The partisan–professional dichotomy revisited: Politicization and decision‐making of senior civil servants

Politicization has an ambivalent reputation among public administration scholars. While considered an effective instrument to safeguard political control over ministerial bureaucracy, partisanship of senior civil servants is likewise associated with patronage and is deemed detrimental to professionalism and meritocracy. To scrutinize this contradiction, the article examines how the party‐political background of senior civil servants influences their decision‐making behaviour. Two theoretically derived conceptions of loyalty are therefore put to the test: responsiveness and responsibility. Effects are captured by using the vignette technique in 40 in‐depth interviews with former senior civil servants from ministerial departments at federal and state level in Germany. The results are surprising in so far as they reveal that politicized senior civil servants act neither more responsively nor less responsibly than their non‐politicized peers. These findings challenge common assumptions and call for a more refined analysis of the conditions under which politicization leads to negative effects.     

Institutioneller Wandel als Hybridisierung

In March 2005, institutional investors forced Deutsche Börse AG to withdraw its takeover bid for the London Stock Exchange, followed some time later by the resignation of both the enterprise’s CEO and supervisory board. This event highlights in an exemplary manner the transformation of joint-stock companies in Germany from insider systems towards systems including both insiders and outsiders and the related transformation of their corporate governance. The conflict between Deutsche Börse AG’s principals and agents demonstrates, first of all, the hybridization of different governance systems. Contrary to assumptions speaking of ?path dependency“ or a convergence of the different varieties of capitalism in the direction of the US model of market-based capitalism, the conflict concerning Deutsche Börse AG underlines the typical example of a transformation displaying path dependencies and convergences at the same time. Secondly, it is demonstrated that the enterprises’ market opening will not necessarily involve stronger market control, but that this process instead evokes new options for corporate policy governance.