缅甸军人与政治关系的现状与趋势

在从1948年1月4日独立至今的68年间,缅甸军人直接掌权或由其扶持的政党执政的时间共约56年。2015年11月8日,昂山素季领导的全国民主联盟在大选中获得压倒性胜利,军方扶持的联邦巩固与发展党惨败。2016年3月30日,民盟资深成员吴廷觉总统领导的新政府宣誓就职,取代退役将领吴登盛领导的巩发党政府。缅甸军人长期直接或间接执政的历史暂告结束,这是缅甸民主转型的里程碑。但依照缅甸宪法,军人仍保留诸多权力,是与民盟政府并立的另一权力中心,军人与民盟政府关系好坏将是影响缅甸政治发展的关键因素。缅甸军人完全退出政治尚需时日,不排除其再度干政的可能。     

2010年东南亚政治经济发展概述

2010年东南亚地区政治经济形势的发展特点可以概括为“政治上喜忧参半,经济上整体上扬,区域合作缓慢推进”。总体上讲,除泰国外,东南亚地区各国基本上都保持了政治社会的稳定;尽管挑战明显增加,但东盟共同体建设以及由东盟主导的东亚合作仍然缓慢推进;东盟国家整体实现恢复性增长,东南亚成为最具经济活力的地区之一。     

论当代的神权政治——伊斯兰原教旨主义

欧洲中世纪确立了以基督教为主体的神权政治思想,伴随着西欧封建社会的瓦解,神权政治体系随之解体。伊斯兰教在自身发展史上也曾确立了神权政治思想,随着20世纪70年代以来伊斯兰原教旨主义运动在世界各地的勃然兴起,神权政治再次引起广泛关注。伊斯兰原教旨主义的兴起应得益于其本身所独有的复古机制,伊斯兰教本身所持有的教条使其产生带有某种必然性,同时,宗教政治化、政治宗教化的传统为伊斯兰原教旨主义提供了政治合法性的根基。     

宗教与政治:当代伊朗政治现代化的困惑

自伊斯兰教什叶派成为伊朗官方宗教以来,在伊朗政治现代化进程中经历了参与、退出,再到主导的过程,从而使伊朗政治进程总是在宗教和政治两大因素间徘徊。从巴列维王朝的世俗化改革到霍梅尼神权政治理论的实践,宗教和政治两大因素在伊朗国家发展道路抉择中的竞争性,在本质上反映的是现代社会对宗教地位的定位问题。如何实现宗教与政治间的平衡,始终是伊朗政治发展面临的重大课题。     

试析土耳其文官政治与军人政治的博弈——基于正义与发展党的执政实践

军人在土耳其历史文化中占据重要地位,曾经通过3次军事政变推翻民选政府,并通过还政文官政府使土耳其沿着凯末尔主义的方向前进。正义与发展党上台后,尽管文官政府和军方极力维持脆弱的平衡关系,但双方在权力争夺、加入欧盟、库尔德问题、复兴伊斯兰文化等方面分歧重重,争端不断。文官政治和军人政治博弈的结果说明了土耳其的军人政治逐渐让步于文官政治,军人干政在可预见的将来很难再发生;尽管世俗主义和伊斯兰主义之间的斗争仍很激烈,但已逐渐趋于理性;正义与发展党"保守的民主"模式获得民众的普遍认可,将为中东诸国提供一种民主发展的范式。     

国际政治视角下的中阿博览会

进入新世纪以来,我国在外交领域积极推行全方位外交,努力发展同阿拉伯国家的关系。中阿经贸论坛于2013年9月正式升格为中阿博览会,成为中阿关系史上又一具有里程碑意义的重大事件。中阿博览会在推动中阿经济发展的同时,也为稳定和发展中阿关系提供了更高层次的互动机制,具有重大的国际政治意义。     

China's ‘charm offensive’ in the Pacific and Australia's regional order

Abstract

In recent years, a perception has emerged among many policymakers and commentators that the deepening of the People's Republic of China engagement in the Pacific Islands Region, predominantly through its expanding foreign aid programme, threatens to undermine the existing regional order, in which Australia is dominant. In this article, it is argued that China's apparent ‘charm offensive’ in the Pacific is mainly driven by commercial, not political, imperatives and is far more fragmented and incoherent than is often assumed. Hence, its (real) political effects hinge, not on any Chinese strategic designs for regional domination, or even a more limited resource security agenda, but on the intent and capacity of Pacific governments to harness deepening aid, investment and trade relations with China towards their own foreign and domestic policy objectives, which include limiting Australian interference in the internal governance processes of Pacific states. This argument is demonstrated by the case of Fiji after the December 2006 military coup.     

Citizen participation through mobilization and the rise of political Islam in Indonesia

The idea that populations participate politically outside of the formal mechanisms of a political system and through mass mobilizations is a reasonably accepted part of political science orthodoxy. Since the turn of the last century, in Indonesia, as in other developing countries, populations have mobilized en masse at particular stages of their histories into nation-state building processes, as well as have been mobilized by political authorities seeking to bolster or install their regimes. In the 1960s, Sukarno increasingly sought to mobilize a range of classes and interests behind his presidency and, in 1965–66, Suharto and his military backers organized anti-communist groups behind a systematic campaign to eradicate the Communist Party and remove Sukarno. Throughout the so-called ‘New Order’ period (1966–98), Suharto periodically mobilized groups behind his presidency and against opponents who, in turn, engaged in occasional street demonstrations against the regime. In the mid-to-late 1990s, the opposition leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri became an important rallying point for popular dissent against Suharto and, in 1998, the student movement played a crucial role in street demonstrations which helped bring down the president after three decades of strongman rule. In the post-Suharto period, which has seen the installation of three presidents between 1998 and 2001, mass mobilizations have continued to be a striking feature of the political landscape. President Habibie mobilized pro-government militias against opponents and student demonstrators, who threatened to bring down his regime. The Muslim supporters of Abdurrahman Wahid entered the streets in their thousands to protest the parliamentary impeachment of the president. Radical Muslim groups demonstrated against US military strikes on Afghanistan and against President Megawati Sukarnoputri's initial soft stance on the strikes. Potentially, these kinds of demonstrations could undermine Megawati's presidency. However, parliamentary processes rather than street mobilizations brought the presidencies of Habibie and Abdurrahman to an end while Megawati is still seeing out her term. This article examines the political mobilizations of the late-Suharto and post-Suharto periods and asks whether these mobilizations pose a threat to Indonesia's fragile transition to democracy and to a more stable institutional political process.