Compensation for nuclear damage: a comparison among the international regime,Japan and China

Following the Fukushima disaster in Japan in 2011, how the compensation system for nuclear damage should be improved has obtained broad attention. The compensation system, including liability rules, insurance and government involvement, does not only concern to what extent the victims can be sufficiently compensated, but is also relevant to create incentives for the nuclear industry to enhance safety. International compensation regimes for nuclear damage started to emerge since 1960s, but still fail to engage some (potentially) big “nuclear power” ones. The Japanese and Chinese systems are such ones which received less attention until recently. This paper will, on the one hand, engage in a positive study by giving a comparison between the international regime, the Japanese and the Chinese system; on the other hand, provide a normative analysis by using economic criteria to examine the efficiency of the systems and formulate suggestions for reform.     

Dumb Barter: A Seminal Form of Negotiation

Negotiation requires communication, but not necessarily verbal exchanges. Adjustments can be achieved incrementally by other means. This article will examine how some parties have managed to strike a deal in situations characterized by total distrust and even hostility, asymmetric power relations, major cultural differences, extreme logistical difficulties in reaching the place in which the trade is to be made, and several additional process risks by employing a type of bargaining known as “dumb barter.” This process presents a distinct paradigm with a specific and unique rationale. Sometimes called “silent trade,” it has been observed in many places (especially West Africa) for more than two millennia. It may well be the oldest form of trade negotiation and is still practiced in some parts of the world. An examination of this unlikely but real and effective process can also provide negotiation theorists with some useful insights into the fundamental nature of negotiation.     

A Selection of Empirical Socio-Economic Research with Respect to the Functioning of Legal Rules and Institutions in Belgium and the Netherlands

In this paper some studies with respect to empirical socio-economic research which has been undertaken in Belgium and the Netherlands concerning the functioning of legal rules and institutions are discussed. The paper focuses on the domains of criminal law, civil procedure, liability and insurance. The paper argues that contrary to the overwhelming economic literature on liability and insurance, the empirical results in that domain are poor. More research is undertaken in the area of criminal law and apparently it is overwhelming in the area of civil procedure. The latter studies are, however, mainly undertaken by socio-legal scholars and less by economists. The general conclusion of the empirical studies discussed seems to be that while the empirical literature on the effect of changes in the decision making environment on rational actions in the legal system is rich and provocative, there is much less empirical testing of the effects of legal rules as such on allocational outcomes. The paper argues that much more effort should be devoted to the latter issue.     

Negotiation: The Chinese Concept

It is no understatement to say that negotiation activity has skyrocketed in China in recent years; however, these negotiations are frequently unsatisfactory. Part of the reason for this lack of success is that Chinese people have a conception of negotiation that is fundamentally different from that of people in the West. Based on extensive interviews with Chinese and non-Chinese negotiators over a period of five years, the author explains the Chinese approach by using two metaphors: mobile warfare and the joint quest. Understanding this approach has significant implications for negotiation practice.     

The civil liability of European nuclear operators: which coverage for the new 2004 Protocols? Evidence from France

In Western Europe, the nuclear liability is governed by two international conventions, drafted by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD: the Paris (1960) and Brussels (1963) Conventions. These conventions traditionally limited the liability of the nuclear power plant operators to relatively low amounts. In France, the liability of the (state owned) operator of €91 million is covered by insurance (for €31 million) and reserves (for €60 million). A recent modification to the conventions occurred in 2004 and increased the liability limit to €700 million. In this paper we aim to evaluate the costs for covering the increased liability for the nuclear risk after the introduction of the 2004 amendments. In order to do so, we calculate the actuarial insurance premium for the nuclear risk and find that the current premium charge is very large. The paper tries to explain the high price of nuclear liability insurance. Also the costs of the own reserves for the coverage of potential nuclear accidents are examined. We then aim to evaluate the different options (mostly insurance and reserves) and indicate the optimal combination of both instruments to cover the future operators’ liability limit, introduced by the latest 2004 amending Protocols.

Economic models of compensation for damage caused by nuclear accidents: Some lessons for the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions

In this paper the economic analysis of accident law is used to examine the liability for nuclear accidents. It is argued that the classic system of individual liability of a nuclear power plant operator with a financial cap on compensation and individual insurance by national pools is not effective. The current system leads to a too low compensation for victims and lacks an adequate internalization of the nuclear risk. Hence, it is argued that the economic analysis of law can provide useful insights for the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions on the liability for nuclear accidents. It is also argued that higher amounts of compensation can be generated only if the idea is accepted that all plants share the costs of an accident wherever it occurs. This could be realized through a mutual pooling system. Such a system could also be fitted into the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions.     

The Economics of Disaster Relief

We distinguish among three types of actions that can be taken to alleviate the consequences of natural disasters: precautionary efforts (made ex ante), relief efforts (made in the immediate aftermath of a disaster), and recovery efforts (made ex post). We argue that recognizing this distinction lessens many of the problems that the literature attributes to government intervention and hence expands the scope of government action following disasters. Relief is less likely than recovery to generate over‐supply by the government and over‐reliance by victims.