Why Are There So Many Lawyers in Congress?

Scholars have long sought to explain the overrepresentation of lawyers in Congress. This article draws on a wealth of data to explore the causes and consequences of this representational imbalance. While lawyers enter politics at higher rates, self-selection at best provides a partial explanation. Conditional on running, lawyers win at twice the rate of candidates from other backgrounds. Contrary to prevailing theories in the literature, voters do not reward candidates with backgrounds in law. Rather, lawyers win because of a sizable competitive advantage in early fundraising, owing in large part to their professional networks. This study has important implications for who runs for office, who wins, and the demographic composition of Congress. It also identifies an underexplored mechanism by which the US system of campaign finance sustains deep representational imbalances.     

Regional disparities and economic growth in Russia: new growth patterns and catching up

The regional disparities in Russia are increasing since transition started in the 1990s, as result of the structural processes of reorganisation and reallocations of resources taking place in the territory. The scopes of this contribution are two folds: to clarify the theoretical and policy background in analysing regional development in the transition and in particular in Russia, and to analyse the specificity of the spatial development and the regional disparities patterns in Russia. The economic geography is recognised among the different theories, very useful for helping to understand in particular the recent phenomena of new concentration pattern in Russia, giving a key of analysis of new polarisation trends: new trends toward urban concentrations in the Western regions, de-population of the Eastern regions, rural decline in those regions faraway from large urban agglomerations. In fact the empirical analysis indicates two dominant phenomena in the up-surging of regional disparities: the increasing weight of the capital city, Moscow as agglomeration effects brings the polarisation phenomena; and the strengthening of the natural resources and energy endowed regions. There is the question whether Russia, at this stage of development, can pursue an active regional policy toward equity targets or whether, for the target of sustaining macro-economic growth, there is the urgency to keep selected priorities based on the best performing poles. A difficult balance between the two targets would be the most suitable answer.     

Testing Explanations of Strategic Voting in Legislatures: A Reexamination of the Compromise of 1790

A difficult yet prevalent problem in legislative politics is how to assess explanations when observable actions may not represent true (and unobserved) legislator preferences. We present a method for analyzing the validity of theoretical/historical accounts that unifies theory, history, and measurement. We argue that approaches to testing accounts of legislative behavior which are theoretically and historically agnostic are not always best and present an approach which: (1) forms an explicit explanation of behavior (here a simple dynamic voting game) that yields estimable parameter constraints, and (2) tests these constraints using a customized empirical model that is as consistent as possible with the explanation. We demonstrate the method using legislative voting data from the first Congress (1789–1791). Using the idea of sophisticated equivalents from voting theory we subject the traditional account of the “Compromise of 1790” to a statistical test and find that there is reason to doubt the claim that legislators of the time believed the specified log roll was taking place. The results suggest that the capital location and assumption issues were resolved independently.     

Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina

Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low-performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975–83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low-achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown.