Principle of Proportionality as Principle of Economic Efficiency

The principle of proportionality is at the cornerstone of EU law, and precisely of the case‐law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In the law and economics literature, the general principles of law are commonly opposed to legal rules in terms of efficiency. On the one hand, the legal formalistic approach consists of apprehending the law as principled, whereby principles of law do not and should not encompass an efficiency rationale and should be self‐sufficient. On the other hand, the legal nihilism denying the existence or relevance of the general principles of law favours legal rules that are said to incorporate an efficiency rationale. I intend to analyse the efficiency rationale of probably the most important general principles of EU law—the proportionality principle. In this paper, I shall assert that not only does the EU proportionality principle encapsulate an efficiency rationale, but most importantly, it has been interpreted by the ECJ as such—hence, I propose the representation of the principle of proportionality as a principle of economic efficiency. After having introduced the principle of proportionality (1), I shall decipher the proportionality principle both from a law and economics perspective, and from a comparative perspective (2). Then, I shall delve into the jurisprudence of the ECJ so that the judicial reasoning of the Court as this reasoning proves the relevance of the proposed representation (3). Finally, I conclude in light of the findings of this paper (4).     

Law and economics of the European multilingualism

The economics of language applied to multilingualism in the European Union (EU) has only recently come to the fore. Languages economics and Law and Economics disciplines both emerged in the 1960s. However, no study has, hitherto, linked these disciplines. This paper intends to fill that void. Language barriers are the last major remaining barriers for the EU??s ??single?? market. The lack of coordination of multilingualism in the EU stems from a taboo crystallized by a dilemma between economic efficiency and linguistic diversity??i.e., the maximization of wealth versus the maximization of utility. The EU Member States (MSs) do not hasten to coordinate their language policies at the EU level inasmuch as they overestimate the benefits of the current EU multilingualism while drastically underestimating its costs. Coordination shall occur when MSs evaluate the costs and benefits of the current EU multilingualism. This will uncover the aforementioned dilemma, that will only be resolved when both Law and Economics are applied. In pursuing this objective a ??Linguistic Coase Theorem?? adapted from the work of Parisi and the Nobel Prize winner, Ronald Coase is elaborated. Having outlined the basic notions deriving from the EU Law of Languages and the Economics of Languages (Introduction), the paper scrutinizes the costs and benefits incurred by the current non-coordinated EU multilingualism (Part I). Subsequently, a ??Linguistic Coase Theorem?? is elaborated in order to reach a Pareto-optimal outcome, thereby solving the dilemma??both economic efficiency and the linguistic diversity being enhanced (Part II).