The Interplay of Adolescents’ Aggression and Victimization with Friendship and Antipathy Networks within an Educational Prosocial Intervention

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - How the interplay between peer relationships and behaviors unfolds and how this differs between classrooms is an understudied topic. This study examined whether...     

Modeling Other-Regarding Preferences and an Experimental Test

Behavior inconsistent with self-interest has beenobserved in many contexts. We argue thatmodels designed to cope with theseanomalies are inadequate to deal with avariety of social values. Our extension ofthe Fehr & Schmidt `inequity aversion'model is applied to results from dictatorexperiments in which the money to bedivided is generated by the efforts ofpaired individuals in either one or tworooms. This production leads to sharingbehavior qualitatively different from thatfound in other dictator experiments. Thepattern of sharing can be explained byentitlements, equity, and the credibilityof the experiment.     

Financial aspects of Chinese planning

Abstract

Economic policy in China is designed to serve the general political line. In their talks with me in April 1973, members of the Budget Bureau of the Ministry of Finance made it unmistakably clear that financial considerations are subordinate to economic ones, which in turn are determined by politics.     

Governing kidnap for ransom: Lloyd's as a “private regime”

Kidnap for ransom raises significant governance challenges. In the absence of formal regulation and enforcement, insurers have created an effective private governance regime to facilitate smooth commercial resolutions. Controlling ransoms is paramount: “supernormal” profits for kidnappers create kidnapping booms and undermine the market for insurance. Ransom control requires cooperation, but there are high transactions costs in enforcing a collusive agreement. The Coasean prediction is that a single firm will form to internalize the externalities arising from lax insurance and mismanaged ransom negotiations—or a government must order the market. There is indeed a single source of kidnap insurance: Lloyd's of London. Yet, within the Lloyd's market several insurers compete for business. Lloyd's is a club providing private governance: Its members issue standard contracts, follow the same regime for kidnap resolution, and exchange information to stabilize ransoms. Lloyd's, therefore, combines aspects of Coase's “single firm” and “government” solution to the externalities problem.