Failed States After 9/11: What Did We Know and What Have We Learned?

This paper addresses the relationship between accumulated knowledge and U.S. policy dealing with failed states and terrorism. The central thesis is threefold: (1) that more was known about the possible linkages between failing states and terrorism than appears in pre-9/11 U.S. policies; (2) that since 9/11 some important realignment of knowledge and practice has occurred, but it remains partial and incomplete; and (3) that new knowledge, especially about the policies to sustain and promote legitimate governance, needs to be generated in order to support an effective grand strategy for addressing the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century. The paper recommends such a grand strategy and, in addition to the required new knowledge, a significant reorganization of the U.S. national security policy-making apparatus. International studies curricula appear well suited for contributing to that new knowledge and the practitioners we require.     

Structure and Process in Consociationalism and Federalism

It is relatively easy to characterize the institutional structureof a country as consociational or federal. The task is muchmore difficult if we turn from structure to the decision process.Within a given structure, there may be a great deal of variationwith regard to the decision process. Data for such variationare given for the decision process in Switzerland for whichthe following four types are distinguished: (1) consociationaland federal, (2) consociational and unitary, (3) competitiveand federal, and (4) competitive and unitary. Difficulties arediscussed in aggregating from such a variation to a measurefor the prevailing decision process in a country as a whole.It is suggested that the problem be disaggregated and that decisionprocesses be compared for particular issues. This can be doneboth across and within countries.     

When Do States Say Uncle? Network Dependence and Sanction Compliance

In this article we address the long-debated question of when and why states comply with sanctions. While the literature remains indeterminate as to whether the key mechanisms driving sanction compliance are tied to interstate relations, intrastate constraints, or a dynamic combination of the two, our theoretical framework and methodological approach provide a novel perspective that incorporates insights drawn from network theory to explain the time until countries comply. Specifically, we argue that reciprocity, a concept with deep roots in both network theory and international relations, has largely been overlooked in the study of sanction compliance. Though often ignored, this concept captures an essential aspect of how cooperation is fostered in the international system and allows us to better analyze the strategic environment underlying sanctioning behavior. Given the theoretical importance of reciprocity in understanding interstate relations, we provide an approach that integrates estimations of this type of network interdependency into extant frameworks for modeling the time until countries comply with sanctions. Our results highlight that reciprocity not only has a substantive effect in explaining the duration of sanctions but that models excluding this concept from their specifications do notably worse in terms of their predictive performance.     

Antigovernment Networks in Civil Conflicts: How Network Structures Affect Conflictual Behavior

In this article, we combine a game‐theoretic treatment of public goods provision in networks with a statistical network analysis to show that fragmented opposition network structures lead to an increase in conflictual actions. Current literature concentrates on the dyadic relationship between the government and potential challengers. We shift the focus toward exploring how network structures affect the strategic behavior of political actors. We derive and examine testable hypotheses and use latent space analysis to infer actors’ positions vis‐à‐vis each other in the network. Network structure is examined and used to test our hypotheses with data on conflicts in Thailand from 2001 to 2010. We show the influential role of network structure in generating conflictual behavior.