型"结构经历了由"轮辐体系"向"网络化"的转型,形成了新的同盟、准同盟和潜在同盟的层次化布局;另一方面,以中俄为代表的新兴经济体在强化原有的"协作型"安全架构的同时,又通过"一带一路""欧亚联盟"等战略性倡议重塑亚太乃至整个欧亚大陆的地缘战略态势。作为亚太地区安全结构中的"第三股力量",东盟通过对一系列多边安全机制的建设,既为两种大国主导的安全架构提供了对话平台,也已成为实现未来亚太地区整体性安全架构的可行性路径之一。与此同时,由于大国战略竞争的加剧,逐渐侵蚀了东盟聚合力、中立性乃至在整体性安全架构中的"中心地位"。未来亚太地区安全架构的解构和重构需要中关找到新的战略共识,并对东盟的中心地位进行"再确认"。     

The scientific‐technological revolution,the forces of nature,and Marx's theory of value

ABSTRACT

Worker and environmental alliances are critical to advancing economic and environmental transformation, yet they have been very challenging to promote and sustain. This article analyzes these difficulties by providing a class analysis of “divide and conquer” strategies instigated by capitalist firms to subvert worker/environmental alliances. It situates the relationship between workers, environmentalist and capitalist firms in two historical contexts, namely of Keynesian welfare state capitalism and neoliberal capitalism. It highlights some contextual factors that shape “divide and conquer” strategies of capital—particularly the paradigm of economic growth characteristic of these historical periods. The conclusion contemplates some of the possibilities that a post-capitalist economy might provide for workers and environmentalists to rethink economic and ecological agendas without the distorting influence of the “divide and conquer” strategies employed by capitalist firms.     

The United States,Japan and the aerospace industry: from capture to competitor? 1

Abstract

For all its success in other high-technology sectors, Japan has largely failed to develop a strong aerospace sector. Its leading firms do not market finished aircraft and, in stark contrast to other sectors, the aerospace industry features a trade deficit with the United States. Japanese firms seem trapped as suppliers of components and sub-assemblies, mainly for the US industry. The general explanation for this state of affairs is that the Japanese industry has been effectively ‘captured’ by the United States; Boeing in particular dominates the sector and has effectively locked the Japanese firms into a relationship where moving up the value chain is difficult. This relationship may be changing. Japan's government has placed renewed emphasis on developing Japan's aerospace sector, while matters are evolving at the corporate level too, with Boeing's relations with Japan revealing a steadily increasing work share for the Japanese industry. The rise of Asia as an important market, and technological change making aerospace more like other manufacturing industries, presents Japanese firms with new incentives and opportunities beyond the US relationship.     

American Views of Europe

America’s diplomacy towards Europe has passed through two broad historic phases. A first, isolationist phase, determined in part by America’s need to maintain its domestic multinational consensus, was replaced, after World War II and under the Soviet threat, by a policy of hegemonic engagement. The Soviet collapse opened a new era forcing a reinterpretation of America’s role in Europe and the world. Four different narratives have emerged: triumphalist, declinist, chaotic or pluralist. If a unipolar American role seems unlikely to persist, American decline is all too possible. A new hegemonic replacement seems unlikely, which makes the pluralist narrative plausible and desirable. This multipolar world will require an adaptation of the Western alliance and a new way of thinking about interstate relations. Confederal Europe, for its experience in bargaining and conciliation, might have much to offer to the new plural world order.     

企业战略联盟伙伴选择研究

企业战略联盟对于提高企业抗风险的能力,实现企业绩效稳定持续增长具有非常重要的意义。虽然战略联盟具有很多优势,但却是很难管理的一种组织方式。据资料显示,战略联盟的成功率只有30%,而失败的主要原因是与联盟伙伴的关系问题。如何使战略联盟取得成功,进一步改进战略联盟的稳定性,是所有参加联盟的企业必须考虑的重大问题。     

西方“技术联盟”组建的战略背景、目标与困境

美国因战略背景变化不断进行战略工具调试,其主导的西方"技术联盟"作为关键的战略遏制工具,曾经成功地限制了战略竞争对手的经济与技术进步。面对新历史环境下的战略博弈,美国再次谋求联合西方盟友组建新的排他性"技术联盟",并加大与战略对手在新技术维度的战略竞争与博弈力度。目前的全球技术结构特征、全球价值链的结构制约、欧美技术治理结构等多重矛盾因素,给"技术联盟"的建立及其战略有效性带来了新困境,但"技术联盟"作为一种战略工具,依旧可能是未来美国政府在"战略安全"语境下的优先战略选项。"技术联盟"扩散的"战略安全"逻辑阻碍了全球技术进步,并将催生全球技术格局的"隔离"状态,同时其外溢效应还可能包括瓦解全球价值链的潜在风险。     

美国新兴技术治理的理念与实践

在中美科技博弈的背景下,新兴技术治理的实际效能兼具重要的经济价值和国际政治意涵。同时,新兴技术的高度不确定性对美国既有技术治理体系和能力提出全面挑战。美国新兴技术治理表现出明显的保护主义和技术民族主义倾向,服从并服务于其国家安全战略。新兴技术的革命性导致美国技术治理能力全面滞后于技术发展速度;国内治理体系碎片化且缺少有效协调机制的现实,制约着新兴技术治理的实际进程;全球范围内技术治理安全化的倾向严重阻碍着技术治理的国际合作,也阻碍美国与盟友之间的合作。拜登政府积极致力于实现美国技术治理体系和能力的现代化,试图采取多边主义策略对中国新兴技术发展进行限制和封锁;极有可能在坚持刚性措施的同时突出强调弹性措施在未来美国新兴技术治理中的优先等级;试图通过重建总统科技顾问委员会以及审查政府科学诚信政策等手段,重塑科学及科学家在新兴技术治理中的核心地位,突出“技术怀疑论”并对新兴技术发展采取更为严格的审查和监管措施,并可能重新确立基础研究在新兴技术治理中的基础性作用。     

Why do they want American Nukes? Central and Eastern European positions regarding US nonstrategic nuclear weapons

This article analyses the potential motivations behind the opposition of a number of Central and Eastern European States (CESs) to the withdrawal of US deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) from Europe. It shows why CES governments obtain no military benefits from the deployed NSNW; it argues CES are unlikely to truly see them as a promising bargaining chip; it suggests CES can derive only limited prestige from US-deployed weapons and the contrasting norm of ‘nuclear disarmament’ likely offers a more attractive option; and it assesses potential bureaucratic interests as improbable to play a decisive role. In contrast, the article proposes a more nuanced elaboration of the transatlantic ‘linkage’ argument. It maintains CES have significant motives to keep the United States involved in Europe, shows how they are likely to mistrust US commitment pledges, and argues they are prone to use the NSNW debate as a convenient instrument (within a limited toolbox) towards locking in the US foothold on the continent.