Punishing corporate criminals with restraint

This article is a revised version of a paper originally written for, and presented at, the eighth international conference of the Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, Hong Kong, December 4–8, 1994. Parts have been published in Don Stuart,Canadian Criminal Law 575-91 (3d ed. 1995).     

The R and D contract and democratic theory

The purposes of this essay are to describe how federal research and development policy has altered authority relationships and to suggest a new concept of legitimacy in accord with the changed conditions. Research and development (R and D) creates an indeterminate future. Thus, the politics of research and development incorporates an apparent contradiction : political leadership demands that jobs be done which require creative and unpredictable actions on the part of private organizations, while it also demands that contractors be held responsible for fulfilling goals efficiently, avoiding deleterious secondary consequences, and refraining from abuses of power. The paradox can be resolved by creating norms of responsibility that allow for judgments on how a job is done rather than what is to be done. New institutions for technological assessment to check on unintended consequences of projects and citizen review boards to estimate the quality of life engendered by projects may provide such norms of responsibility.     

Local planners — global constraints

A number of reports have been published over the past few years documenting the evidence of decline in the northeastern U.S.A. and the simultaneous migration of industry to the U.S. Sunbelt. (Academy for Contemporary Problems, 1977; Sale, 1975; Sternlieb and Hughes, 1975). In developing appropriate recommendations to planners, such studies invariably urge that localities or regions facing industrial out-migration arrest this activity by making themselves more suitable and attractive (Council for Northeast Economic Action [CNEA], 1977a) within the framework of a number of characteristic strategies. We propose to examine critically some of the traditional strategies recommended by these reports.     

Competition in political and economic markets

Prepared as a response to Frey and Eichenberger's Anomalies in Political Economy. We thank Gordon Tullock for helpful discussions. This work was partially supported by the Taylor Experimental Laboratory at Washington University.     

Non‐tariff measures and United States' imports of CBERA‐eligible products

Trade coverage ratios are calculated to assess the 1991 incidence of non‐tariff measures (NTMs) on imports of products eligible for duty‐free treatment under the United States’ Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). Overall, 16 per cent of all CBERA‐eligible products were found to be covered by one or more NTM. Corresponding figures for all eligible products exported from individual beneficiaries range up to 40 per cent. Much higher trade coverage ratios are found for individual product groups. NTMs constitute important deterrents to US imports of CBERA‐eligible products. Heavy reliance on NTMs counters the intent of the CBERA, namely to extend preferential treatment to exports from Caribbean Basin countries.