论法经济学分析范式的一般结构——作为一种研究方式的考察和理解

本文阐述法经济学分析范式的概念及其方法论意义,分析法经济学分析范式的存在形态和本体论意义上的结构,并概括了其一般体系和基本类型。本文的分析表明:法经济学分析范式的一般结构决定了法经济学现有理论的整个知识框架,并在逻辑上构成了法经济学全部历史发展的理论实质。     

Theoretical foundation for a debtor friendly bankruptcy law in favour of creditors

Although many works support creditor friendly bankruptcy laws, an evolution towards debtor friendly systems is at work. This paper proposes a theoretical ground to meet this paradox. It reconsiders the economic role of bankruptcy law by stressing on the courts’ production of information. It reveals that the transmission of a lenient signal by judges makes it possible to reduce the hazard that bad risks seek to avoid going on trial. Thus, it shows that debtor friendly bankruptcy laws are not systematically opposed to creditors’ interests. They reduce the risk of the economy and contribute to the improvement of the global efficiency.      

法与经济学视野中的外部性及其解决方法分析

对于外部性的含义,学者们多从经济学的角度进行界定;而对于外部性的解决方法,学者们又多从制度的角度加以寻求。从法律视角即权利和义务的角度,也可以对外部性进行界定,并由此提出法律解决的方法。在解决外部性方面,经济法机制优于民法和行政法机制,但经济法解决外部性也需要注意一些问题。     

对我国食品召回的新制度经济学分析——写在食品安全法通过之前

食品召回制度是食品安全和市场经济法治化的必然要求。食品召回作为一项制度创新,能有效抑制企业的机会主义行为,并通过制度向消费者作出质量承诺,消除由于信息不对称产生的不信任,形成对市场行为的确定性预期,从而降低交易成本,提高市场整体效益。目前,由于我国市场经济制度尚不成熟,企业生产方式,政府管理体制,技术和标准的管理水平,以及与之相关的各项配套制度,在短时间内无法与该制度的实施相适应。用新制度经济学的理论加以分析,有助于我们对这一制度的制定和实施有一个科学的认识和理性的预期。     

中国侵犯知识产权犯罪原因探析

犯罪学意义上的知识产权犯罪是指侵犯他人的知识产权权益，对社会具有严重危害性的行为。犯罪行为的发生是犯罪外因与内因相互作用的结果。在外因层面，我国社会经济、政治、文化及法制环境中存在的某些不利因素，为侵犯知识产权犯罪提供了滋生滋长的土壤；在内因层面，犯罪经济学的成本一收益理论阐释了在知识产权犯罪巨额收益的基础上，诸多犯罪外因极大地降低了侵犯知识产权犯罪的成本．最终导致个体犯罪动机的形成。提高我国公民的知识产权保护意识，完善侵犯知识产权犯罪的立法，以及大力改善执法不力的现状，是当前形势下知识产权犯罪防治之举的重中之重。     

新经济自由主义研究中应该注意区分的若干问题

在我们学习和借鉴西方市场经济的理论和政策过程中,越来越多的人对西方新自由主义思潮给予关注,并进行了针对性的研究,但其中存在着不同程度的误解和不适当的态度,妨碍着我们正确对待新自由主义思潮.我们要区分新自由主义经济学中的合理因素和谬误成分,区分新自由主义经济学所涉及的利益和立场在不同时间、不同范围、不同对象上的差异,区分理论界与政策决策当局认识的异同、学术界认识与"华盛顿共识"的异同,区分新经济自由主义的国内政策和国外政策的异同,注意新自由主义经济政策与国家干预主义和保护主义经济政策的交替、转换和灵活运用.发展中国家学习和借鉴新自由主义经济学必须注意:要将市场化与市场自由化、全面市场化区分开,将对外开放与对外全面自由开放区分开,将市场化、产权改革与全面私有化区分开,将市场化与快速市场化和快速自由化区分开.     

Lessons of Russian in Afghanistan

The experience of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan (1979–1989) is considered through the prism of institutional transfers. Afghanistan has a long history of attempts to implement Muslim, Soviet and Anglo-Saxon institutional designs. Most of them have failed. This failure can be attributed to the lack of ‘elective affinity’ between traditional and new institutions imported from more developed countries. It is argued that a careful examination of the degree of elective affinity must precede any attempt of institutional transfers. An analysis of Ph.D. dissertations defended by Afghan students at Soviet and Russian universities complements logical arguments and references to historical facts.

借贷合同与赠与合同之间的司法抉择

基于“特别关系”所产生的借贷合同或是赠与合同纠纷往往会让裁判者感到十分棘手，不仅仅是证据的搜集和判定十分困难，最重要的是缺乏一个稳定的裁判标准以及依据这个标准所发展出来的兼具科学性和解释力的论证方法。通过对借贷合同和赠与合同的重构以及对“特别关系”下交易费用和担保的分析，依靠法经济学“社会财富最大化”这一标准，采用多重情况成本一收益计算比较和概率的引入，使得裁判者可以细致严谨地判断出哪一种抉择是更加理性的。     

规制的公共实施论评述

规制公共实施论是新比较经济学的一个热点研究领域。公共实施论的积极之处在于,强调对政府的中性态度,强调不同制度结构决定着规制实施能力的差别,强调从实施能力角度重新理解交易费用等,但在对规制的公共实施论的实践含义、认识含义与基本设定方面,却存在不可忽视的缺陷,文章就以上问题对公共实施论进行了较为全面的述评。     

The Resurrection of Group Selection as a Theory of Human Cooperation

Two books edited by members of the MacArthur Norms and Preferences Network (an interdisciplinary group, mainly anthropologists and economists) are reviewed here. These books in large part reflect a renewed interest in group selection that has occurred among these researchers: they promote the theory that human cooperative behavior evolved via selective processes which favored biological and/or cultural group-level adaptations as opposed to individual-level adaptations. In support of this theory, an impressive collection of cross-cultural data are presented which suggest that participants in experimental economic games often do not behave as self-interested income maximizers; this lack of self-interest is regarded as evidence of group selection. In this review, problems with these data and with the theory are discussed. On the data side, it is argued that even if a behavior seems individually-maladaptive in a game context, there is no reason to believe that it would have been that way in ancestral contexts, since the environments of experimental games do not at all resemble those in which ancestral humans would have interacted cooperatively. And on the theory side, it is argued that it is premature to invoke group selection in order to explain human cooperation, because more parsimonious individual-level theories have not yet been exhausted. In summary, these books represent ambitious interdisciplinary contributions on an important topic, and they include unique and useful data; however, they do not make a convincing case that the evolution of human cooperation required group selection.