Guilt Shall Not Escape or Innocence Suffer? The Limits of Plea Bargaining When Defendant Guilt is Uncertain

This article examines optimal prosecutor behavior with respectto plea bargaining when defendant guilt is uncertain. I showthat when jury beliefs and behavior are determined endogenouslyin equilibrium along with defendant and prosecutor behavior,plea bargaining can play only a limited role in managing society'sconflicting desires to maximize punishment of the guilty andminimize punishment of the falsely accused. In particular, whileit can be optimal for prosecutors to use plea bargaining toinduce a large fraction of guilty defendants to voluntarilysort themselves from the innocent, such sorting must come atthe cost of imposing relatively short sentences on such guiltydefendants who accept plea bargains.     

How Much Can We Trust Causal Interpretations of Fixed-Effects Estimators in the Context of Criminality?

Researchers are often interested in estimating the causal effect of some treatment on individual criminality. For example, two recent relatively prominent papers have attempted to estimate the respective direct effects of marriage and gang participation on individual criminal activity. One difficulty to overcome is that the treatment is often largely the product of individual choice. This issue can cloud causal interpretations of correlations between the treatment and criminality since those choosing the treatment (e.g. marriage or gang membership) may have differed in their criminality from those who did not even in the absence of the treatment. To overcome this potential for selection bias researchers have often used various forms of individual fixed-effects estimators. While such fixed-effects estimators may be an improvement on basic cross-sectional methods, they are still quite limited when it comes to uncovering a true causal effect of the treatment on individual criminality because they may fail to account for the possibility of dynamic selection. Using data from the NSLY97, I show that such dynamic selection can potentially be quite large when it comes to criminality, and may even be exacerbated when using more advanced fixed-effects methods such as Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW). Therefore substantial care must be taken when it comes to interpreting the results arising from fixed-effects methods.     

Measuring the Relationship Between Youth Criminal Participation and Household Economic Resources

Using data from the NLSY97, this paper re-examines the empirical relationship between household economic resources and youth criminal participation. Previous estimates of this relationship have often suggested this relationship to be quite weak or even non-existent. However, this analysis suggests that much of the strength of the relationship between household economic resources and youth criminal participation may be obscured due to non-linearities in this relationship, the fact that this relationship is isolated to crimes of a serious nature only, and especially because of measurement error with respect to measuring household economic resources. I show that adjusting for these issues substantially increases the estimated strength of this relationship. Indeed, the results in this paper show that the differences in serious criminal participation between youth from households in the upper parts of the income distribution and youth from households in the lower parts of the income distribution appear to be greater than the difference in serious criminal participation between genders.