Pseudo‐democratic politics and populist possibilities: the rise and demise of Turkey's Refah party

Within the span of only a few years, Turkish politics witnessed the dramatic rise and fall of the Refah Party. This transformation from relative obscurity to the head of a ruling coalition and eventual banning was caused by a combination of features inherent in the Turkish political system and the party itself. Turkish democracy features the continued interference of the military in domestic political affairs on the one hand and a preponderance of largely centrist and bland ‘mainstream’ parties on the other. Nevertheless, the existence of ostensibly democratic institutions such as elections or a parliament enable potential political aspirants who are outside the mainstream to make bids for power through officially sanctioned channels. The Refah's rise was a product of the perceived uniqueness of its ideological platform and its unparalleled focus on grass roots voter mobilization. Its fall, however, came when the military considered it to have overstepped the bounds of acceptable political behaviour within the country's narrowly defined democracy.     

Structural Impedimentsto Economic Globalizationin the Middle East

Dr. Kamrava is professor and chair of the Political Science Department at California State University, Northridge. His latest book is The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War (University of California Press, forthcoming 2005).     

Frozen political liberalization in Jordan: The consequences for democracy

Prompted by serious economic difficulties, in 1989 the Jordanian government launched a series of political liberalization measures aimed at rejuvenating the country's parliament and party politics, and restoring freedom to the media. Despite much initial enthusiasm, the liberalization process has become frozen and there have been few substantive moves toward a meaningful transition to democracy. Two developments have combined to result in this democratization freeze. One is the reluctance of the state to give up many of its powers in relation to the forces of civil society. A second is the inability of professional associations and the emerging parliamentary opposition bloc to formulate and institute viable links within themselves and with other social actors in an attempt to pressure the monarchy for more political concessions. The hybrid, semi‐democratic, absolutist monarchy that has emerged in the process has enhanced its popular legitimacy by adopting certain democratic trappings, which, in the short run at least, appear detrimental to a more meaningful transition to democratic rule.     

Liberty in Akhundzadeh's and Kermani's Thoughts

Here I examine the modern idea of liberty in works of Akhundzadeh and Kermani – two leading Iranian intelligentsia under the Qajar Iran (1794–1925). In doing so, first, I set forth a brief (intellectual) background that shows some of the influences of Iranian, Russian, and European scholars on Akhundzadeh and Kermani. Then, their thoughts will be represented systematically by following a simple theoretical framework driven from their works. Applying one model to both cases particularly helps to demonstrate their similarities and differences, as well as how fundamentally different was their understanding of liberty from their contemporaries. To Akhundzadeh and Kermani, life under the Qajars resembled the lawless state of nature, transcending which, however, required more than establishing laws. For the transcendence to occur, a revolution in mind was needed; and for that matter to happen, liberty was a critical prerequisite and consequence.     

The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution

The author contends that the Arab Spring has provided an opening for the Gulf Cooperation Council as a group and for Saudi Arabia as a long-time aspiring leader of the Arab world to try to expand their regional influence and global profile. An already weakened Arab state system, he argues, has been once again weakened by the sweeping wave of rebellion.     

The semi‐formal sector and the Turkish political economy

The general dichotomy in developing economies between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economic sectors needs to be refined to account for the ‘semi‐formal’ sector: one whose activities appear to be governed by formal rules and procedures but are, in fact, largely unregulated and unrecorded by the state. Using Turkey as an example of a transitional, developing economy, the paper situates the semi‐formal sector in relation to the other two. Also important to examine is the level of autonomy which the semi‐formal sector enjoys in relation to the state and other economic sectors. Autonomy depends on access to resources, and the use of these resources in pursuit of economic, political, or socio‐cultural agendas. Three comparative lessons can be drawn: 1) despite state endeavours, a sizeable portion of seemingly formal economic activities go unreported and unregulated; 2) the semi‐formal sector helps the perpetuation of a mutually beneficial relationship of mutual neglect between state and society; and, 3) the sector's political agendas may best be characterised as one of ‘oppositional pragmatism’.     

The Civil Society Discourse in Iran

A survey of recent Iranian books and journal articles reveals four important characteristics about how writers and academics in Iran generally perceive the concept of civil society. First and foremost, the notion of 'civil society' has gone through a substantial process of indigenization. Secondly, those who theorize about the concept see a crucial role in it for the 'rule of law'. This implies, both directly and indirectly, a primary role for the State, 'coexisting in harmony' and functioning as an integral part of civil society. Thirdly, even Iran's secular theorists have not been able to fully evade the gravitational pull of Islam and its overwhelming role in Iranian culture and society. At the very least, they maintain that civil society is possible only after a 'proper' interpretation of Islam gains popular acceptance. Finally, these authors frequently mention the 'image' that non-Iranians have of the Iranian nation. The importance of this self-perception lies in its implications for how the élite literati articulates 'culture' and portrays it to the public and, in turn, to non-Iranians. Essentially, this appears to be where the most lasting consequences of the discovery of 'civil society' in Iran seem to lie: whereas the articulations of Iranian scholars and politicians appear to be little more than a native version of a global academic trend, they seem to have ignited a subtle process of cultural re-orientation and re-articulation under the rubric of religion and an institutionalized Islamic Republican State.