首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   295篇
  免费   39篇
各国政治   3篇
工人农民   8篇
世界政治   3篇
外交国际关系   188篇
法律   47篇
中国共产党   2篇
中国政治   18篇
政治理论   13篇
综合类   52篇
  2023年   3篇
  2022年   1篇
  2021年   9篇
  2020年   8篇
  2019年   15篇
  2018年   15篇
  2017年   11篇
  2016年   11篇
  2015年   9篇
  2014年   23篇
  2013年   21篇
  2012年   21篇
  2011年   20篇
  2010年   18篇
  2009年   34篇
  2008年   34篇
  2007年   28篇
  2006年   17篇
  2005年   11篇
  2004年   9篇
  2003年   6篇
  2002年   4篇
  2001年   2篇
  2000年   1篇
  1999年   1篇
  1996年   1篇
  1992年   1篇
排序方式: 共有334条查询结果,搜索用时 140 毫秒
331.
During three days in 2003, an Israeli–Palestinian group met in London to negotiate the draft of the “Geneva Initiative,” which offered a potential final status agreement between Israel and Palestine. In this article, I analyze the video recording of these unofficial negotiations and examine how the framing and conduct of the talks enabled significant progress toward reaching an agreement. I describe six main framing techniques used by the mediators: calling the meetings an “exercise,” which reduced restraints on the participants and enhanced their flexibility, avoiding deep historical issues to focus solely on future‐oriented pragmatic solutions, allowing the participants to discuss any topic they chose while deliberately avoiding crucial narrative issues, convincing the participants that this track two negotiation was crucial for the future of official Israeli–Palestinian relations, accentuating the parties' understandings and agreements with each other, and building a sense of superordinate group identity among the participants, to encourage cooperation. These components were the key “ingredients” for the first — and still the only — (unofficial) detailed proposal for an Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement. They provide lessons that could improve the success of other track two negotiations.  相似文献   
332.
A range of studies have examined what should be said and done in crisis negotiations. Yet, no study to date has considered what happens when an error is made, how to respond to an error, and what the consequences of errors and responses might be on the negotiation process itself. To develop our understanding of errors, we conducted 11 semi-structured interviews with police crisis negotiators in the Netherlands. Negotiators reported making errors of three types: factual, judgment, or contextual. They also reported making use of four types of response strategy: accept, apologize, attribute, and contradict. Critically, the negotiators did not perceive errors as solely detrimental, but as an opportunity for feedback. They advocated for an error management approach, which focused on what could be learned from another person’s errors when looking back at them. Suggestions for improvement of the communication error management experience in crisis negotiations are discussed.  相似文献   
333.
334.
Although most scholars recommend making the first offer in negotiations, recent research and practitioners' experience have uncovered a second-mover advantage in certain situations. In the current article, we explore this first- versus second-mover dynamic by investigating the circumstances under which negotiators would make less favorable first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on the effects of negotiation power in the form of alternatives. Additionally, we examine the effects of low power on reservation prices and whether these effects could be mitigated using an anchor-debiasing technique. In Study 1, we manipulated negotiators' power in the form of the best alternative to the negotiated agreement and examined its effect on first offers and reservation prices. Our results showed that low-power negotiators would receive more favorable first offers than they would have made themselves when facing either low- or medium-power counterparts. Also, our results suggest that low-power negotiators had less favorable reservation prices than their medium- and high- power counterparts. In Study 2, we investigated whether this effect would persist in the face of anchor-debiasing techniques. Our results showed that while anchor-debiasing techniques did improve their first offers, low-power negotiators would still benefit from making the counteroffer rather than moving first. Our findings uncover the disadvantageous effects of low power on first-offer magnitude while offering practical advice to negotiators.  相似文献   
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号