Sharing the benefits of biodiversity the Kani TBGRI deal in Kerala,India

Abstract

The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) concluded at the Earth Summit in 1992, mandates that where utilisation of the knowledge, innovations and practices of local and indigenous communities leads to benefits, such benefits shall be equitably shared with the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices. The study analyses some of the issues that have emerged in the context of a ‘benefit sharing exercise’ attempted by the Tropical Botanic Garden and Research Institute (TBGRI), a research institute based in Kerala, with the Kani tribals of Kerala, pursuant to the development of a pharmaceutical drug, based on the knowledge, information and natural resources that the Kanis have nurtured over many years.

As the case study illustrates, the debate on benefit sharing in the absence of other fundamental rights such as the rights to land, access to the resource and adequate governance structures becomes a limited and myopic exercise. A ‘fair and equitable benefit sharing mechanism’ would therefore call for certain basic pre‐conditions that will be discussed in the course of the study.     

Institutionalised Co-production: Unorthodox Public Service Delivery in Challenging Environments

In developing countries in particular, services are often delivered through unorthodox organisational arrangements that cannot simply be dismissed as relics of ‘traditional’ institutions, or as incomplete modern organisations. Some have emerged recently, and represent institutional adaptations to specific political and logistical circumstances. We need to expand the range of organisational categories that are considered worthy of study and develop a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of unorthodox arrangements. The concept of institutionalised co-production provides a useful point of entry. Institutionalised co-production is defined as: the provision of public services (broadly defined, to include regulation) through a regular long-term relationship between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions. We explain some varieties of institutionalised co-production arrangements; explore why they appear to be relatively so widespread in poor countries; and relate the concept to broader ideas about public organisation.     

Autonomy or organisation? Reforms in the Ghanaian internal revenue service

Autonomous Revenue Authorities (ARAs) have recently become a popular organisational reform to improve revenue collection in developing countries. The success of ARAs is commonly attributed to ‘autonomy’ which reduces political interference, and increases financial independence and managerial freedom. This article examines the case of the Ghanaian ARA – the Internal Revenue Service and argues that its strong performance is the result of not ‘autonomy’, but other more nuts and bolts reforms, specifically: (a) strategies designed to direct the focus of the IRS to different taxpayer segments, particularly the informal sector and (b) significant attempts to bring the tax administration closer to the taxpayer through decentralisation and improved taxpayer services. To the extent that autonomy enables ARAs to undertake these other reforms it forms an important piece of the picture, however, they do not require autonomy – they could well be adopted under traditional tax administrations. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Taxing the Informal Economy: The Current State of Knowledge and Agendas for Future Research

Abstract

This paper reviews the literature on taxation of the informal economy, taking stock of key debates and drawing attention to recent innovations. Conventionally, the debate on whether to tax has frequently focused on the limited revenue potential, high cost of collection, and potentially adverse impact on small firms. Recent arguments have increasingly emphasised the more indirect benefits of informal taxation in relation to economic growth, broader tax compliance, and governance. More research is needed, we argue, into the relevant costs and benefits for all, including quasi-voluntary compliance, political and administrative incentives for reform, and citizen-state bargaining over taxation.