Scanning electron microscopy: application in the identification of diatoms in cases of drowning.

A simple and rapid method is described for processing organ and water samples for the identification of diatoms so that they can be studied and recorded for taxonomic and diagnostic purposes. Samples are treated with concentrated nitric acid; the fluid obtained is centrifuged, and its sediment is dried, coated, and examined under the scanning electron microscope. The method does not alter the morphology of diatoms and allows the study of freshwater and seawater species present in the organs of bodies found in the water, making possible the diagnosis of drowning under specific conditions.     

Book reviews

Transborder Data Flows (Proceedings of an OECD Conference) Edited by Hans‐Peter Gassmann North Holland (Elsevier Science Publishers) 1985, US$74.00

Plastic and Electronic Money: New Payment Systems and Their Implications Patrick Frazer Woodhead Faulkner Limited 1985 £35

A User's Guide To Computer Contracting: Forms, Techniques and Strategies Davis, Allen, Bowman and Armstrong Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1985, $75

Legal Protection of Computer Programs and Data C. Millard Sweet & Maxwell/Stevens 1985, £24

Piracy of Phonograms Gillian Davies ESC Publishing Ltd. 1986. 2nd edition. £17.95.

Biotechnology and Patent Protection—An International Review F. K. Beier, R. S. Crespi and J. Straus O.E.C.D. 1985, £5

Protecting Privacy in Two‐Way Electronic Services David H. Flaherty Mansell Publishing Company 1985, £23.50

High‐Tech Espionage Jay Tuck Sidgwick and Jackson Ltd 1980, £10.95     

Secrecy and Self-Interest: When Mediators Act Deceitfully

3rd party intervention in interstate conflict is a common strategy for mitigating conflict and obtaining a final agreement. However, not all mediations are successful, leading to the development of a rich literature on the mechanisms which decrease the probability of failure in a 3rd-party intervention. Within this literature, some studies examine how a mediator’ behavior and incentives affect the result of the mediation. Virtually all these studies assume that the mediator is virtuous such that peace is the most desired outcome of a conflict for her. However, this study challenges this assumption and contends that a mediator can gain benefit from the conflict between disputants. If this benefit is adequately large to overcome the benefits of peace, then the mediator has enough incentive not to conduct the mediation toward a peaceful outcome. We develop a signaling game model to study this issue formally and test the proposed hypothesis empirically.