全文获取类型
收费全文 | 295篇 |
免费 | 39篇 |
专业分类
各国政治 | 3篇 |
工人农民 | 8篇 |
世界政治 | 3篇 |
外交国际关系 | 188篇 |
法律 | 47篇 |
中国共产党 | 2篇 |
中国政治 | 18篇 |
政治理论 | 13篇 |
综合类 | 52篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 3篇 |
2022年 | 1篇 |
2021年 | 9篇 |
2020年 | 8篇 |
2019年 | 15篇 |
2018年 | 15篇 |
2017年 | 11篇 |
2016年 | 11篇 |
2015年 | 9篇 |
2014年 | 23篇 |
2013年 | 21篇 |
2012年 | 21篇 |
2011年 | 20篇 |
2010年 | 18篇 |
2009年 | 34篇 |
2008年 | 34篇 |
2007年 | 28篇 |
2006年 | 17篇 |
2005年 | 11篇 |
2004年 | 9篇 |
2003年 | 6篇 |
2002年 | 4篇 |
2001年 | 2篇 |
2000年 | 1篇 |
1999年 | 1篇 |
1996年 | 1篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有334条查询结果,搜索用时 140 毫秒
331.
Yuval Benziman 《Negotiation Journal》2016,32(1):49-62
During three days in 2003, an Israeli–Palestinian group met in London to negotiate the draft of the “Geneva Initiative,” which offered a potential final status agreement between Israel and Palestine. In this article, I analyze the video recording of these unofficial negotiations and examine how the framing and conduct of the talks enabled significant progress toward reaching an agreement. I describe six main framing techniques used by the mediators: calling the meetings an “exercise,” which reduced restraints on the participants and enhanced their flexibility, avoiding deep historical issues to focus solely on future‐oriented pragmatic solutions, allowing the participants to discuss any topic they chose while deliberately avoiding crucial narrative issues, convincing the participants that this track two negotiation was crucial for the future of official Israeli–Palestinian relations, accentuating the parties' understandings and agreements with each other, and building a sense of superordinate group identity among the participants, to encourage cooperation. These components were the key “ingredients” for the first — and still the only — (unofficial) detailed proposal for an Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement. They provide lessons that could improve the success of other track two negotiations. 相似文献
332.
A range of studies have examined what should be said and done in crisis negotiations. Yet, no study to date has considered what happens when an error is made, how to respond to an error, and what the consequences of errors and responses might be on the negotiation process itself. To develop our understanding of errors, we conducted 11 semi-structured interviews with police crisis negotiators in the Netherlands. Negotiators reported making errors of three types: factual, judgment, or contextual. They also reported making use of four types of response strategy: accept, apologize, attribute, and contradict. Critically, the negotiators did not perceive errors as solely detrimental, but as an opportunity for feedback. They advocated for an error management approach, which focused on what could be learned from another person’s errors when looking back at them. Suggestions for improvement of the communication error management experience in crisis negotiations are discussed. 相似文献
333.
334.
Although most scholars recommend making the first offer in negotiations, recent research and practitioners' experience have uncovered a second-mover advantage in certain situations. In the current article, we explore this first- versus second-mover dynamic by investigating the circumstances under which negotiators would make less favorable first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on the effects of negotiation power in the form of alternatives. Additionally, we examine the effects of low power on reservation prices and whether these effects could be mitigated using an anchor-debiasing technique. In Study 1, we manipulated negotiators' power in the form of the best alternative to the negotiated agreement and examined its effect on first offers and reservation prices. Our results showed that low-power negotiators would receive more favorable first offers than they would have made themselves when facing either low- or medium-power counterparts. Also, our results suggest that low-power negotiators had less favorable reservation prices than their medium- and high- power counterparts. In Study 2, we investigated whether this effect would persist in the face of anchor-debiasing techniques. Our results showed that while anchor-debiasing techniques did improve their first offers, low-power negotiators would still benefit from making the counteroffer rather than moving first. Our findings uncover the disadvantageous effects of low power on first-offer magnitude while offering practical advice to negotiators. 相似文献