Party and Gender Stereotypes in Campaign Attacks

Research on negative campaigning has largely overlooked the role of stereotypes. In this study, we argue that the gender and partisan stereotypes associated with traits and policy issues interact with a candidate’s gender and partisanship to shape the effectiveness of campaign attacks. We draw on expectancy-violation theory to argue that candidates may be evaluated more harshly when attacks suggest the candidate has violated stereotypic assumptions about their group. Thus, attacks on a candidate’s “home turf,” or those traits or issues traditionally associated with their party or gender, may be more effective in reducing support for the attacked candidate. We use two survey experiments to examine the effects of stereotype-based attacks—a Trait Attack Study and an Issue Attack Study. The results suggest that female candidates are particularly vulnerable to trait based attacks that challenge stereotypically feminine strengths. Both male and female candidates proved vulnerable to attacks on policy issues stereotypically associated with their party and gender, but the negative effects of all forms of stereotype-based attacks were especially large for democratic women. Our results offer new insights into the use of stereotypes in negative campaigning and their consequences for the electoral fortunes of political candidates.     

Reconciling Sexism and Women’s Support for Republican Candidates: A Look at Gender,Class, and Whiteness in the 2012 and 2016 Presidential Races

Political Behavior - Much of the gender gap literature focuses on women’s greater average liberalism relative to men. This approach masks considerable heterogeneity in political identity and...     

On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide

On the face of it the 1948 Convention on Genocide appears tobe a treaty that on the one hand obliges contracting statesto criminalize and punish genocide in their domestic legal systemsand, on the other, arranges for interstate judicial cooperationfor the repression of genocide. The International Court of Justice(ICJ), in the Bosnia v. Serbia judgment, has instead held thatthe Convention, in addition to providing for the criminal liabilityof individuals, also imposes on contracting states as internationalsubjects a set of obligations (to refrain from engaging in genocide,to prevent and punish the crime, and also to refrain for allthose categories of conduct enumerated in Article III: conspiracy,incitement, attempt, complicity). This approach raises two questions:(i) is it warranted so to broaden states' responsibility? (ii)when applying such Article III categories to state responsibility,should an international court such as the ICJ that pronounceson interstate disputes rely upon criminal law categories toestablish whether a state incurs responsibility for conspiracy,complicity, and so on? Or should it instead forge autonomouslegal categories better suited to state responsibility? Theauthor sets forth doubts about whether it is appropriate totranspose criminal law categories to the corpus of internationallaw of state responsibility. In particular, his misgivings relateto the category of ‘state complicity in genocide’as set out by the Court: once the Court decided to transplantthis criminal law category to state responsibility, arguablyit should have relied upon the rigorous concept of complicity,as derived by international criminal courts from case law andthe relevant practice of states, rather than apply a notionthat finds no basis in international criminal law, in comparativecriminal law or in state practice.     

Reflections on International Criminal Justice

Judge Cassese presents arguments in favour of the use of international courts in order to punish war crimes. He argues that the application of justice through a court is better in certain circumstances than amnesties. He examines the merits of international courts rather than national courts, but acknowledges that at present there are several major stumbling blocks to an effective international criminal justice system.     

On Some Merits of the Israeli Judgment on Targeted Killings

The recent judgment by the Israeli Supreme Court on targetedkillings is a landmark decision in many respects. Its main meritlies in trying to give precision to, and therefore make concretelyapplicable by the belligerents, some loose standards of internationalhumanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities. In particular,the judgment is significant because (i) it concluded that theissue of targeted killings did not amount to a non-justiciablequestion, (ii) it suggested a novel and imaginative way of narrowingdown the vague scope of imprecise international rules on methodsof combat, and in addition (iii) it set out a range of measuresthat belligerents must take both before and after armed attacksagainst civilians participating in hostilities, so as to avoiddamage to innocent civilians as far as possible. The measuresauthoritatively suggested in the judgment may serve both toturn some unclear international rules into workable standardsof conduct, and also to open the way to the possible prosecutionof individuals (superiors and subordinates) who do not complywith such standards.     

The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability in internationalcriminal law is a concept widely upheld by international caselaw. It has, however, been harshly attacked by commentators,particularly with regard to what has come to be known as the‘third category’ of the notion, that of liabilitybased on foreseeability and the voluntary taking of the riskthat a crime outside the common plan or enterprise be perpetrated.This author considers that while most criticisms are off themark, at least two are pertinent: (i) that the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamberin Tadi (1999) was wrong in indiscriminately using terminologytypical of both the civil law and common law tradition, and(ii) that the foreseeability standard, being somewhat looseas a penal law category of culpability and causation, needssome qualification or precision. Generally speaking, the notionof JCE needs some tightening up. For instance, in Kvoka, anICTY Trial Chamber rightly stressed that the contribution ofa participant in a common criminal plan must be ‘substantial’(the Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed to some extent in thesame case). Furthermore, with specific regard to the third categoryof JCE, the author, after setting out the social and legal foundationsof the foreseeability standard and the motivations behind itsacceptance in international criminal law, suggests various waysof qualifying and straightening it out. One of them could liein assigning to the ‘primary offender’ (i.e. theperson who, in addition to committing the concerted crimes,also perpetrates a crime not part of the common plan or purpose)liability for all the crimes involved, while charging the ‘secondaryoffender’ with liability for a lesser crime, wheneverthis is legally possible. The author then suggests, contraryto a 2004 decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Branin, thatthe third category of JCE may not be admissible when the crimeother than that agreed upon requires special intent (this appliesto genocide, persecution as a crime against humanity, and aggression).In such cases, the other participants in JCE could only be chargedwith aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the ‘primaryoffender’ if the requisite conditions for aiding and abettingdo exist. The author then suggests that the view propoundedin 2004 by an ICTY Trial Chamber in Branin is sound, namelythat the general notion of JCE may not be resorted to when thephysical perpetrators of the crimes charged were not part ofthe criminal plan or agreement, but rather committed the crimesunaware that a plan or agreement had been entered into by anothergroup of persons. In conclusion, he contends that this qualifiednotion of JCE, in addition to being provided for in customaryinternational law, does not appear to be inconsistent with abroad interpretation of the provision of the ICC Statute governingindividual criminal responsibility, that is, Article 25, inparticular 25(3)(d).