Shifting rights,property and authority in the forest frontier: ‘stakes’ for local land users and citizens

Customary land and forests are more embedded in the global economy than ever. With globally significant supplies of land and raw materials and favorable terms for foreign investors, developing countries – particularly in Africa – have become increasingly attractive trade partners and destinations for investors. Increasing competition over land is placing new pressures on vast tracts of forest and woodland, areas often considered ‘under-utilized’ by national governments despite their critical role in supporting local livelihoods. While increased demand for primary agricultural, forest and mining commodities in the context of forest tenure reforms and decentralized decision-making could create unprecedented economic opportunities for forest-dependent communities, increased ‘stakes’ over forest resources and land will undoubtedly heighten governance challenges. This is in no small part due to the political dynamics of property, and to the role of the ‘recursive constitution of property rights and authority’ in the evolution of the modern nation-state. By identifying the social ‘stakes’ associated with different pathways through which sectoral and extra-sectoral commodities shape forests, this paper provides a conceptual framework for analyzing how shifting contours of rights, property and authority in the context of forest-related trade and investment shape human well-being for affected communities and the wider citizenry of host countries. It then illustrates the use of the framework through its application to two brief case studies from southern Africa: tobacco production in Malawi and copper mining in Zambia. It is hoped that this framework will provide a meaningful contribution to growing scholarship on the political dynamics of property, and implications for rights-based approaches to agricultural investment and large-scale land acquisitions.     

Strafrahmen,Strafsatz, Strafschärfung gem §§ 39, 313 StGB

Mit der Strafbefugnis in § 281 Abs 1 Z 11 erster Fall StPO wird der für die Strafbemessung zur Verfügung stehende Strafrahmen angesprochen. Relevant dafür sind jene die Strafbefugnis bestimmenden Umst?nde, welche nicht bereits Gegenstand zul?ssiger Anfechtung des Schuldspruchs im Rahmen von § 281 Abs 1 Z 10 StPO sind. Mit Strafsatz wird nicht die Strafbefugnis iSd § 281 Abs 1 Z 11 erster Fall StPO, sondern vielmehr die logisch vorgelagerte Subsumtion, die unter § 281 Abs 1 Z 10 StPO releviert werden kann, angesprochen. Ist das Sch?ffengericht – sei es auch aufgrund einer Fehleinsch?tzung über das Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen der §§ 39, 313 StGB – verfehlt von einer erweiterten Strafbefugnis ausgegangen, steht § 281 Abs 1 Z 11 erster Fall StPO selbst dann offen, wenn die ausgemessene Strafe innerhalb des zutreffenden Rahmens liegt. Hat es bei der Sanktionsfindung umgekehrt trotz vorliegender Voraussetzungen keine erweiterte Sanktionsbefugnis in Rechnung gestellt, ist Z 11 erster Fall hingegen – schon aus prozessualen Gründen – nicht anzunehmen. Die Zul?ssigkeit einer Strafsch?rfung nach §§ 39, 313 StGB ist, zumal es sich dabei um §§ 28 f StGB nachgelagerte Umst?nde handelt, für die Anwendung von §§ 17, 21, 37, 57 StGB und § 191 StPO ohne Bedeutung.     

Stärkere Volksrechte – Zufriedenere Bürger: eine mikroökonometrische Untersuchung für die Schweiz

Direkte Demokratie führt für die Bürger zu vorteilhaften Ergebnissen des politischen Prozesses, was in zahlreichen empirischen Untersuchungen überzeugend nachgewiesen wurde. Wir zeigen überdies, dass die Bürger in stärker ausgebauten direkten Demokratien mit ihrem Leben zufriedener sind. Unsere Untersuchung stützt sich dabei auf eine Befragung über das subjektive Wohlbefinden von über 6'000 Einwohnern der Schweiz zwischen 1992 und 1994. In der Querschnittsanalyse wird das geäusserte subjektive Wohlbefinden einem neuen Index gegenübergestellt, welcher die direktdemokratischen Rechte der Bürger in den 26 Kantonen der Schweiz erfasst. Die Sensitivitätsuntersuchungen zeigen, dass besonders die Möglichkeit, via Verfassungs‐ und Gesetzesinitiativen neue Ideen in den politischen Prozess einzubringen, das subjektive Wohlbefinden erhöht. Dieser Zusammenhang ist um so stärker ausgeprägt, je kleiner die absolute Anzahl nötiger Unterschriften ist und je länger die Sammelfrist dauert.     

Outcome,Process and Power in Direct Democracy – New Econometric Results

Based on survey data for Switzerland, new empiricalfindings on direct democracy are presented. In thefirst part, the authors show that, on average, public employeesreceive lower financial compensation under more directdemocratic institutions. However, top bureaucrats aremore constrained in direct democracies and have to becompensated by higher wages for that loss of power.In the second part, they demonstrate that reportedsubjective well-being of the population is much higherin jurisdictions with stronger direct democraticrights. This is not only the case because people valuepolitical outcomes higher but also because they derive utilityfrom the political process itself.     

Strengthening the citizens' role in international organizations

Today's international organizations are characterized by a fundamental deficit in democracy. We therefore propose institutional measures to increase the direct participation possibilities of the citizens in international organizations. In order to reduce the number of citizens involved in decision-making to a manageable size, a representative sample of trustees is selected using a random mechanism. The trustees are given the right to launch initiatives and to vote in referendums on issues related to an international organization's constitution. They can also recall executives when they are dissatisfied with their behavior. No specific changes to the organization of these entities, especially their executive function, are proposed. Rather, the executives of international organizations must obey the constitutional changes adopted by the trustees. The proposal gives international organizations democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the executives are subjected to the control of the citizens of the member states, which induces better responsiveness to the preferences of the people, as well as higher organizational efficiency. JEL codes D72 · 019     

The Impact of Postal Voting on Participation: Evidence for Switzerland

Many countries are forging ahead with convenient balloting methods, in particular electronic and postal voting, in order to re‐engage voters. In this paper, we test whether the cost reductions through postal voting increase turnout. The empirical analysis is based on a newly collected data set on the introduction of postal voting in Swiss cantons. We take advantage of the unique fact that voting by mail was introduced at different times across cantons. This allows identifying the impact of postal voting on turnout, independent of time, issue and canton‐specific effects. The estimated average effect on turnout is roughly 4.1 percentage points for an average turnout of 43 percent between 1970 and 2005.     

Economies of Scale in Municipal Administration. Empirical Analyses of Municipal Mergers

Economies of scale in municipal administration are an important argument in the discussion on municipal mergers. However, they are seldom studied empirically. It is suggested here to analyse advantages of scale by municipal mergers. This procedure has a favorable feature compared to previous cross‐section analyses, because the number of inhabitants appointed to an administration is immediately increased, whereas the conditions of production are largely unchanged. In an exploratory application for four municipal mergers, we find no evidence for increasing economies of scale. Compared to the level prior to the mergers, average current expenditure for the municipal administration increased more than in a control group of similar municipalities that did not merge.     

The life satisfaction approach to valuing public goods: The case of terrorism

Terrorism has large social costs that are difficult to quantify for the well-known problems of eliciting people’s preferences for public goods. We use the LSA to assess these costs in utility and monetary terms. Based on combined cross-section time-series data, we estimate the costs of terrorism for France and the British Isles. We find large negative effects of terrorism on life satisfaction that translate into considerable compensating surpluses for a hypothetical reduction in terrorism, in particular for the serious conflict in Northern Ireland. The effects of terrorism are robust and differ across groups in accordance with prior expectations.     

Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? – Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland

Public choice theory takes citizens as rationally ignorantabout political issues, because the costs of being informedgreatly exceed the utility individuals derive from it. Thecosts of information (supply side) as well as the utility ofinformation (demand side), however, can vary substantiallydepending on the political system under which citizens live.Using survey data from the European Union and Switzerland, wepresent empirical evidence that citizens are politicallybetter informed when they have more extended politicalparticipation rights. The results corroborate theoreticalarguments and circumstantial evidence that voter informationshould be treated as endogenously determined by politicalinstitutions.     

Public servants in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany

This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public service and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the representation of public servants in parliaments generates a conflict of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. We find that a legal incompatibility of a position in the public service and a political mandate decreases and a compensation for having to hold one’s office in abeyance increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.