IF A THREAT OF VIOLENCE IS PRESENTED,WHEN DOES THE LAW REQUIRE FAMILY MEDIATORS TO BREACH CONFIDENTIALITY?

For a family mediator to protect his client, a third party, and/or himself from unlawfully disclosing a client's admission, the family mediator should use the principles set forth in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California when a threat of violence is presented by one of his clients, since many states have adopted these principles through case law and statute to protect third parties from acts of violence. The two most significant factors in determining whether to breach confidentiality are the identifiability of the victim and the likelihood of the potential physical harm. If a jurisdiction has not explicitly done so via statute, the family mediator should nonetheless follow these principles since they are likely to be adopted by that jurisdiction through case law, because the probability of a court's finding a special relationship between a family mediator and a client is relatively high.     

俄罗斯的“中国威胁论”：历史与现实

俄罗斯的＂中国威胁论＂有其历史和现实原因,它是反华、侵华的历史残余,同时又有着较深厚的现实土壤,其内容比西方的＂中国威胁论＂更为广泛和具体。我们在制定对外政策时,应当对俄罗斯的＂中国威胁论＂给予重视,并采取相应的措施。     

How voters' perceptions of junior coalition partners depend on the prime minister's position

Recent studies document that voters infer parties' left‐right policy agreement based on governing coalition arrangements. This article extends this research to present theoretical and empirical evidence that European citizens update their perceptions of junior coalition partners' left‐right policies to reflect the policies of the prime minister's party, but that citizens do not reciprocally project junior coalition partners' policies onto the prime minister's party. These findings illuminate the simple rules that citizens employ to infer parties' policy positions, broaden understanding of how citizens perceive coalition governance and imply that ‘niche’ parties, whose electoral appeal depends upon maintaining a distinctive policy profile, assume electoral risks when they enter government.     

消费者对互联网银行的可接受度问题研究

互联网银行能否取得成功很大程度上取决于消费者对其的接受程度。西方互联网银行的发展早于中国,所以对其研究也早于中国,但这些早期研究对中国仍有启发意义。本文在借鉴西方学者研究基础上,综述了研究消费者是否接受互联网银行的相关理论,分析了影响消费者对互联网银行可接受度的相关因素,并着重从消费者的风险感知视角研究了影响消费者接受互联网银行的风险,最后就如何发展中国互联网银行提出了政策建议。     

Lay-Perspectives on Criminal Deviance,Goals of Punishment,and Punitivity

Empirical studies corroborate a relatively close relation between goals of sentencing and punitiveness. However, it is not clear what aspects of sentencing goals motivate harsh punishment. This study analyzes the structure of sentencing goals and scrutinizes in particular whether the idea of retribution is associated with punitiveness, or whether punishment considerations from a societal perspective (macrolevel) are the source of more punitive responses. A questionnaire was mailed to a random sample drawn in Bern, Switzerland. A total of 357 persons responded to items measuring constructs including goals of sentencing, punitiveness, target of justice considerations, and perceived threat to society, after reading one of three short stories about specific crimes (fraud, physical injury, assault). Results of this study reveal a two-dimensional structure of sentencing goals. One dimension represents readiness to punish and exclude the offender socially. The other dimension refers to concerns of the victim versus the needs of the society as a whole. The analysis provides a new interpretation of sentencing goals.     

论“台独“对我国安全和统一的威胁

目前台岛内"台独"势力十分猖獗,已对我国的战略安全、经济安全、领土与主权完整、民族尊严、政治安定构成巨大威胁.坚决制止和遏制"台独",是我们目前的一项紧迫任务.     

Economic Insecurity,Blame, and Punitive Attitudes

This study examines the relationship between punitive attitudes toward criminals, two measures of economic insecurity and a measure of blame for stagnating incomes that targets welfare, affirmative action, and immigration. In effect, we are testing whether punitiveness toward criminals is part of a general constellation of resentment toward what Gans (1995 Gans, H. J. 1995. The war against the poor, New York: Basic Books.  [Google Scholar]) has termed the “undeserving poor” and that Garland (2001 Garland, D. 2001. The culture of control, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) has described as the “politics of reaction.” Survey data involving 1,476 adults are assessed using OLS regression. Results indicate that blame of welfare, affirmative action, and immigration is the strongest predictor of punitiveness. Economic insecurity has variable input to punitive attitudes that depends on the measure used and the sex and race of respondents. Some evidence of an “angry White male” phenomenon is also provided by the results.     

Packing Heat in the Classroom: Public Support for “Armed Teacher” Policy

ABSTRACT

Recently, states have enacted teacher-carry laws. While controversial, little scholarship has tapped public attitudes toward such reforms. Because public opinion shapes policy, the public is an important stakeholder in this debate. Thus, we investigated three questions. First, how supportive is the public of arming teachers? Second, what demographic and social divides exist, if any, for reform approval? Finally, do crime-related perceptions, concerning views about public safety, and criminogenic influences shape policy preferences? We test these questions using a 2018 poll of Virginia residents (N = 521). Overall, approval for teacher-carry is split. Crime-related perceptions mediate some of the initial social and demographic divides in opinion but other correlates, such as parental status, remain salient predictors of views. Implications are discussed.     

Unity in the face of threat? Exploring the empirical relationship between strategic threat perceptions and public support for a common European army in Germany

ABSTRACT

Perceptions of threat from Russia’s military activities in Ukraine and President Trump’s critical attitude towards NATO have put the idea of a common European army on the agenda of European politics. Do these strategic threat perceptions also influence public support for the creation of a common European army? Previous research has largely overlooked strategic threat perceptions as individual-level determinants of public support for a common European army. This article explores the empirical relationship between strategic threat perceptions and support for a common European army at the individual level of analysis with representative German survey data from 2018. The multivariate analysis shows that perceiving Russia’s military activities in Ukraine as a threat to Germany’s security, and U.S. foreign and security policy as a threat to the cohesion of NATO significantly increases support for the creation of a common European army, even when the influence of numerous other determinants is controlled for. The findings highlight the importance of considering strategic threat perceptions in future analyses of public opinion on European defence cooperation and integration.     

How does democracy influence citizens’ perceptions of government corruption? A cross-national study

We examine the effect of democracy as an institutional context on individuals’ perceptions of government corruption. To do so, we compile an integrated dataset from the Asian, Afro, and Latino Barometer Surveys and use a hierarchical linear regression model. Our primary finding is that the effect of democracy has different effects on ordinary citizens’ perceptions of corruption in different contexts. In general, people in countries with higher levels of democracy tend to perceive their governments to be more corrupt. However, more importantly, conditional models show that in countries with more developed democratic institutions, individuals with stronger democratic values are less likely to perceive the government to be corrupt. Moreover, people in such countries are less likely to assess their government based on their perceptions of economic situation.