I don't Agree with Nick: Retrodicting the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition

Insider and journalistic accounts of the formation in May 2010 of the Conservative‐Liberal Democrat coalition actually, although not explicitly, rely on types of explanation familiar to those who study politics. They tell us that structure (or at least the economy) was important. So too, they suggest, were institutions (timing and the rules of the game). They also stress the importance of contingency (‘events, dear boy, events’) and agency (who did and said what to whom). While none of these things were unimportant, they only served to make certain an outcome that anyone with a passing acquaintance with the theory and the practice of coalition formation would have predicted—namely a ‘minimum winning coalition’. The only thing that could have made that outcome uncertain was a fundamental ideological difference between the two parties involved; however, it quickly became apparent—to the surprise of those of us who failed to appreciate how much the Liberal Democrats had changed—that no such difference existed. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the coalition formed was not merely minimum winning but ‘minimum connected winning’. As such, its formation was not so much breathtakingly bold and exciting as pretty much inevitable. In the end, the maths and the physics mattered more than the chemistry. Fortunately for the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats seriously underplayed their hand in the negotiations, with possibly disastrous consequences for them in the long term.     

Coalition formation and polarisation

Party ideology plays an important role in determining which government coalitions form. Research on coalition formation tends to focus on the ideological distance between coalition parties. However, the distribution of preferences within the coalition, and the legislature, also has implications for which government coalition forms – that is, a party's willingness to join a coalition depends not only on its prospective coalition partners, but also on the alternative coalitions it could form. Several hypotheses about the effects of legislative polarisation are offered and tested using data on coalition formation in 17 parliamentary democracies in the postwar period. This article also demonstrates how the traditional measure of ideological divisions within coalitions fails to capture certain aspects of ideological heterogeneity within the cabinet (and the opposition) and how Esteban and Ray's polarisation index helps in addressing these deficiencies.     

China's ‘win-win’ cooperation: Unpacking the impact of infrastructure-for-resources deals in Africa

This paper discusses China's use of infrastructure-for-resources loans in Africa as a win–win economic cooperation tool. This formula, offering generous loans for infrastructure in exchange for resource access, came into being largely as a default cooperation tool, inspired by China's own domestic experience, its competitive advantages and Africa's receptivity to this kind of barter deal. Embodying the principle of mutual benefit, China has consistently combined the extension of financial assistance for infrastructure construction in Africa with the expansion of Chinese business interests and the pursuit of resource security goals. The analysis focuses on whether this instrument is actually promoting African development or fuelling instead China's economic growth at the expense of African economies. The author argues that the impact has been mixed. Although there are some meaningful positive signs, many challenges persist, and as such the long-term developmental impact of this particular tool remains uncertain. The responsibility to ensure a positive outcome rests, however, on the African side as much as on China.     

Political Finance Regimes in Southeast Asia: Introduction

ABSTRACT

The three articles in this themed collection investigate the interplay between political finance regimes and the quality of democracy in Southeast Asia. Andreas Ufen's piece on political finance in Malaysia and Singapore argues that the semi-authoritarian regimes in both states have blocked the reform of campaign and party funding regulations in order to keep their opposition in check. The article on Indonesia, authored by Marcus Mietzner, showcases the country's dysfunctional political finance system as a major hurdle toward further democratization. In their contribution on Thailand, Napisa Waitoolkiat and Paul Chambers show that weak political finance regulations have contributed significantly to the shallowness of Thai parties. Overall, the collection demonstrates that without meaningful political finance reforms, Southeast Asia's democratic stagnation is likely to persist for many years to come.     

Laissez-faire versus Strict Control of Political Finance: Hegemonic Parties and Developmental States in Malaysia and Singapore

ABSTRACT

This article compares the financing of political parties and candidates in two Southeast Asian countries. In Malaysia, some political finance regulations exist only on paper, and political financing is for the most part not restrained at all. In contrast, the financing of candidates and parties has always been tightly circumscribed in Singapore. These different strategies, “laissez-faire” versus “strict control,” are the consequence of various factors. In Malaysia, the New Economic Policy has effected a close, often economically unproductive linkage between the state, the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition, and business. The rise of businesspeople has resulted in the commercialization of competition within (the United Malays National Organisation. Additionally, increasing competition between the ruling coalition and the opposition has resulted in growing expenditures for electioneering in the form of advertisements and electoral patronage. The laissez-faire style of regulation has been compounded by the difficult-to-control practices in East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak), where vote buying, electoral patronage based on the largesse of oligarchs, and obvious nonobservance of the rules have been typical. In contrast to Malaysia as a whole, the costs for parties and candidates are still relatively low in Singapore. As a cadre party, the PAP (People's Action Party) is relatively autonomous from private business interests, and intraparty competition is not commercialized; the developmentalist state is highly productive, and the ties between the state, the PAP, and business are not characterized by cronyism. Moreover, electioneering is not very commercialized because the opposition is still relatively weak.     

Debating Economic Democracy in South Korea: The Costs of Commensurability

ABSTRACT:

In the 2012 Korean presidential election, both liberal and conservative parties fought their campaigns on the slogan of “economic democratization,” marking a strong departure from past presidential elections and the growth-first policies of the then-incumbent conservative administration. Both parties pledged to tackle growing social polarization and the concentration of economic power by reforming the corporate governance of Korea's large, family-led conglomerates (chaebol), to the degree that chaebol reform itself became synonymous with economic democratization. This focus led to a series of heated exchanges among liberal-left reformers about the vision of economic democratization being promoted, with one camp favoring the creation of a “fair market” through the restructuring of the chaebol and another promoting the protection of the chaebol’s management rights over their affiliates as a desirable strategy for the creation of a Korean welfare state. This essay examines the long-standing tensions between these two liberal-left perspectives and argues that the capital-centric and market-based visions these camps promoted risk confining intellectual debate over the meaning of economic democracy within boundaries that serve dominant political interests.     

Advocacy Coalition for Historic Preservation in the U.S.: Changes in Motivations

As the policy discussions of historic preservation have become complicated in recent years, the advocacy for the use of heritage is now even more important, and the number of coalitions for promoting the economic value of heritage has been on the rise. This research provides a historical view of the development of advocacy coalition networks that actively pursue the benefits of heritage resources. Through this context, the article then examines a case study of the Wheeling National Heritage Area. The case exemplifies the framework of how coalition networks can provide the structure necessary to push preservation policy in government.     

The impact of timing and frequency of parental criminal behaviour and risk factors on offspring offending

This paper explores mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of criminal behaviour by investigating specifically the timing and frequency of the parents' criminal behaviour while including risk factors for criminal behaviour. The results demonstrate a dose–response relationship: parents' number of criminal convictions is positively related to offspring's conviction rate. Furthermore, children whose parents had only been convicted before the child's birth have more convictions than those whose parents had never been convicted. Children whose parents had been convicted after the child's birth have more convictions than those whose parents had only been convicted before the child's birth, but this difference can be explained partly by the observation that the latter group had fewer risk factors for crime. When parental convictions at different ages were examined, children whose parents had been convicted between their 7th and 13th birthdays exhibit more criminal behaviour than children whose parents were convicted in other periods, but none of the differences were significant. There does not appear to be a sensitive period for the impact of parental criminal behaviour. The results demonstrate support for static as well as dynamic explanations of intergenerational transmission such as the transmission of a criminogenic environment and/or mediation through risk factors.     

Portfolio Allocation within Parties: The Role of Regional Party Branches

One of the most persistent findings in coalition research is the proportionality rule (‘Gamson's Law’) that guides the allocation of portfolios between parties. This article tests the assumption that a similar rule is at work within parties. More specifically, it examines the allocation of ministerial posts to regional party branches in 25 post-war cabinets in Austria between 1945 and 2008. Drawing on the literature on party organisations, three types of resources (membership, vote and population shares) are identified, all of which account for a substantial part of the variation in the shares of cabinet seats awarded to each party branch. The analysis thus bears out the proportionality proposition to a significant degree. Furthermore, it is shown that there is considerable cross-party variation in the allocation patterns, which reflects differences in the organisational structure of the parties.     

Bills from the Floor: Why Governing Party Groups Initiate their Own Legislation

In parliamentary systems, why do party groups of the government camp initiate their own bills instead of going through the cabinet? This article suggests that such governing party group bills occur for three reasons: (a) cabinets hand out bills to the parties on the floor; (b) party groups or MPs want to signal to constituencies; or (c) parties on the floor are dissatisfied with cabinet policy making. Arguing that the absolute and relative importance of these explanations varies with institutional context, country-specific hypotheses with regard to the number of governing party group bills in Germany are tested. As expected, mechanisms (a) and (c) are especially important in explaining the occurrence of governing party group legislation in Germany.