The Impact of Affirmative Action on the Employment of Minorities and Women: A Longitudinal Analysis Using Three Decades of EEO‐1 Filings

What role has affirmative action played in the growth of minority and female employment in U.S. firms? This paper presents a longitudinal analysis of this question by exploiting rich variation across firms in the timing of federal contracting to identify affirmative action effects over the course of three decades spanning 1973 to 2003. It constitutes the first study to comprehensively document the long‐term and dynamic effects of affirmative action in federal contracting on employment composition within firms in the United States. I use a new panel of over 100,000 large private‐sector firms from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, including both firms that obtain federal contracts and are therefore mandated to implement affirmative action and firms that are noncontractors, across all industries and regions. The paper's key results indicate that the primary beneficiaries of affirmative action in federal contracting over 1973 to 2003 were black and Native American women and men. Dynamic event study analysis of workforce composition around the time of contracting reveals that a large part of the effect of affirmative action on increasing protected group shares occurred within the first four years of gaining a contract, and that these increased shares persisted even after a firm was no longer a federal contractor. The paper also uncovers important results on how the impact of affirmative action evolved over 1973 to 2003, in particular that the fastest growth in the employment shares of minorities and women at federal contractors relative to noncontracting firms occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s, decelerating substantially in ensuing years.     

Exploring the Paradoxical Consequences of State Collapse: the cases of Somalia 1991–2006 and Lebanon 1975–82

Relative social and economic well-being in the aftermath of a state's collapse is usually explained on the basis of a single case, Somalia, and with reference to the impact of endogenous factors such as the repressive and predatory nature of the state which collapsed and the ability of civil society actors and institutions to fulfil those functions that are normally performed by a state. This article challenges this theoretical view. As can be seen from a study of Lebanon, relative well-being after state collapse is more common than it appears to be at first glance. Moreover, given the limited role that the Lebanese state played in the economic and political spheres before the breakdown of state authority in 1975, the repressive and predatory nature of the collapsed state cannot be the explanatory variable in this case. Exogenous factors, such as remittances from abroad, international loans bestowed upon residual state institutions and ‘political money’ from foreign powers, are the decisive factors generating such paradoxical developments. Study of Somalia and Lebanon also shows the limitations of the conceptualisations of state collapse prevalent in the literature.     

‘The Cedar Revolution’: Lebanese Independence and the Question of Collective Self-Determination

The article rejects the notion conveyed by the expression ‘the Cedar Revolution’ that Lebanon has recently experienced radical political changes. On the basis of an empirical survey of recent developments, it identifies four elements of continuity; the confessional nature of Lebanese politics, the omnipresence of trans-national alliances, the confrontational nature of the political rhetoric and the continuation of foreign interventions in Lebanon's internal affairs. Making use of opinion surveys, it argues that some of these elements indicate the existence of an independence-integration cleavage in Lebanon which follows sectarian lines and which renders the conceptualization of Lebanese citizens as a collective actor able to exercise collective self-determination—either by gaining complete independence or establishing close ties with Syria—problematic. Finally, it argues at a theoretical level that the problem of collective agent and the ensuing problem of collective self-determination can potentially emerge in any polity where there is an independence-integration cleavage.     

Terrorism and fear: do terrorists really want to scare?

There is a widespread tendency among academics, state institutions and international organisations to regard intention to cause fear and intimidation as a key definitional characteristic of terrorism. This article argues that such a conceptualisation of terrorism is unfounded. A survey of mainstream terrorist doctrines (propaganda by the deed, foco theory–urban guerrilla warfare and armed propaganda, and jihadist doctrines) and writings of several pre-eminent terrorist ideologues provides little evidence to suggest that the main tactical goal of terrorism is to spread fear and intimidation. Rather, regardless of their ideological orientation and the historical period in which they operated, terrorists seem to be preoccupied with similar goals: mobilising what they regard to be their constituency, avenging their fallen comrades, extracting retribution for their allegedly wronged constituency, or, simply, with the physical destruction of their perceived enemies. This survey is complemented with a number of “crucial case studies”, where “most-likely cases” of terrorist justification of indiscriminate attacks and a detailed analysis of terrorist literature, which explicitly deals with the question of “fear”, are used to test the validity of the claim that terrorists aim to cause fear and intimidation. In both type of cases the hypothesis is invalidated. In cases of justification of indiscriminate attacks, there is no evidence to suggest that the aim of the terrorists is to spread fear and intimidation. Moreover, in the case of one particular terrorist ideologue who explicitly addresses the question of fear, the analysis of the texts indicates that fear among a population is not seen as an aim to be achieved but as an obstacle for mass mobilisation: an obstacle, which can only be overcome by the terrorist tactics. Thus, in this particular “most-likely case” the aim of terrorist tactics turns out to be encouraging masses for insurrection rather than intimidating them.