Reflections on mentoring experiences for evidence-informed decision-making in South Africa and Malawi

This article is based on the consensus that the availability and utilisation of research enhances policy discussions. The article reflects on the experiences within one approach: capacity building through mentoring. The UJ-BCURE programme aimed to increase the capacity of decision-makers to use evidence in decision-making via mentoring models. Mentoring is described as an interactive, facilitated process that promotes learning. The features of the models that have contributed to the programme’s success are orientation workshops with mentees combined with participatory, needs-led, and flexible approaches. UJ-BCURE experiences are relevant to the field of evidence-informed decision-making in an African government context.     

Indicators for economic vulnerability to drought in South Africa

This article identifies and estimates economic drought vulnerability indicators among communal farmers in South Africa, using an economic vulnerability index based on a household survey of 121 communal farmers. The results show that lack of resources, unemployment, price sensitivity, market access, the level of farm debt, output, on- and off-farm diversification, management, and financial safety nets were the main economic vulnerability variables. Farm debt and financial safety provide the bulk of the vulnerability index. The study’s findings suggest that government should reconsider priorities in the implementation of appropriate policy measures in response to drought.     

Hybrid Warfare,International Negotiation,and an Experiment in “Remote Convening”

The authors are leading a multinational effort to understand the effects of “hybrid” warfare on international commercial negotiation. The start-up process is itself essentially a negotiation, among about forty individual practitioners and scholars with very diverse backgrounds, over whether and how they will work together. In a pandemic, a key risk is that the necessary cooperation and trust will be harder to build, particularly among professionals who are dealing with security-sensitive issues and who have never met each other. This article discusses the current necessity of replacing the in-person model for eliciting such cooperation which the authors had developed previously for large collaborative projects, and describes a “remote convening” replacement process.     

The smell of fried onions and other stories: a case study in a narrative understanding of multicultural competence

SUMMARY

The authors of this paper pose the question whether or not television has become the modern family hearth or gathering-place. The results of the investigations reported on, reveal that television viewing is primarily a family activity. It was also found that television viewing is not an exclusive act but that it is typically discontinuous and combined with other activities such as eating and talking. Television does not necessarily inhibit communication between family members: on the contrary, under certain circumstances it may serve as a strong stimulus to family communication. Television may therefore be said to have replaced the hearth or the dining-table as a gathering place for the family.     

The emerging middle power concept: Time to say goodbye?

To deal with the wide range of states that are considered middle powers, scholars distinguish between traditional middle powers on the one hand, and emerging, non-traditional or Southern middle powers on the other. This article examines the middle power concept in light of such diversity. It rejects middle power conceptions based on a ranking of size, power or position, on performing morally commendable international actions, on playing niche roles in international diplomacy, or on national self-identification. The article then considers a conception of middle powers as international stabilisers. The difficulty with this latter conception is that new middle powers exhibit a counter-hegemonic streak and a preference for multipolarity. Both of these are destabilising. The proposed solution is to jettison adjectives such as ‘emerging’ or ‘Southern’ with regard to middle powers, to stop classifying mid-range states with counter-hegemonic tendencies as middle powers, and to restrict the middle power term to mid-range states that actively support the liberal hegemonic project.     

Questioning Thomas Pogge's Proposals to Eradicate Global Poverty

Moral cosmopolitanism has often been criticised for being too demanding and not offering a viable solution to the problem of extreme global poverty. Thomas Pogge has responded to both these concerns by arguing that it is possible to eradicate most global poverty through relatively light international-level actions. Pogge's proposals can be divided into two broad categories: financial transfers to the poor and international institutional reforms (which include changing the rules of global trade and restricting the ability of undemocratic governments to borrow internationally or sell off their country's natural resources). However, Pogge's proposed international-level actions are unlikely to eradicate global poverty as he has underestimated the tenacity of poverty-causing local practices. More specifically, this article will question the workability of Pogge's plans against the backdrop of sub-Saharan Africa. Confronted with a gap between what Pogge's proposed international-level reforms are able to accomplish and what they aim to accomplish, the final part of the paper considers Pogge's three options (or some combination of them): one, settle for a more modest reduction of global poverty; two, expect greater endeavour from the poor and their governments; or (and) three, demand a deeper involvement and sacrifice from citizens of well-off countries.     

Inadequately self-critical: Rwanda's self-assessment for the African peer review mechanism

During the first stage of the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD) peer review process, the country under reviewcompiles a report on the state of economic, political, social,and corporate governance in the country. This article examinesRwanda’s evaluation of its political governance duringthis first stage, as reflected in the January 2005 version ofthis country’s self-assessment report. After sketchingthe compromised political environment in which the report waswritten, it is indicated how this rosy report inadequately addressesa number of serious political problems in Rwanda, such as Rwanda’sinvolvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the inadequateseparation of powers in the Rwandan political system, tensionsin Rwandan society, and the flawed presidential and parliamentaryelections of 2003. While it remains to be seen to what extentRwanda either acknowledges its political problems in the finalversion of its self-assessment report, or is censured in thesubsequent stages of the peer review process, it is concludedthat the greater the failure to do either, the greater the doubtthat will linger over the value of the African peer-review exercise. ^1. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Memorandum of understanding on theAfrican Peer Review Mechanism’ (http://www.nepad.org,17 July, 2005). ^2. P. Chabal, ‘The quest for good government and developmentin Africa: is NEPAD the answer?’ International Affairs78, 3 (2002), pp. 447–62; I. Taylor, NEPAD: Towards Africa’sdevelopment or another false start? (Lynne Rienner, Boulder,CO, 2005). ^3. See Taylor, NEPAD, pp. 15–44. ^4. On this problem, see ibid, pp. 61–74. ^5. M. Katzenellenbogen and W. Hartley, ‘No political peerreview, says Mbeki’, Business Day, 31 October, 2002. ^6. T. Mbeki, ‘Critics ill-informed about NEPAD peer review’,ANC Official Home Page (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at45.htm,27 July, 2005). ^7. Ibid. ^8. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, Rwanda Country Self-Assessment Reportfor the African Peer Review Mechanism (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat,Kigali, 2005). The 230-page report consists of an introduction,followed by four chapters, each addressing one of the thematicareas set out in the questionnaire. ^9. On Kigali’s ‘official line’, see J. Pottier,Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, survival and disinformation inthe late twentieth century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2002). ^10. During the second stage of the peer review process, the countryvisit by the Country Review Team, this team’s ‘priorityorder of business will be to carry out the widest possible rangeof consultations with the Government, officials, political parties,parliamentarians and representatives of civil society organizationsincluding the media, academia, trade unions, business and professionalbodies’: NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines for countriesto prepare for and to participate in the African Peer ReviewMechanism (APRM)’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm/aprmguidelinesforcountryreview200104final.pdf,27 July, 2005). Never mind that ‘representatives of civilsociety organizations’ in Rwanda tend to be not all thatindependent from the government, the NEPAD documents make nomention of possible consultations with embassy staff, the UNand its agencies, international financial instutions, internationalchurch groups and international NGOs — groups that wouldbe able to broaden the perspectives of the Country Review Team. ^11. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration on democracy, political,economic, and corporate governance’, NEPAD Official HomePage (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/2.pdf, 15 July,2005). ^12. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism(APRM) base document’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf,22 July, 2005). ^13. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines’. ^14. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment for the AfricanPeer Review Mechanism’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/156.pdf,24 January, 2005). ^15. Ibid. ^16. Ibid. ^17. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM base document’. ^18. According to Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM NationalCommission’, Rwanda NEPAD Magazine 1 (2004), pp. 14–16. ^19. Ibid, p. 14. ^20. NEPAD Secretariat, Final Report: African Peer Review Mechanismcountry support mission to Rwanda, 21–June 24, 2004 (NEPADSecratariat, Midrand, 2004), p. 4. ^21. Ibid. ^22. On the extent of presidential and senatorial appointments, seeGovernment of Rwanda, The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda(Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Kigali, 2003),Articles 88 and 113. ^23. In May 2003, Pro-Femmes sided with the government and attackedHuman Rights Watch for being ‘divisive’: UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2003’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27744.htm,27 January, 2005). ^24. They were Aimable Kabanda (African Peer Review Focal Point,Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat), Alex Semarintoya (Ministry of LocalGovernment), Solange Tuyisenge (Member of the National Assembly)and James Ngango (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). ^25. US Department of State, ‘Country Report 2003’; UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2004’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41621.htm,23 July, 2005). ^26. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: human rights organizationforced to close down’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470012005,22 January, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: preparingfor elections: tightening control in the name of unity’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503.bck.htm,9 February, 2005). ^27. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration’, op. cit. ^28. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué: The African PeerReview (APRM) support mission to Rwanda’, Southern AfricanRegional Poverty Network Official Home Page (http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000845/P958-Rwanda_APRM.pdf,31 July, 2005). ^29. Nepad Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^30. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 26. ^31. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: observing the rules ofwar?’ Human Rights Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/rwanda2,15 February, 2005). ^32. See Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:killing human decency’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620072000,9 February, 2005); Amnesty International, ‘DemocraticRepublic of Congo: Rwandese-controlled east: devastating humantoll’, Amnesty International Official Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620112001,19 July, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Observing the rulesof war?’ ^33. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo:"Our brothers who help kill us" — economic exploitationand human rights abuses in the east’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620102003,19 July, 2005). ^34. T. Longman, ‘The complex reasons for Rwanda’s engagementin Congo’, in J.F. Clark (ed.), The African Stakes ofthe Congo War (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002), p. 136. ^35. Government of Rwanda, ‘Reply to the final report (documentS/2002/1146) of the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitationof natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo’ (http://www.afrol.com/Countries/Rwanda/documents/reply_un_resources_2002.htm,15 June, 2005). ^36. Amnesty International, ‘Our brothers who help kill us’. ^37. United Nations, ‘Final report of the panel of expertson the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other formsof wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UnitedNations in Denmark Official Home Page (http://www.un.dk/doc/S20021146.pdf,10 February, 2005). See also Amnesty International, ‘Ourbrother who help kill us’. ^38. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^39. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:Arming the east’, Amnesty International Official HomePage (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620062005,14 July, 2005). ^40. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 25. ^41. Amnesty International, ‘Arming the East’. ^42. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^43. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 36. ^44. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^45. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’; USDepartment of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^46. F. Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide todictatorship’, African Affairs 103, 411 (2004), p. 187. ^47. Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, p. 9. ^48. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^49. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^50. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^51. National Electoral Commission, ‘Executive summaries ofNational Electoral Commission reports on the constitutionalreferendum, presidential and parliamentary elections’,National Electoral Commission of Rwanda Offical Home Page (http://www.comelena.gov.rw/english/resumeelection2003.html,18 July, 2005). ^52. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^53. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^54. European Union Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report2003’, EU Official Home Page (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/rwanda/moe_ue_final_2003.pdf,25 July, 2005). ^55. During the presidential elections (August 2003), the incumbent,Paul Kagame, won 95 percent of the vote, while his party, theRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), won 74 percent of the vote inthe parliamentary elections (September 2003). ^57. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: government slams dooron political life and civil society’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470122004,22 January, 2005); US Department of State, ‘Country report2003’. ^56. The US Department of State referred to the 2003 presidentialelections as ‘seriously marred’: US Department ofState, ‘Country report 2003’. ^58. Amnesty International, ‘Government slams door’;Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: run-up to presidentialelections marred by threats and harassment’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470102003,22 January, 2005); I. Samset and O. Dalby, ‘Rwanda: presidentialand parliamentary elections 2003’, Norwegian Centre forHuman Rights Official Home Page (http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2003/12.pdf,28 February, 2005). ^59. Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: resolve disappearances, assassination’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/05/04/rwanda133.htm,9 February, 2005). ^60. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: deeper into the abyss— waging war on civil society’ Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470132004,22 January 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^61. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^62. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^63. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^64. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^65. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report 2003’. ^66. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^67. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^68. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report’. ^69. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^70. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^71. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^72. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’, emphasisadded. ^73. Amnesty International, ‘Devastating human toll’(http://web.amnesty.org, 19 July, 2005). ^74. As had happened during the previous year, as during 2004 Rwanda’sjudiciary ‘was subject to presidential influence’:US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^75. N. van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of PermanentCrisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge University Press, 2001),p. 51. ^76. On this tension, see Chabal, ‘Good government and developmentin Africa’; Taylor, NEPAD. ^77. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué issued at the endof the third summit of the Committee of Participating Headsof State and Government in the African Peer Review Mechanism(APR Forum), 19 June, 2005, Abuja, Nigeria’, Institutefor Security Studies Official Home Page (http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/nepad/aprm/comsum3jun05.pdf,28 July, 2005).     

Differences in the usefulness of communication channels,as experienced by gender and ethnic groups during their university selection process

Abstract

Recruiting students to enrol at a particular institution is becoming a competitive and challenging process for higher education institutions. Therefore, institutions should create efficient and effective ways of providing relevant information to prospective students during their process of selecting an institution. The major communication channels that prospective students consult during their selection process, and the usefulness thereof for students, are important knowledge imperatives for higher education institutions. In this study, 12 different channels of communication, considered by students during a typical higher education institution selection process, were investigated. A non-probability convenience sample of 1 241 first-year students from six higher education institutions in South Africa was drawn. Findings suggest that female students attach a significantly higher value to nine of the 12 communication channels, compared to their male counterparts. There were also differences between the ethnic groups in terms of the usefulness of events on campus, high school teachers, open days and campus visits, as well as university publications. Higher education institutions can use the results to develop communication strategies that are more student oriented, in order to reinforce their image and to reach students more effectively through the appropriate communication channels.     

Foreign policy without the policy? South Africa and activism on sexual orientation at the United Nations

Although South Africa led the UN to adopt its first resolution on sexual orientation in 2011, in recent years, South Africa has made various sharp foreign policy reversals on issues related to sexual orientation and human rights. This article discusses five such policymaking episodes over the period 2010–2016 and considers the wider implications of South Africa's flip-flopping. For one, South Africa's recent behaviour on international sexual orientation issues suggests that the foreign policymaking environment in South Africa is weak, unstructured and porous. Moreover, the sexual orientation issue exposes the limited scope South Africa has to act as a representative of Africa, as a leader in the developing world and as a bridge-building middle power.