Tarasoff in Missouri: The jurisprudence of a mental health provider's duty to warn and protect non-patients of potential risks from patients

In 1976, the Supreme Court of California issued its well-known Tarasoff Principle. From this principle, other courts found a duty to warn, and some found more than just a duty to warn, a duty to protect. As courts in other states adopted a version of the Tarasoff Principle, they issued a wide variety of third-party liability rules. In light of the dynamic, everchanging Tarasoff jurisprudence in the United States and recent relevant appellate court opinion in Missouri, a timely updated summary and update of Tarasoff-related jurisprudence in Missouri is warranted. In the present analysis, we compiled the four appellate court decisions that pertained to the questions of Tarasoff-like third-party liability in the State of Missouri: Sherrill v. Wilson (1983), Matt v. Burrell (1995), Bradley v. Ray (1995), and Virgin v. Hopewell (2001). We reviewed all legal measures for clinicians to protect nonpatients in Missouri, not just those that relate to protecting nonpatients from violence as in a Tarasof-like scenario. Thus, this paper concisely provides a compendium of such options and allows for a meaningful comparison of which legal, protective measures are mandatory and which are permissive, thereby evoking the question of whether measures of protecting nonpatients from a patient's violent acts ought to be mandatory duties or permissive application of professional judgment.     

Protecting Journalists’ Sources Without a Shield: Four Proposals

Journalists’ right to protect the identities of their confidential sources relies on an inconsistent set of court decisions based on constitutional and common law interpretations and state statutes. Efforts to bring some consistency to federal law through the passage of a shield law have stalled while journalists face new threats because of the vulnerability of their communications to discovery and monitoring by third parties. Also, the entry of non-professional communicators into the news ecosystem is causing courts to reevaluate and redefine long-standing protections. This article proposes four ways that sources could be better protected from unmasking without the passage of a shield law: improving whistleblower laws to better protect people who report illegal or unethical actions to the media; vastly reducing the number of government secrets to make “leaking” less attractive or necessary; changing legal strategy to focus on protecting the anonymity of sources instead of the rights of journalists to keep secrets; and more widespread and intelligent use of encrypted applications and software could all improve the security of journalistic sources. Because of the complexity of amending multiple whistleblower protection laws and changing the government’s document classification system, the article argues that the best solutions may be to persuade news organizations to change legal tactics and to use better encryption technology.     

Regulating technology: Can administrative agencies cope with technological change?

The debate over scientific issues has made a difficult transition from the scientific community to the public-polity process. The traditional view of scientists undertaking “pure” science in their laboratories did not envision government intervention into scientific and technological discovery through administrative agency regulation of risks associated with the results of such research. Yet examples of government regulation of technological risks abound as the nation grapples with nuclear power issues, new-drug testing, and environmental issues, to name a few. This paper considers whether the presently constituted regulatory apparatus is capable of responding to dramatic advances in technology in a timely and effective way. Concluding that it is not, the paper examines the circumscribing characteristics of the regulatory process. Then it discusses alternate approaches for regulating the risks posed by science and technology without doing too much violence to due process or the notion of public participation in the regulatory function.     

Patient termination of a life-sustaining medical device: Suicide or natural death?

Medical technology has made tremendous strides in extending the lives of patients who have suffered organ failure. Machines can now replace the function of the kidneys, the heart, and other vital organs. Much has been written about a patient's right to refuse or direct the withdrawal of medical treatment, especially at the end of life, under the guise of “death with dignity.” However, little attention has been paid to the situation where a patient elects to deactivate their life-sustaining medical device without a physician's involvement. This raises the challenging question of whether the patient's manner of death should be classified as suicide or natural. Surprisingly, common law, statutes, medical ethics, and public health practice are not in alignment on the answer. This article will explore the ramifications and far-reaching impact that such divergence has on the survivors and the medical community, as well as recommend corrective actions and practical approaches for the medical and legal practitioner.