Weak and Ineffective? Reassessing the Party Political Leadership of John Major

Interpretations on the party political leadership of John Major are dominated by perceptions of weakness and ineffectiveness. This article examines his party political leadership by considering the relationship between, first, his political ambitions, and, second, his style of political leadership. When evaluating the political ambitions of Major, the article will demonstrate that he was ideologically agnostic and a political pragmatist. When examining his party political leadership style, the article will demonstrate, via an examination of his management of the European policy divide and his Cabinet management, that he was politically indecisive and an avoider of political confrontation. The article concludes, however, that perceptions of his weakness and ineffectiveness should be contextualised due to the following two factors: first, the constraints of inheriting an ideologically divided parliamentary Conservative party; and, second, the contrasting circumstances that ensured that his predecessor and successor appeared strong and effective, which have magnified perceptions of his weakness and ineffectiveness.     

IS Success and Failure—The Problem of Scale

In the midst of Implementing Electronic Government (IEG), the almost knee-jerk reaction of our political elite seems to be to embrace hugely ambitious Information Systems (IS) solutions to public-sector operations. Problem after problem has been viewed as solvable by throwing some big IT at it. However hindsight and a wealth of evidence and examples shows that overly large-scale public-sector IT projects do not work and persistently end in failure and costly waste. In this article we consider IT projects 'failures' and the combination of social and technical factors that contribute. We illustrate our argument with more detailed reference to the Connecting for Health agenda, part of the NHS National Programme for IT. We suggest 'think local, think modular' to build on good practice and advocate use of the government's own 2004 eGovernment Interoperability Framework (eGIF) to learn lessons from past IT project catastrophes.     

Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union

Lobbying is central to the democratic process. Yet, only four political systems have lobbying regulations: the United States, Canada, Germany and the EU (most particularly, the European Parliament). Despite the many works offering individual country analysis of lobbying legislation, a twofold void exists in the literature. Firstly, no study has offered a comparative analysis classifying the laws in these four political systems, which would improve understanding of the different regulatory environments. Secondly, few studies have analysed the views of key agents—politicians, lobbyists and regulators—and how these compare and contrast across regulatory environments.
We firstly utilise an index measuring how strong the regulations are in each of the systems, and develop a classification scheme for the different 'ideal' types of regulatory environment. Secondly, we measure the opinions of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, exist between the different ideal types of system and their opinions. The conclusion highlights our findings, and the lessons that can be used by policy-makers in systems without lobbying legislation.     

China: Administrative Corruption — Experience in a Comparative Context

As a new world economy emerges what is being learned about the accompanying phenomenon of administrative corruption? To probe this question we combine study of current developments in China with prevailing theories of corruption. The administrative corruption experience, as it has unfolded during the economic development thrust of the Deng reform era, is described and analysed in a comparative context. In specifically interjecting the American experience we suggest that a balanced control response to corruption —rather than an elimination focus—could be a fruitful avenue for policy and research, and that informal, social approaches to corruption control are pregnant with possibilities. China's experience offers a significant opportunity to push the margin of wisdom on these issues as they relate to economic and political development.     

CEOs, POLICIES AND PUBLIC BODIES

Abstract: The literature on statutory authorities has concentrated largely upon matters of structure and administrative arrangements. One significant dimension which has received scant treatment is the idiosyncratic role of chief executive officers in such organisations and their ability to capture both the agency and policy-direction, often in ways immune from government control. This article mainly examines one example from the Northern Territory, the Darwin Trade Development Zone, but evidence is included to support the contention that similar processes occur in other statutory authorities both locally and elsewhere in Australia. It is argued that structural reforms cannot by themselves remedy the gap between expectation and policy-delivery. Avenues for reform are discussed, including the more orthodox accountability linkages, and the conclusions drawn argue for greater attention to be given to the appropriateness of chief executive appointments within a context of more disciplined and coherent policy-direction.     

ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTUAL GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY-MAKERS

Abstract: Traditionally public policy analysis has been able to employ the conceptual framework offered by the theory of market failure in order to evaluate the efficiency of market outcomes. However, until fairly recently, no corresponding analytical structure existed which could facilitate the examination of the efficiency and equity characteristics of government or non-market outcomes. Quite apart from public choice theory, an embryonic normative theory of government failure has now been developed which can act as a conceptual analogue to the market failure paradigm. At present, three theories of government failure coexist in the literature: Wolf's theory of non-market failure; Le Grand's theory of government failure; and Vining and Weimer's theory of govern- ment production failure. These models form the basis for a more universal theory of government failure. Nevertheless, in its current state of development this seminal literature can still assist in rational public policy design subject to certain caveats. Foremost amongst these is the need for policy analysts to augment the efficiency and equity criteria with some additional broader normative measures, and the necessity for care to be taken in the use of allocative efficiency as a benchmark in non-market circumstances.