The Age of Anxiety: The Crisis of Liberal Democracy in a Post-Hegemonic Global Order

The crisis of liberal democracy is closely associated with major global shifts, which have been accelerated by the global financial crisis of 2008, with its dislocating effects in the established democracies of the global centre. Relative stagnation and rising problems of inequality and unemployment, coupled with additional shocks in the form of mass migration and terrorist attacks have generated fertile grounds for the rise of right-wing radical populist sentiments, which have been turned into electoral advantage by charismatic leaders. The crisis of liberal democracy is also a global phenomenon in the sense that liberal democracy has been severely challenged by the rise of strategic models of capitalism, notably its authoritarian version represented by the growing power and influence of the China-Russia coalition. Indeed, the success of the latter has served as a kind of reference for many authoritarian or hybrid regimes in a changing global context, at a time when the key Western powers appear to be losing their previous economic and moral appeal.     

One in 20: the G20, middle powers and global governance reform

There is a growing consensus that the international system needs to be reformed to reflect the changing distribution of power with the rise of the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs). The Group of Twenty (G20) has been at the centre of these discussions. Within the G20, emphasis has been on great powers or rising powers and their capacity to drive reform. Less attention has been given to the preferences and strategies of middle powers in the G20 and their capacity to shape global governance reform. Drawing on interviews with G20 officials, this paper considers the role of Australia as president of the G20 in 2014. Australia’s presidency presents a unique opportunity to examine the behaviour of a middle power as it balances the competing global governance claims of the USA and the BRICs.     

Emerging powers at the UN: ducking for cover?

The economic rise of China, India, South Africa, and Brazil has turned these countries into important providers of development assistance. While they seem increasingly comfortable in their bilateral relations with other developing countries, they are struggling to adapt their position within global institutions such as the United Nations. Do they turn their increased weight into a greater influence at the UN, and if not, why not? This article analyses financial contributions and political positioning at the UN in the area of development. Despite small changes, the four countries mostly insist on keeping their traditional status as recipients and ‘ordinary’ developing countries. This reservation can be explained in two ways: first, a more explicit leadership creates political and material costs that outweigh the potential benefits. Second, their shared experiences as developing countries make it hard to break ranks at the UN.     

特朗普政府对华军事战略评析及对策思考

在国际政治正重回“大国竞争时代”的背景下,美国已将中国视为全球、全方位、首要战略竞争对手。特朗普政府对华军事战略包括军事战略目标、地缘战略重点、军力资源配置、作战思想、军事装备技术竞争等多方面内容,在美国对华战略判断日益消极的前提下,中国军力的发展、战略空间的拓展以及中美战略竞争将受到深远影响。针对中美实力对比、管控中美战略竞争、应对未来可能出现的中美军事冲突等,我们应当保持战略定力和战略自信,自主回应“大国竞争”,军、政、经等多领域配合,“拆解”美国对华军事战略、努力寻找和扩大中美共同利益,缓解美国对华敌意。     

农村宅基地“三权分置”制度

2018年《中共中央国务院关于实施乡村振兴战略意见》明确提出农村宅基地要实行所有权、资格权、使用权“三权分置”政策。为了更好地保障农民的生存权和财产权,维护农民的合法权益,需要尽快创设宅基地“三权分置”制度体系。在“三权分置”制度中,农村集体经济组织是农村宅基地所有权的主体,农村集体经济组织成员是宅基地资格权的主体,但新的宅基地使用权主体不应仅仅限于本村的集体经济组织成员,在新的制度体系下,使用权的主体范围应当不断扩大。本文从我国“三权分置”的历史演变出发,分析了“三权分置”的基本要义及三权之间的关系,并提出了推进农村宅基地“三权分置”制度改革的相关建议。     

Norm-making,norm-taking or norm-shifting? A case study of Sino–Japanese competition in the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed rail project

This paper’s main aim is to contribute to the debate on the impact of China’s rise on the established norms and practices in the field of international development. To do so, it zooms in on a single infrastructure project, the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail line, which involved intense competition between China and Japan. Specifically, it examines how competition between China, a non-Western emerging power, and Japan, an OECD member, led to a recalibration of both China and Japan’s approaches to infrastructure financing in the region. The findings suggest that rather than straight convergence or competition between diverging models, there is an ongoing process of two-way adjustment between China, and representatives of the dominant global norms and practices. We also argue that to understand the implications of China’s participation in the field of international development, and its impact on the ‘rules of the game’ of global governance, researchers should avoid positioning inquiries within the premises of China’s one-directional impact on the development assistance regime. Rather, it is necessary to take into account a complex set of relationships including China, host countries and other ‘socialised’ actors, and the process of negotiation between them.     

How can emerging powers speak? On theorists,native informants and quasi-officials in International Relations discourse

Emerging powers like China, India and Brazil are receiving growing attention as objects in International Relations (IR) discourse. Scholars from these emerging powers are rarely present as subjects in mainstream IR discourse, however. This paper interrogates the conditions for scholars in emerging powers to speak back to the mainstream discipline. It argues, first, that ‘theory speak’ is rare from scholars based in periphery countries perceived to be ‘emerging powers’. Despite increasing efforts to create a ‘home-grown’ theoretical discourse in China, India and Brazil, few articles in mainstream journals present novel theoretical frameworks or arguments framed as non-Western/Southern theory or even as a ‘Chinese school’ or ‘Brazilian concepts’. Second, scholars from emerging powers tend to speak as ‘native informants’ about their own country, not about general aspects of ‘the international’. Third, some scholars even speak as ‘quasi-officials’, that is, they speak for their country.     

Public commitment strategies in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty

We analyze the impact of public commitment strategies as bargaining tools in the negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty using a sequential-bargaining model with incomplete information. The analysis suggests selection bias in observable public commitments with respect to the kind of issues that are publicly challenged as well as the kind of governments that will ‘go public’. Public commitments are more likely under high uncertainty over audience costs. Further, the effect of public commitments on the duration and outcome of negotiation is conditional as well. In our empirical analysis, where we analyze the intergovernmental stage of the negotiations on the European Constitutional Treaty, we find strong empirical support for each of our theoretical predictions. Governments were most likely to commit publicly if they represented a domestic constituency that was negative about the EU Constitution and, at the same time, contained many undecided respondents. Moreover, these public commitments were generally quickly accommodated. In contrast, public commitments were less likely to lead to any changes if they were made by governments representing a domestic constituency that was relatively positive about the draft Constitution or negative and decided. In the latter case, however, public statements made bargaining deadlock more likely.

从政治层面看演变中的中俄关系

20世纪80年代末90年代初苏联解体、冷战结束后,国际形势发生了新的变化。大国关系也处于全新的构筑之中。其显著的标志是美、俄、中、日、欧盟世界五大力量的相互关系带有根本性的调整。在这种国际环境背景下．中俄两国关系在以往中苏关系的基础上继续发展。逐步确立了中俄两国的战略协作伙伴关系。冷战后的两国关系呈现出三大特点两国关系稳定迅速发展;政治关系重于经济关系;变与不变同时存在。对于中俄关系。在发展趋势上我们要在努力争取长期稳定的睦邻友好合作关系的同时．关注两国关系中的不稳定因素,做到有备无患、未雨绸缪、趋利避害。     

村民自治推进中存在的问题与对策探讨

村民自治是中国农村基层民主的重要形式。当前在推进村民自治的进程中还存在乡镇政府干部制约村民自治的正常进展、村委会干部的权力难以受到有效制约和村民自治权利的保障与救济不完善等问题。因此,要完善村民自治,首先要从战略高度重视农村文化教育事业,使之成为村民自治的重中之重;其次要完善村民自治的监督机制,保障自治权不被异化,完善村委会选举制度,真正实行民主选举。