CAN RATIONAL CHOICE BE CONSIDERED A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME? EVIDENCE FROM INDIVIDUAL‐LEVEL PANEL DATA

In the last few decades, rational choice theory has emerged as a bedrock theory in the fields of economics, sociology, psychology, and political science. Although rational choice theory has been available to criminologists for many years now, the field has not embraced it as other disciplines have. Moreover, rational choice scholars have fueled this skepticism of the theory's generality by modeling offender decision making that is one‐sided—large on the costs of crime (sanction threats), short on the benefits of crime. In this article, we directly assess the generality of rational choice theory by examining a fully specified model in a population that is often presumed to be less rational—adolescents from lower socioeconomic families who commit both instrumental (property) and expressive crimes (violence/drugs). By using a panel of N = 1,354 individuals, we find that offending behavior is consistent with rational responses to changes in the perceived costs and benefits of crime even after eliminating fixed unobserved heterogeneity and other time‐varying confounders, and these results are robust across different subgroups. The findings support our argument that rational choice theory is a general theory of crime.     

网络黑产链犯罪中帮助行为的刑法评价

网络黑产链犯罪中的帮助行为与传统共同犯罪中的帮助行为有较大的区别,具体表现在行为人的主观故意内容、帮助行为与正犯行为的关联程度及行为的作用效果等方面。然而,目前对网络黑产链犯罪中帮助行为人以共同犯罪论处存在理论障碍,如欠缺共同故意且正犯行为难以认定为犯罪等。司法实践将帮助行为正犯化确实具有现实需要。帮助行为正犯化的论域应当限定在正犯、共犯分离二元参与体系的形式正犯概念之下。在我国刑法分则对实行行为明确定型的立法体制下,司法机关超越解释权限将帮助行为扩张为实行行为的解释与罪刑法定原则有悖。帮助信息网络犯罪活动罪的增设是网络帮助行为正犯化理论的典型立法实践,但成立该罪既不要求帮助行为人对被帮助者实施的具体犯罪内容有明确的认识,也不要求被帮助的犯罪行为在实体上或程序上被认定为犯罪。     

Avoiding the internet of insecure industrial things

Security incidents such as targeted distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on power grids and hacking of factory industrial control systems (ICS) are on the increase. This paper unpacks where emerging security risks lie for the industrial internet of things, drawing on both technical and regulatory perspectives. Legal changes are being ushered by the European Union (EU) Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive 2016 and the General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR) (both to be enforced from May 2018). We use the case study of the emergent smart energy supply chain to frame, scope out and consolidate the breadth of security concerns at play, and the regulatory responses. We argue the industrial IoT brings four security concerns to the fore, namely: appreciating the shift from offline to online infrastructure; managing temporal dimensions of security; addressing the implementation gap for best practice; and engaging with infrastructural complexity. Our goal is to surface risks and foster dialogue to avoid the emergence of an Internet of Insecure Industrial Things.     

超越“确保摧毁”：核武器数量、承诺可信度与核威慑原理

现有几乎所有关于核威慑的理论和政策研究都认为,核武器数量是否达到确保摧毁门槛对核威慑有效性有决定性影响。这种"确保摧毁"原则对学界的影响已达到范式级程度,以至于学者们在争论中国核武器数量够不够这个政策问题时,均自发地从该原则出发论证各自的主张。本文认为,"确保摧毁"范式忽视了承诺可信度在核威慑生效过程中所起的关键性作用,特别是未能充分意识到核武器数量变化对承诺可信度的反向影响以及这种反向影响对核威慑生效机制的影响,因而错将是否具备确保摧毁能力作为判断核威慑是否有效的唯一标准。通过剖析核武器数量、承诺可信度与核威慑有效性三者的作用关系,充分说明,"确保摧毁"既不是核威慑有效的充分条件,也不是其必要条件;未达到确保摧毁门槛时无需增加核武器同样有可能实现有效核威慑,而达到该门槛后为确保威慑有效反而应当(继续)增加核武器。超越"确保摧毁"范式有助于更准确、更完整地理解核威慑生效的全部机制。     

导弹防御与美国延伸威慑政策

对盟友提供的延伸威慑安全保证,是美国维持与盟友关系的重要基础。冷战时期,美国的延伸威慑主要通过核保护伞方式运作。为了应对冷战后新的安全环境,以满足新旧盟友的安全需求,美国开始通过导弹防御合作来提供对盟友的安全承诺与安全保证。这使得美国的延伸威慑从以核保护伞为核心,转变为核保护伞与导弹防御并重的模式。与盟友发展导弹防御合作关系,对美国的延伸威慑体系造成了一定程度的影响。其正面效益是,导弹防御合作使更多盟友能参与集体防务并贡献更多力量,还可增强盟友与伙伴的凝聚力和向心力,巩固美国的军事领导地位。但是,导弹防御系统仍然不具备绝对的可靠性和有效性,而且美国必须在以导弹防御合作促进延伸威慑方面投入更多的成本。如今,美国已开始加大力度,团结盟友进行新一轮的全球战略竞争。在此背景下,导弹防御延伸威慑模式的可持续性也将面临考验。