Hans Kelsen's Normativist Reductionism

Abstract. This paper discusses Kelsen's attempt at reducing the concept of subjektives Recht (what is subjectively right) to that of objektives Recht (what is objectively right). This attempt fails, it is argued, because in Kelsen's theory the concept of subjektives Recht survives concealed within the concept of individual norm (individuelle Norm), a norm that, pace Kelsen, is not a case of what is objectively right (objektives Recht) but is precisely what is subjectively right (subjektives Recht): We could call it “what is individually right.”     

Models of Reason, Types of Principles and Reasoning. Historical Comments and Theoretical Outlines

Abstract. The author distinguishes between scientific and prudential reason (practical wisdom) in Aristotle with reference to the nature of the principles assumed as premises, and to the method of inference. In the history of thought these two models of reason are elieved not only to be proper to science and, respectively, ethics, but also, at times, to be the scientific model proper to ethics (for example, in natural law doctrines) and the prudential model proper to science. Mixed models are also given in the history of thought: scientific-prudential (for example, in Thomas Aquinas) and prudential-scientific. Furthermore, some aspects of the relationship between authority and reason are examined.     

I Will Tell You about Axel Hägerström: His Ontology and Theory of Judgment

In this paper I set out to read Hägerström through his own eyes, adhering to the terminology he uses in his own original work and attempting to make sense of the variance and uniformity alike that one finds in his linguistic usage. The translations we have of Hägerström's works are quite liberal, using the same word in English where the original uses different ones, and, vice versa, using different words in English where the original uses a single one in different contexts. These misleading translations of Hägerström have contributed in some measure to Hägerström's reputation for obscurity. Further, and most importantly, I will take seriously what Hägerström says about his own thought, namely, that it is dependent on that of Kant and independent of the currents of thought contemporary with Hägerström. In Section 1 , I will briefly take up the problem of consciousness that Hägerström proceeds from, and will recall something that Bertrand Russell once said, in 1928, in regard to the revolt staged in the early 20th century in Europe against German idealism. In Sections 2 and 4.1 , I will instead take up Kant for the purpose of clarifying Hägerström's theory of judgment as treated in Section 3 . In Section 4.2 , I will illustrate the difference between the notions of nothing, R‐reality, and W‐reality in Hägerström. In Sections 5 and 6 , I will examine the analysis that Hägerström offers of the principle of contradiction, and will summarize the three types of judgment he singled out, including the type he called impossible judgment (or, in my own words, pseudojudgment). In Section 7 , I will consider Hägerström views as grounding, in a transcendental way, the presupposition of the primacy of the external spatio‐temporal world, a world independent of our representations: I will consider in particular the W‐real complexes that are merely represented, as well as the spatio‐temporal world as the only W‐real complex that is not merely represented. Finally, in Section 8 , I will briefly consider some of those who have commented and translated Hägerström, this to conclude that R‐reality and W‐reality are coextensive but not synonymous.     

A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence

Abstract. “The Notebook Corner,” edited by Enrico Pattaro, makes its first appearance here as a new section of Ratio Juris. This new section can be described in a sense as an offshoot of the project for A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, a work still in progress composed of five theoretical volumes and six historical ones. The theoretical volumes receive a brief presentation in the paper immediately below, with a specific focus on Volume 1, entitled The Law and the Right: A Reappraisal of the Reality That Ought to Be. This volume is then discussed as well by Rosaria Conte and Cristiano Castelfronchi in the second paper of this “Notebook Corner”.