Russian Voting and the Initial Economic Shock of Hyperinflation

This paper addresses the issue of economicvoting in transitional democracies using data from the Russianfederal elections. It argues that the shock of inflation thatfollowed the fundamental economic reform has a lastinginfluence on voters. Specifically, it shows that in Russia,where inflationary policy led to hyperinflation and thewidespread loss of personal savings, the magnitude of savingslost at that time continues to explain a significant portionof the variation in the regional support for the Communistparty in parliamentary and presidential elections.     

Where Russian Online Nationalists Go When Their Communities are Banned: A Case Study of Russian Nationalism

Abstract

This article presents the results of a case study of the online community Russian Nationalism, one of the most popular Russian nationalists’ online communities on VKontakte in 2012–2016. The article aims to find out where network leaders and common members of nationalist online groups closed on the Russian Internet go and in which thematic communities they continue their activity. Russian Nationalism members’ personal profiles and friendly links on VKontakte were used as data sources. The metrics of social network analysis were used to study Russian Nationalism’s network structure. The study showed that the ban of a massive extreme right nationalist online group leads to an increase in the number of smaller shelter groups that retain their ideological basis, but abandon the clearly expressed hate speech; members of a banned nationalist group flow to groups whose content is both close (militaristic, cultural, and historical) and far (everyday) to the extreme right. The content of the latter can transform in line with the nationalist ideology. The case study of Russian Nationalism shows a high potential for diffusion of extreme right nationalist ideas in the Russian network space, which manifests in their ability to penetrate other thematic and ideological areas of public discourse.     

Refining and Resolving the Blur of Gault for Juvenile Capital Offenders in Texas: A World without the Juvenile Death Penalty

Texas's approach to juvenile capital offenders has been profoundly lacking any balance of the interests of accountability and rehabilitation. Texas has employed adult transfer for juvenile capital offenders with potential life imprisonment and possible parole in 40 years and determinate sentencing to adjudicate capital offenders in juvenile court, yielding a maximum sentence of 40 years in prison. Legislative initiatives in the 1990s to curtail parole have led to only 22 percent of violent offenders receiving early release while serving an average of 61 percent of their sentence. Aggravated offenders, including youth capital offenders, serve at least 80 percent of their total incarceration time. Notably the Texas framework does not effectively allow for offenders whose acts were the product of either an undeveloped or disabled mental capability to be punished appropriately and distinctly from those who possess psychotic or antisocial tendencies—or adult offenders. This deficiency is worsened as a result of the recently passed legislation SB.60, which establishes that juvenile capital offenders must receive the sentence of life without the possibility of parole upon conviction. Texas can create a more precise approach with three modifications: (1) centralize all youth capital adjudications to a criminal court, (2) effectuate separate imprisonment and enhanced educational programs for the first ten years of incarceration, (3) implement a “soft-ten” sentence where after the initial ten years of imprisonment the presumption for release favors the offender unless the state establishes that additional time is needed; this determination is primarily based on a complete psychological assessment of the offender.     

“Bad enough governance”: state capacity and quality of institutions in post-Soviet autocracies

This article contributes to current discussions on state capacity, quality of institutions, and political regimes. Our analysis demonstrates that the J-curve argument (“good institutions” in autocracies as compared to hybrid and transitional regimes) may not be generic and is not well supported by empirical evidence from the sample of post-Soviet countries. An explanatory model of the “King of the Mountain” is instead provided. Its focus is on the monopoly of political rent as a precondition for extraction of economic rent. It demonstrates an inverse correlation between the quality of institutions and the extraction of political and economic rent, and explains why an autocrat may not have an incentive to improve institutions that may make his/her monopoly vulnerable, and rather would prefer to preserve a low quality of institutions and “bad enough governance.” An analysis of a variety of external and domestic factors that may endanger this monopoly is provided. Finally, the autocrat's alternative strategic choices are analyzed. It is argued that better payoffs for the autocrat – paradoxically – may result from partial reforms and improvement of the quality of institutions. However, for various reasons, this is not occurring in post-Soviet autocracies.