Peter Ebsen, Emissionshandel in Deutschland

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Does Federalism Weaken Democratic Representation in the United States?

The framers of the U.S. Constitution explicitly designed federalismto enhance representation. Because powers are divided amongmultiple governments, citizens are able to exert pressure onthe elected officials of various governments in an effort toachieve desired outcomes. If one government is not doing whatcitizens prefer, they can seek it from a different government.This assumes that individuals form opinions about the functionsperformed by different governments. Given the complexity offederalism, this may be an unrealistic assumption for many citizens.Original survey data uniquely suited to explore this questionsuggest that citizens do behave in a fashion consistent withthe federalist framework. Moreover, the actual change in theassignment of functional responsibilities across governmentsbehaves as if it responds to public opinion.     

The European community software directive: The United Kingdom implementation

Conclusion The Regulations appear to have reinforced the protection available to software producers under United Kingdom law. The provisions of the Software Directive and the Regulations are complex and not without significant inconsistencies which are likely to prove to be a source of litigation. The drafters of the Regulations chose, unlike many of its European partners, not to adopt the wording of the Software Directive but to write their own interpretation, adding an element of uncertainty to the law in this area, which is perhaps inevitable bearing in mind the linguistic problems of translating and interpreting any directive coupled with the ambiguity and omission of definitions of several key terms. More important, however, than any academic argument will be the practical impact of the new law and its effectiveness in achieving its aim.     

Thinking land law differently: Section 70(1)(g) and the giving of meanings

Elements of this article first appeared in a paper given at the Hart Conference on Property, 1993.